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When trial is viewed less in terms of discerning past events, and more
in terms of shaping future events, several apparently troublesome
aspects of the existing system’s treatment of evidence tampering gain
substantial justification, and the way is paved for a more fruitful
evaluation of current doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Headlines periodically remind us that the production of evidence
is a game whose rules can be broken. In the 1980s, Oliver North
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destroyed key documents during the Justice Department’s Iran1
Contra investigation. In the 1990s, President Clinton lied under oath
about his involvement with White House intern, Monica Lewinsky.2
In the early 2000s, Arthur Andersen shredded trunkloads of auditrelated documents during an SEC inquiry into Enron’s special
purpose entities.3
In fact, according to many judges and practitioners, evidence
tampering4 is hardly confined to blockbuster events.5 Documents that
should be produced in response to a discovery request are regularly
shredded, altered, or suppressed. Witnesses frequently lie to
investigators, deposers, and courts. Fact finders are routinely misled
by the fabrication or destruction of evidence.
Academic analysis of evidentiary foul play, however, is far from
common. On the evidence scholar’s bookshelf, a few lonely volumes

1. See Quotations of the Day, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1989, at A2 (“‘When the time came for
Oliver North to tell the truth, he lied. When the time came for Oliver North to come clean he
shredded, he erased, he altered. When the time came for Oliver North to let the light shine in,
he covered up.’—John W. Keker, prosecutor.”).
2. Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1121–1125 (E.D. Ark. 1999); RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY §
55-1, at 772–73 n.4 (2002).
3. Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Misread Depths of the Government’s Anger, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2002, at A1; see also Indictment at 5–8, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, No.
CRH-02-121 (S.D. Tex. filed Mar. 7, 2002).
Since this Article was written, domestic icon Martha Stewart and her broker, Peter Bacanovic,
were convicted of obstruction of justice, perjury, and related offenses in connection with
Stewart’s fortuitous sale of Imclone stock. Constance Hays & Leslie Eaton, Stewart Found
Guilty of Lying in Sale of Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at A1; see also Superseding
Indictment, United States v. Stewart, No. 03 Cr. 717 (MGC) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2004).
4. This Article uses the term “evidence tampering” to refer to the full range of activities
by which parties alter the natural evidentiary “emissions” of the transactions and occurrences
that may give rise to suit. Some of these activities add to the set of natural emissions. These
include fabricating documents or things, or lying to investigators, deposers, or the court. Other
activities reduce the set of natural emissions. These include destroying or preventing the
creation of documents and things, or bribing witnesses not to testify. As discussed in detail in
Part II, not all of these activities are subject to sanction under current law. Indeed, there is a fine
line—if any line at all, in principle—between some of these activities and the legitimate
“production” evidence. See, e.g., Chris W. Sanchirico, Relying on the Information of Interested—
—and Potentially Dishonest——Parties, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 320, 320–41 (2001)
(emphasizing the importance of the probabilistic dependence of evidence presentation costs—
and by extension, evidence destruction costs—to regulating out-of-court behavior).
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this Article, I take as given that there is much to be said about
the regulation of evidence tampering without first resolving this definitional boundary problem.
5. See infra Part I.

080304 SANCHIRICO.DOC

2004]

9/17/2004 2:04 PM

EVIDENCE TAMPERING

1219

6
on perjury, obstruction, and spoliation hide among numerous tomes
on hearsay, character, privilege, experts, and the like. An
uncharitable assessment might characterize the field as more
concerned with whether the declarant herself testifies than with
whether what she says is truthful. To be sure, rules prohibiting
hearsay are often said to be designed in part to prevent foul play.7 But
notwithstanding sideways glances of this sort, evidence tampering has
been something of a Medusa in evidence scholarship. Though
recognizing its presence, the field has largely been reluctant to stare
directly at the problem.
Among the few scholars who have investigated the web of rules
that police evidence tampering, the most common reaction might be
characterized as dismay. Some distillation reveals that this response is
largely inspired by two perceptions regarding the current system.
First, commentators perceive a dissonance between the apparent
epidemic of evidence tampering, on the one hand, and the leniency of
8
the rules prohibiting such behavior on the other. Second,
commentators view the practical prohibitions that do exist as myopic,
given the almost exclusive focus of these prohibitions on tampering
directly connected to specific ongoing or imminent litigation. Such
rules, it is argued, merely encourage parties to shift their manipulative
behavior “upstream” toward the underlying transaction or occurrence
and away from specific litigation, with little or no impact on the
9
problem.
This Article allies itself with the small existing literature on
evidence tampering in viewing the topic as worthy of far more
attention than it receives. It parts company with that literature,
however, in proposing that the dismay expressed in previous
scholarship may well be misplaced. It contends that such dismay is
more the result of a conceptual imbalance regarding the object of
evidentiary process than an indication that the current system is in a
state of fundamental disrepair.

6. The term “spoliation” most commonly refers to the destruction or alteration of
documents, though its meaning may also encompass a broader range of activities. See Jay E.
Rivlin, Note, Recognizing an Independent Tort Action Will Spoil a Spoliator’s Splendor, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1003, 1004 n.2 (1998).
7. See, e.g., GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 180–81
(1996) (listing exposing deception as a purpose of cross-examination and a basis for the hearsay
rule).
8. See infra notes 52–96 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 119, 360, and accompanying text.
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The imbalance concerns the ex ante versus ex post purposes of
law. Regarding law’s ex ante function, one need not look far for
explanation or justification. When it comes to analyses of the
“substantive law,” the idea that legal rules set incentives for everyday
behavior—incentives to perform as contracted, to disclose accurate
financial information, to take reasonable precaution, to adopt a safe
product design, to eschew physical violence—occupies a central
10
position. In recent decades, the importance of this ex ante approach
has only increased, as law and economics has become ever more
11
assimilated into legal scholarship. In the modern teaching of torts,
contracts, or criminal law, explicit reference to how such legal rules
influence behavior is de rigueur.
At the same time, the study of the essential informational link
between the substantive law and the day-to-day behavior that it
supposedly regulates—namely, evidentiary process—retains a
predominantly ex post perspective. Most analyses of evidence law
take litigation’s prime object to be the discovery of truth about past
events.12 The role that evidence law plays alongside the substantive
law in shaping truths that have yet to materialize receives scant

10. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 378–79, 422–23 (1994) (citing deterrence as the
primary rationale for tort law among mainstream legal scholars).
11. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 1–3 (3d ed. 2000)
(providing evidence of the influence of economics on legal scholarship).
12. See, e.g., William Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, 47 MOD. L. REV. 261, 272
(1984) (stating that according to the “dominant underlying theory of evidence . . . the primary
end of adjudication is rectitude of decision”). With specific relation to evidence tampering, see
JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 1.11, at 14 (1989) (“The most
obvious and perhaps the strongest justification for restricting the destruction of evidence is that
destruction reduces the likelihood that the judicial process will reach accurate results.”); John
H. Beckstrom, Destruction of Documents with Federal Antitrust Significance, 61 NW. U. L. REV.
687, 689 (1966) (discussing the truth-finding benefits of a statute requiring businesses subject to
federal antitrust laws to retain certain documents for a period of time to help prevent document
destruction); Dale A. Nance, Missing Evidence, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 831, 832, 881–82 (1991)
(arguing that law’s response to the “missing evidence” problem evinces its primary concern with
trial accuracy); Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need
for Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 793 (1991) (“[Spoliation] is a form of
cheating which blatantly compromises the idea of the trial as a search for the truth.”); Dale A.
Oesterle, A Private Litigant’s Remedies for an Opponent’s Inappropriate Destruction of Relevant
Documents, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1187–88 (1983) (analyzing document destruction in light of
increased truth-finding and litigation costs); Lisa C. Harris, Note, Perjury Defeats Justice, 42
WAYNE L. REV. 1755, 1755 (1996) (“[T]he crime of perjury is the antithesis of truth that is the
ultimate objective of the judicial system.”).
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attention. Oddly, this is largely true even among the few economicsoriented scholars who study evidence.14

13. To be sure, the fact that the ex post perspective predominates the study of process does
not mean that it reigns in isolation. Nearly all proceduralists are willing to admit a place for
“deterrence” in the pantheon of social policy objectives by which they take the measure of
doctrine. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 1.11, at 15 (“[D]estruction of evidence
strikes indirectly at . . . utilitarian goals served by [substantive law].”). But whereas the social
objective of truth-finding has finely chiseled features following generations of careful attention,
“deterrence” remains more or less a block of stone.
Several authors have challenged the dominance of ex post truth-seeking by advocating
for alternatives other than primary activity incentive setting. See, e.g., LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN
GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 59–60, 67–73
(1996) (arguing that aspects of evidence law difficult to reconcile with the consequentialist goal
of accurate trial outcomes are well explained by recourse to deontological concerns regarding
the path taken to reach such outcomes); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A
DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 3 (1984) (emphasizing the importance of dispute resolution rather
than truth-seeking in the adversary system); Mirjan Damaska, Truth in Adjudication, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 289, 303–04 (1998) (discussing how a focus on lawmaking in legal proceedings
reduces the importance of fact-finding accuracy); David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to
Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2–3
(1986–87) (pointing to trial’s role in producing social and individual “catharsis,” achieved
through visceral satisfaction with legal process); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On
Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1358, 1359, 1373, 1378
(1985) (arguing that the purpose of judicial process is to induce individuals to internalize the
instruction of the law and, to this end, to produce “acceptable verdicts,” which are not
necessarily “probable verdicts”).
14. See, e.g., Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the Information of Interested
Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18, 30 (1986) (analyzing the incentive to omit evidence and positing
truth revelation as the policy objective); see also Luke M. Froeb & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Naive,
Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence?, 12 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 257, 257 (1996) (arguing that the legal system is likely to generate unbiased estimates of
liability and damages despite the jury’s naiveté and initial bias); Daniel L. Rubinfeld & David
E.M. Sappington, Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings, 18 RAND J.
ECON. 308, 309 (1987) (analyzing standards of proof and positing as the social objective the
minimization of the sum of loss-weighted false convictions, loss-weighted false acquittals, and
the litigation effort of defendants); Joel Sobel, Disclosure of Evidence and Resolution of
Disputes: Who Should Bear the Burden of Proof, in GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF
BARGAINING 341, 351–59 (Alvin Roth ed., 1985) (analyzing a model in which maximizing social
welfare is equivalent to minimization of loss-weighted trial error plus evidence costs).
In the law review literature, see, for example, Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Richard
Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice
and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 313, 381 (1991):
Under a theory of adjudication that emphasizes deterrence, [an] unskewed increase in
favorable and unfavorable information presented ought to improve the tribunal’s
ability to distinguish desirable from undesirable conduct. This in turn increases
expected sanctions for those who act undesirably at the same time that it decreases
sanctions for those who act desirably.
and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477,
1480–84 (1999), which posits trial error minimization as the goal of evidence law.
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This Article suggests that the sizable gap between how the
system actually regulates evidentiary foul play and how
commentators believe it should is largely the result of the fact that the
literature’s treatment of litigation’s ex ante purpose is
disproportionately cursory compared to the prominence of this
purpose in actual system design. In particular, the Article shows that
both sources of scholarly consternation regarding evidence
tampering—the law’s apparently Neronian attitude toward evidence
tampering, as well as the supposedly myopic approach of the steps it
does take—are more easily reconciled with an approach to evidence

There are exceptions. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Legal Error,
Litigating and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 99, 99–100 (1989) (examining
the relationship between deterrence and truth-finding); see also Louis Kaplow, The Value of
Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 312–14 (arguing that
when there is perfect information about whether an accident has occurred, there is no incentive
difference between charging the injurer with the harm that she expected to cause or the harm
that she actually did cause, even though the later assessment of damages is in a sense more
accurate); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 191, 192, 194, 201–02 (1996) (claiming that “accuracy in assessment of harm cannot
influence the behavior of injurers . . . to the degree that they lack knowledge of the harm they
might cause when deciding on their precautions”); Chris W. Sanchirico, Character Evidence and
the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1259–63 (contrasting “trace evidence” and
“predictive evidence” and arguing, in the context of character evidence, that the use of
“predictive evidence” at trial, though helpful for truth-finding, may be harmful for primary
activity incentive setting); Chris W. Sanchirico, Games, Information and Evidence Production:
With Application to English Legal History, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 342, 342–43 (2000)
(extending the model in Sanchirico, supra note 4, to examine the trade-off between the “fixed”
and “variable” evidentiary costs of litigation); Sanchirico, supra note 4, at 320 (modeling “the
role of evidence production in the regulation of private behavior via judicial and administrative
process”); Joel Schrag & Suzanne Scotchmer, Crime and Prejudice: The Use of Character
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 319, 319–24 (1994) (finding that the optimal
threshold quantum of evidence for guilt is systematically lower when the object is taken to be
error minimization, rather than maximal deterrence); Chris W. Sanchirico, Enforcement by
Hearing: How the Civil Law Sets Incentives (Columbia Economics Dep’t, Discussion Paper No.
95-9603, 1995) (first circulated version of model in Sanchirico, supra note 4); Chris W.
Sanchirico & George Triantis, Evidentiary Arbitrage: The Fabrication of Evidence and the
Verifiability of Contractual Performance 2–4 (Sept. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (questioning the emphasis on “verifiability” in contract scholarship),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/99030901.pdf?abstractid=10033.
Note that a sizable portion of the economic analysis of procedure does ground itself in the
goal of setting incentives for everyday behavior. However, this literature is not concerned with
the issue of how claims are proven; most models simply posit exogenous probabilities for
possible trial outcomes. Rather, the focus of this research program is on other aspects of
litigation, such as filing and settlement behavior. See generally ROBERT BONE, BONE’S CIVIL
PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003) (surveying major advances in the
economics of civil procedure).
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law that emphasizes setting “primary activity” incentives rather than
discerning past primary activity behavior.
Consider first the law’s purportedly lackadaisical attitude toward
tampering. Determining whether the law devotes an appropriate
amount of energy to the problem of evidence tampering requires
understanding the social costs and benefits of enforcing evidencetampering law.
The social costs of anti-tampering enforcement, which are well
16
understood by scholars in this area, are roughly the same whether
one takes the purpose of process to be truth-finding or primary
activity incentive setting. Accordingly, such costs do not play a
leading role in distinguishing these two approaches. Nor, therefore,
do they play a leading role in this Article. Nonetheless, it is important
to bring these costs to the fore upfront, to take off the table the
notion that more enforcement is always better under any approach.
Such social costs consist essentially of the costs of running a
second layer of legal process to adjudicate behavior, not in the
17
primary activity, but in the primary layer of legal process.
18
Prosecuting a litigant for obstructing her primary prosecution for
narcotics trafficking, for instance, requires diverting prosecutorial
resources away from other offenses, including narcotics crimes. The
obstruction defendant, in addition, will divert private resources away
from potentially productive activity toward her second-layer defense.
And society must then pause to entertain arguments and evidence on
each of the several elements of the obstruction crime. Likewise,
imposing sanctions for the destruction of evidence under either
specific procedural rules19 or the court’s “inherent power”20 requires
holding secondary hearings to determine whether evidence was in
fact destroyed, and if so, its likely content, the destroyer’s state of

15. Following common usage, I use the term “primary activity” to refer to the underlying
transaction or occurrence that may give rise to litigation.
16. See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1187 (analyzing the effect of evidence destruction
on litigation costs); GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.11, at 96 (describing the costs of
hearings on evidence tampering).
17. Indeed, the costs of policing tampering accrue in a theoretically infinite regress, as was
hinted at when the government recently indicted a witness for perjuring himself in Martha
Stewart’s trial for perjury, obstruction, and related offenses. Jonathan D. Glater, Stewart Stock
Case is Jolted by Charge That an Agent Lied, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A1.
18. See infra Part II.A.1.
19. See infra Part II.B.1.
20. See infra Part II.B.2.
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mind, and the extent to which the destruction prejudiced the other
21
side.
Unlike the social costs of policing and punishing evidence
tampering, the social benefits of these activities differ markedly
depending on whether one takes a truth-finding or primary activity
approach. These different benefits are the subject of Part III. As
explained therein, truth-finding benefits come primarily from two
sources: the deterrence of tampering and the ability to rectify trial
outcomes when those tamperers who are not deterred are caught in
22
the act. In contrast, and somewhat counterintuitively, the main
primary activity benefit of increasing anti-tampering enforcement
derives from the fact that such enforcement worsens the prospect of
ending up as a litigant who still finds the tampering worthwhile.23
These different sources of social benefit lead to different views of
24
the appropriate intensity of anti-tampering enforcement. The truthfinding benefits of increasing anti-tampering enforcement turn out to
have a self-enhancing quality: the greater the current level of
enforcement, the greater the incremental benefits of additional
enforcement.25 This quality is largely inconsistent with a middling
level of enforcement effort. Were the truth benefits of increasing antitampering enforcement up to a middling level worth the social cost,
so too would be increasing enforcement from a middling level to a
26
high level. In contrast, the primary activity benefits of antitampering enforcement are self-dampening: the more we increase
anti-tampering enforcement, the less reason there is to continue to
increase it.27 It follows that from a primary activity perspective, the
law’s seemingly halfhearted approach may well be appropriate.28
The Article’s discussion of general enforcement effort centers on
this distinction between self-enhancing truth benefits and selfdampening primary activity benefits. But, in fact, expressions of

21. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.11, at 96 (recounting a case where the
hearing to determine whether the spoliator knew that the destroyed documents were relevant
“lasted 23 days and generated 3,000 pages of transcript, approximately 2,000 pages of
depositions introduced into evidence, and thousands of pages of documentary exhibits”).
22. See infra Part III.A.3.
23. See infra Part III.A.4.
24. See infra Part III.B.
25. See infra Part III.B.2.
26. See infra Part III.B.3.
27. See infra Part III.B.1.
28. See infra Part III.B.3.
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dismay regarding the law’s laissez-faire attitude toward evidence
tampering implicate not just the general intensity of enforcement, but
also the methods of enforcement employed. Here too, as explained in
Part III, the implications of the primary activity approach are both
distinct from those of the truth-finding approach and better aligned
with current law.29
First, in creating a given level of legal risk for the potential
tamperer, the primary activity approach provides less of a reason than
the truth-finding approach to emphasize the frequency with which
tampering is detected, as opposed to the size of the sanction
imposed.30 And indeed, though it may be that only a small proportion
of tamperers are caught under the current regime—as is often
31
32
claimed —when they are caught, punishments can be severe.
Second, in the event that tampering is uncovered, there is less
reason under the primary activity approach than under the truthfinding approach to correct litigation outcomes that have already
33
been skewed as a result of the tampering. This may help explain the
law’s otherwise dismaying reluctance to make such ex post
corrections under current law.34
The second source of scholarly dismay with evidence tampering
law is commonly characterized not as a problem of lax enforcement,
but as a problem of focus—myopia, to be specific. As noted, the law
tends to penalize evidence tampering only when it occurs far
downstream in the flow from primary activity through filing,
discovery, and trial.35 After challenging conventional explanations for
this enforcement regularity, Part IV of this Article puts forward an
alternative explanation founded on how the private benefits of
evidence tampering change along the course of litigation.
The point of departure in Part IV is the suggestion that our
system of fact-finding is remarkably inscrutable when viewed from an
upstream perspective. A manufacturer of dangerous products, for
example, may have little sense ex ante of precisely which evidentiary
emissions will end up as damaging evidence in future lawsuits.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.C.1–2.
See infra Part III.C.3.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.C.1–2.
See infra Part III.C.3.
See infra Part II.
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Exacerbating this uncertainty is the fact the plaintiff is in large
measure free to meet her burden of persuasion however she prefers—
using whatever combination of evidentiary offerings she chooses.
Whatever its drawbacks along other dimensions, the ex ante
inscrutability of fact-finding lowers the private benefits of evidence
tampering. When one is less able to predict whether a given piece of
evidence will be decisive in future litigation, the benefits of tampering
with it are reduced.36
Clearly, however, the evidentiary lay of the land comes into
sharper focus for the parties as they head toward trial. By the time
they pass through process’s lower reaches, therefore, tampering is no
longer as effectively discouraged by the system’s erstwhile
inscrutability. Consequently, other more direct devices—like
spoliation inferences, discovery sanctions, or the threat of obstruction
charges—become necessary to fill the growing regulatory void.37
These are the main substantive points of the Article. But before
turning to their detailed exposition, some clarifying remarks on scope
and methodology are in order.
After scarcity, the second most notable feature of scholarship on
evidence tampering is fragmentation.38 In general, the few scholars
39
who have written in the area write on either perjury, or evidence
40
41
destruction, or missing witnesses, or some other isolated genre of
manipulation. Very few treat the problem of evidence manipulation
42
generically.
But despite the inevitable sacrifice of detail and the necessity of
spanning several fields of legal scholarship, there is arguably much to

36. See infra Part IV.A.
37. See infra Part IV.C.
38. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum & Stephen J. Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of
the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1191–92 (1987) (criticizing “doctrinal
isolationism” even within the specific rules governing evidence destruction).
39. See, e.g., Rebecca Kislak & John J. Donoghue, Perjury, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 957
(1999).
40. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12; MARGARET M. KOESEL ET AL.,
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN
CIVIL LITIGATION (2000).
41. See, e.g., Robert H. Stier, Jr., Revisiting the Missing Witness Inference—Quieting the
Loud Voice from the Empty Chair, 44 MD. L. REV. 137 (1985).
42. Exceptions include Joseph M. Livermore, Absent Evidence, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 27 (1984),
who considers simultaneously missing witness instructions, use of weaker evidence when
stronger evidence is available, and the failure to create or preserve evidence, and Nance, supra
note 12, who deals with “missing evidence” generically.
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be gained from an integrated treatment, if only because the potential
evidence manipulator is likely also to take a holistic approach,
viewing fabrication, destruction, suppression, coercion, bribery, and
the like as potential substitutes and complements. This Article
specifically attempts to parallel the manipulator’s integrated
approach.
Accordingly, the Article is forced to make the requisite sacrifices
to doctrinal detail, both generally throughout, and also specifically, by
focusing on the regulation of evidence tampering as it affects civil
litigation in federal district court between private parties. This focus
certainly does not insulate the project from administrative or criminal
law, since these may be implicated by private suit behavior. But it
does, nonetheless, bound the topic. Not considered herein, for
example, are the special constitutional issues surrounding the
destruction of evidence by police and prosecutors.43
Second, a remark on method. Following Professor Nesson, who
44
in turn takes his lead from Justice Holmes, this Article measures
anti-tampering law by its effect on the behavior of the “bad person”:
the person who makes a coolly “rational” assessment of whether
shredding, fibbing, or forging furthers her selfish interests, with no
serious consideration of the ethical implications of her behavior.
Nesson justifies designing doctrine according to its effect on the
“bad” based on the risk that market evolutionary forces will
otherwise drive out the “good.”45 The choice of a similar approach in
this Article derives in part from Nesson’s concern, but also from an
additional consideration that goes more to incidence than evolution.
Even if it were determined, contrary to Nesson’s hypothesis, that an

43. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, §§ 6.1–6.25, at 205–48 (discussing the
problems that arise when evidence is destroyed by prosecutors or police in criminal
proceedings).
44. See Nesson, supra note 12, at 795:
Holmes tells us to consider the law from the vantage of a “bad man” who cares only
for the material consequences of his actions . . . . Unlike good men and women who
are influenced by conscience, the bad man is unmoved by soft considerations of ethics
and morality except as they translate, through the actions of others, into bottom line
effects.
(citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897)).
45. See id. at 805:
I do not believe that lawyers are stereotypically Holmesian bad men, or that the law
should assume that they are. But neither are they saints. Many lawyers will consider
these incentives and succumb to the powerful temptation to spoliate. And once some
lawyers begin to serve their clientele through spoliation, the marketplace will force
others to follow suit.
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evolutionarily stable majority of litigants behave legally and
46
ethically, a system not specifically designed to guard against the
minority who manipulate it would be a system that essentially taxes
the ethical to subsidize the unethical.
A final point on methodology. Although this Article is concerned
with explaining existing law, the object here is not to provide just-so
stories for existing doctrine. In the first place, the justifications for
existing law that are provided apply only to the broadest contours of
the law in this area. A large set of interesting (though arguably
secondary) issues are left aside. Secondly, as the reader will see, the
analysis herein is less a justification than a suggestion to revise the
justifying criteria—by shifting the focus from truth-finding to primary
activity incentive setting.
That said, the Article does argue for this revision of justifying
criteria specifically by making the case that the implications of the
primary activity approach fit better with existing doctrine. This
reflects the methodological conviction that it is in some cases
legitimate to discipline legal analysis by treating as a “rebuttable
presumption” the proposition that the basic outline of existing law
makes sense.
Anchoring the analysis in existing law may be especially justified
when it comes to evidence tampering, where the gap between what
the law is and what most scholars believe it should be has been so
persistent over time. Modern treatments of evidence tampering may
well entice the reader with the claim that the problems of spoliation
and perjury have become much more serious in recent years. But, in
fact, researchers in this area have been making similar claims of
urgency for at least the last five decades. In what remains one of the
most thoughtful (and undervalued) treatments of document
destruction, Professor Beckstrom, writing in 1966, warns of the
growing prevalence of document “retention” policies (twice as many
47
at U.S. corporations in 1961 as in 1957), discusses the existence of
firms specializing in the “storage” of business documents,48 considers
46. Behavioral law and economics offers compelling evidence that some portion of the
population is indeed “fair-minded.” See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer & Richard H. Thaler,
Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 209 (1995); Ernst Fehr & Simon
Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 159
(2000) (documenting that “many people deviate from purely self-interested behavior in a
reciprocal manner”).
47. Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 688–89.
48. Id. at 714.
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49
the impact of data processing and computer science, and attests to
the growing prevalence of document destruction in antitrust settings.50
Things have certainly changed since 1966. But the gap between
scholarship and practice is apparently not one of them.
The rest of the Article is organized as follows. Parts I and II
critically assess the two above-mentioned sources of scholarly dismay
on their own terms. In particular, Part I examines the dual empirical
proposition that the law is lackadaisical in policing evidence
tampering and that such tampering is commonplace in actual process.
Part II assesses the claim that what practical prohibitions exist are too
exclusively focused on activities directly connected in time and effect
to specific ongoing or imminent litigation. Because of the nature of
these respective claims, Part I concerns mainly data, Part II mainly
doctrine. Taken together the two parts also serve as a general review
of evidence tampering in law and practice, an exercise justified,
perhaps necessitated, by the dearth of attention devoted to evidence
tampering in scholarship to date.51
Parts III and IV contrast the primary activity and truth-finding
approaches to the two sources of scholarly unease. Part III concerns
the law’s purportedly lackadaisical attitude. Part IV addresses the
law’s apparently myopic approach. Concluding remarks and a
technical appendix complete the Article.

I. THE LAW’S NERONIAN ATTITUDE: DATA
Commentators who approach evidence tampering from a truthfinding perspective find the legal regime lackadaisical and myopic.
This Part of the Article investigates the empirical basis for the first of
these concerns, breaking it down into two separate claims: that
evidentiary foul play is rampant and that the law has been looking the
other way.
The findings on both claims are mixed. On the one hand, both
enjoy surprising unanimity among experts in the field. On the other
hand, however well grounded in personal experience, both are
unsupported by systematic empirical investigation. Data is often
cited, to be sure. But a peek behind the numbers reveals their lack of
reliability and relevance.
49. Id. at 714–15.
50. Id. at 768–69.
51. Readers who wish to move quickly to the Article’s main points, however, can focus on
the summaries in Sections I.C. and II.E.
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The Part ends with a consciously forced assessment of the
empirical landscape and a resolution to move forward provisionally,
accepting for the purpose of argument that the legal regime
regulating evidence tampering is running far short of full tilt.
A. Is Legal Process Burning?
1. Impressionistic Evidence. Impressionistic evidence that
tampering is unexceptional is easy to come by. On the topic of
fabrication, Federal District Judge Marvin H. Shoob remarks that
“people would be shocked if it were truly known how many witnesses
lied under oath in a court of law every day.”52 Milwaukee prosecutor
E. Michael McCann, former chair of the ABA Section of Criminal
Justice, provides the vivid metaphor that “if perjury were water, the
people in civil court would be drowning.”53 Chief Judge Richard A.
Posner of the Seventh Circuit notes that “[i]t is not unusual for one
judge to say to another that he or she has just presided at a trial at
which several of the witnesses were obviously lying.”54
Regarding evidence destruction, the leading treatise on the topic
similarly notes:
During the course of our work, many litigators privately confided to
us that, at some point in their careers, they suspected or were
confronted with the fact that documents were deliberately destroyed
by their clients or their opponents. Public confirmation of these
55
suspicions was not hard to find.

In sum, the assertion that evidence tampering is a common
56
occurrence is at least itself a common pronouncement.
52. Mark Curriden, The Lies Have It, 81 A.B.A. J. 68, 69 (1995).
53. Id. at 70.
54. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT,
AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 147 (1999); see also Richard H. Uviller, Credence,
Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 813
(1993) (“All guilty defendants who choose to testify will lie on the stand about anything that
might improve their chances and about which they imagine they can be persuasive.”).
55. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, at ix.
56. See, e.g., KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at xi (“Spoliation of evidence is an unfortunate
reality of modern-day civil litigation.”); Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 715 (“[W]illful document
destruction in antitrust settings has been revealed in a number of cases, and from this fact alone
it is reasonable to speculate that, as with an iceberg, this is only a sample of what is below the
surface.”); Steven M. Cohen, What Is True? Perspectives of a Former Prosecutor, 23 CARDOZO
L. REV. 817, 817–18 (2002) (arguing as a former Assistant U.S. Attorney that witness
cooperators often lie to police); Curriden, supra note 52, at 70 (quoting a prominent trial judge
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2. Systematic Empirical Analysis. But for a phenomenon that
everyone seems to think happens all the time, tampering remains
57
surprisingly elusive in systematic empirical analysis. The few
empirical findings mentioned in the literature are often carelessly
58
employed and, on closer inspection, ultimately inconclusive.
Consider, first, the two most frequently cited studies.
a. Looking for Mr. Pepke. In support of the claim that
spoliation is a pervasive problem, several recent law review articles
cite to a survey conducted, apparently circa 1991, by “Harvard Law
59
Professor Charles R. Nesson.” Nesson’s survey, these articles
as saying that perjury “is so widespread and pervasive that it has become a major concern
among trial judges”); id. (quoting a state trial judge as saying: “I think there is an element out
there beginning to realize that you can walk into court, take the oath, lie up a storm, and not
have to worry about being punished for it, even if you are caught.”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A
New Antidote for an Opponent’s Pretrial Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct at Trial
as an Admission by Conduct of the Weakness of the Opponent’s Case, 1993 BYU L. REV. 793,
794 (1993) (“The general consensus is that misconduct is widespread during discovery.”);
Nesson, supra note 12, at 793 (“It is impossible to know precisely how common spoliation is
today. Interviews and surveys of litigators suggest a prevalent practice.”); Steffen Nolte, The
Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying Principles, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 351, 353 (1995)
(“Destruction or spoliation of evidence in civil litigation has undermined the integrity of the
adversary system.”); Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1186 (“The naked truth is that many
corporations purposefully operate programs to destroy evidence.”); Harris, supra note 12, at
1777 (“[P]erjury in the courtrooms continues to skyrocket seemingly out of control.”); Laura
Mansnerus, Lying Rampant in Civil Suits, but Prison for Lying Is Rare, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
1998, at A22 (“[L]egal experts agree that in ordinary civil suits, lying is rampant . . . .”).
Even sources that explicitly advise against tampering also implicitly indicate that it is a
frequent occurrence. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 18.1, at 381 (advising against
evidence destruction while also stating that “[p]ersons under investigation for tax violations
often . . . panic and take steps to ‘fix’ the case against them by [evidence tampering]” (emphasis
added)); Laurie Kindel & Kai Richter, Spoliation of Evidence: Will the New Millennium See a
Further Expansion of Sanctions for the Improper Destruction of Evidence?, 27 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 687, 710–11 (2000) (repeatedly warning about the sanctions for evidence destruction
and also providing advice on how to prevent seemingly inevitable tampering by the other side).
57. See Curriden, supra note 52, at 69 (“Perjury is an evasive issue that has been subject to
little, if any, formal research. Nor are there adequate statistics on perjury prosecutions and
convictions.”); Nesson, supra note 12, at 793 (“It is impossible to know precisely how common
spoliation is today.”).
58. Cf. STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD
CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 55–72 (1989)
(contrasting casual empirical claims about the impact and operation of Rule 11 to actual data
for the Third Circuit); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of
Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1393, 1396 (1994) (questioning empirical evidence on “alleged massive discovery abuse in the
federal courts”).
59. Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold, Spindle or Mutilate: The Trend Towards Recognition of
Spoliation as a Separate Tort, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 39 (1993) (“One survey completed by
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explain, established that “50% of all litigators found spoliation to be
60
either a frequent or regular problem.”
In fact, Nesson conducted no such survey, let alone in the early
1990s, as the opening lines of his cited article reveal. Although
61
Nesson does cite a similar statistic, his supporting footnote refers the
62
reader to a 1985 article by Professor Rhode. What is more, the
statistic that Nesson recites concerns not “spoliation,” but “unfair and
inadequate disclosure of material information prior to trial.”63
A perusal of the Rhode article confirms that Rhode conducted
no such survey either, let alone circa 1985. Instead, Rhode cites to an
unpublished manuscript by “S. Pepke” cautiously entitled “Interim
Report and Preliminary Findings,” laying out the results—which one
must conclude are “preliminary”—of a study conducted circa 1983.64
Rhode, like Nesson, reports that the survey question concerned
65
“unfair and inadequate disclosure” rather than “spoliation.”

Harvard Law Professor Charles R. Nesson, concluded that 50% of all litigators found spoliation
to be either a frequent or regular problem.” (citing Nesson’s 1991 article, Nesson, supra note 12,
at 793)); Rivlin, supra note 6, at 1001 n.4 (“See Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold Spindle or
Mutilate . . . (commenting on a survey completed by Harvard Law Professor Charles R.
Nesson)”; Kindel & Richter, supra note 56, at 706 (stating that “one survey has found that fifty
percent of all litigators now consider spoliation to be either a frequent or regular occurrence,”
and citing, without signal, solely to Nesson’s 1991 article); KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at xiv
(supporting the same statistic with only a “see” citation to Nesson’s 1991 article, Nesson, supra
note 12).
60. Spencer, supra note 59, at 39.
61. Nesson, supra note 12, at 793.
62. Id. at 793 n.1 (citing Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37
STAN. L. REV. 589, 598–99 (1985)).
63. Id. at 793 (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 589, 598–99 (1985)). The linguistic distinction between “spoliation” and “unfair and
inadequate disclosure prior to trial” is potentially significant. Although the term “spoliation” is
in some usages broadly defined, neither Rivlin nor Spencer employ a particularly broad
definition. See Rivlin, supra note 6, at 1004 (defining spoliation as “the failure to preserve
property for another’s use as evidence in pending or future litigation”); Spencer, supra note 59,
at 38 n.4 (adopting a prior author’s definition of “spoliation” as when a person “destroys,
mutilates, or alters evidence, and thereby interferes”) (quoting Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation,
Intentional Spoliation of Evidence, Interfering With Prospective Civil Action, as Actionable, 70
A.L.R. 4th 984, 986 (1989)). Even so, potential differences remain between even the broadest
meaning of “spoliation,” on the one hand, and “unfair and inadequate disclosure,” on the other.
Plumbing the depths of these linguistic distinctions at this point would, nonetheless, be
premature—for there were several more switches in this game of telephone.
64. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 599
n.30 (1985) (citing “S. Pepke, Standards of Legal Negotiations, Interim Report and Preliminary
Findings (1983) (unpublished manuscript)”).
65. Id. at 598.
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As it turns out, there is no “S. Pepke” in the legal literature.
66
Further investigation reveals, however, that there is an S. Pepe who
did indeed conduct a survey of litigators, and among the
“preliminary” findings listed in his “interim report” was something
resembling the 50 percent figure that is so frequently cited.67 Pepe’s
results were never published in final form,68 and his “interim report”
leaves unanswered several important questions about how the survey
69
was conducted.
Nonetheless, the “interim report” does make clear that Pepe’s
often cited finding was neither about spoliation, as asserted by recent
articles, nor about “unfair and inadequate” disclosure, as asserted by
both Rhode and Nesson. Rather, the phenomenon that 50 percent of

66. Typographical errors of this sort, though regrettable, are inevitable and
understandable. Whether those who continue to cite this statistic are conducting a reasonable
inquiry under the circumstances is open to question.
67. STEVEN D. PEPE, STANDARDS OF LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS: INTERIM REPORT AND
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 3 (1983) [hereinafter PEPE, REPORT] (on file with the Duke Law
Journal); Steven D. Pepe, Summary of Selected Findings of the Study on the Standards of Legal
Negotiations 16 (date unknown) [hereinafter Pepe, Summary] (unpublished manuscript on file
with the Duke Law Journal). The study was conducted “[i]n conjunction with the American Bar
Foundation and the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.” PEPE,
REPORT, supra, at cover page. The interim report describes itself this way:
The following is a summary of preliminary findings of the Study on the Standards of
Legal Negotiations. These preliminary findings were drawn from responses by 1034
litigation attorneys from the State of Michigan and 1513 from large law firm litigators
throughout the country as well as 256 state judges, 75 federal judges, and 128
law professors . . . .
Id. at 1. (emphases added).
The focus of the survey was attorney behavior during pretrial negotiation, but several
questions dealt specifically with discovery itself. The survey consisted of two parts. First, the
respondents were asked questions about a hypothetical fact pattern and the ensuing settlement
negotiation scenario. Steven Pepe, Standards of Legal Negotiations, Appendix to PEPE,
REPORT, supra (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (questionnaire
relating to PEPE, REPORT, supra). Second, the respondents were asked general questions about
their own experiences regarding, inter alia, pretrial disclosure. Id. According to the report, the
average respondent was a 37-year-old attorney who had spent seven years doing a substantial
amount of litigation. PEPE, REPORT, supra, at 2.
68. Cf. Steven D. Pepe, Professional Responsibility in Pretrial Discovery—A Tale of Two
Cities, MICH. B.J., Mar. 1985, at 298, 300 (mentioning the findings only in passing); Steven D.
Pepe, Standards of Legal Negotiations: Interim Report for ABA Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards and ABA House of Delegates, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 206–08 (3d ed. 1985) (excerpting Pepe’s interim report and
preliminary findings, but not including the result cited by Rhode, supra note 64, at 598–99, 599
n.30).
69. For example, there is little information in the interim report on sampling methods and
response rates.
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Pepe’s litigators regarded as a regular or frequent problem was
70
“unfair or inadequate disclosure.”
The distinction between “and” and “or” is as important as the
distinction between “Pepe” and “Pepke.” Had half the respondents
stated that they found pretrial disclosure regularly or frequently to be
both “unfair and inadequate,” one could conclude that half found
disclosure regularly or frequently to be, inter alia, “unfair.” If “foul” is
the opposite of “fair,” then perhaps “unfairness” represents the kind
of evidentiary foul play whose prevalence those who cite the statistic
mean to establish. But because Pepe’s survey respondents were
talking about “unfair or inadequate,” one cannot rule out the
possibility that some, or even all of the 50 percent thought that only
“inadequacy,” and not “unfairness,” was a regular or frequent
problem.
The difficulty with this, in turn, is that “inadequate” is not a selfdefining term. “Inadequate for what?” is the begged question. From
what can be gleaned from Pepe’s “interim report,” each respondent
was free to provide her own tacit answer.71 Some respondents may
well have interpreted “inadequate” to mean “inadequate for my
opponent to meet the requirements of law” or “inadequate for her to
meet her ethical obligations.” But some or all respondents might just
have meant “inadequate for my side to win the case” or even
“inadequate for my side to win without having had to try so hard.”
In the end, therefore, perhaps all that can be concluded from this
elusive twenty-year-old study—this detached root of the most
commonly cited empirical finding on evidence tampering—is that the
average attorney circa 1980 would have liked to have known more
about her opponent’s case.
70. See PEPE, REPORT, supra note 67, at Appendix (containing a copy of the survey
questionnaire, which poses the question at issue in the second part); id. (describing the two parts
of the survey, entitled “Discovery Problems & Negotiations,” phrasing the question thus: “In
your practice do you experience the problem of unfair or inadequate disclosures of material
information during pretrial stages of litigation? Seldom if ever, Occasionally, Regularly,
Frequently, Not applicable or do not know” [emphasis added]); see also Pepe, Summary, supra
note 67, at 3 (noting that a majority of litigators in both samples experience unfair or inadequate
disclosure of information as a regular and commonplace problem).
Note, however, that in the summary discussion in PEPE, REPORT, supra note 67, Pepe
uses “and” rather than “or” in relation to this question (though, arguably, this choice is not
incorrect in the specific context in which it appears). Id. at 3 (“When asked about problems of
unfair and inadequate disclosure of material information pretrial . . . 51% of the [n]ational
respondents felt that this was a regular or frequent problem.” [emphasis added]). This may help
to explain later confusion regarding the actual wording of the questionnaire.
71. See PEPE, REPORT, supra note 67; Pepe, Summary, supra note 67.
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b. Brazil Survey. Another frequently cited statistic derives
from Professor Brazil’s questionnaire-guided interviews of 180
73
Chicago area litigators in 1979. Based on responses to “open-end
questions, plus complaints attorneys volunteered at other times
74
during the interviews,” Brazil reports that 61 percent of his sample
“mentioned” the problem of “evasive responses, withholding
75
information, or noncompliance” in connection with discovery.
Brazil’s survey was a pioneering effort. Yet, as empirical support
for the prevalence of evidence tampering—one of the survey’s
frequent employments—it has several drawbacks. First, Brazil’s
aggregate statistics, the only statistics that are cited in the evidence
tampering literature, are of questionable value given Brazil’s
sampling technique. As Brazil explains,
[a]lthough the method used to select the attorneys to be interviewed
would not produce a statistically representative sample of Chicago
litigators, it was designed to . . . permit comparison of the attitudes,
76
perception and experiences of differently situated litigators.

Brazil’s study is perhaps best viewed as a series of parallel surveys,
one for each cohort of similarly situated litigators. Even if each cohort
taken individually was properly sampled, it would be a mistake to
assume that the simple concatenation of these parallel surveys
produces a proper sample of the full population. By way of analogy
one might properly survey one hundred randomly chosen individuals
from each state in order to compare attitudes across states. But
simply aggregating these individuals into a sample of five thousand
would provide an inaccurate sense of national attitudes. Rhode
Island, for example, would be oversampled relative to California.
Second, Brazil’s study, like Pepe’s, raises serious definitional
issues. The phenomenon whose prevalence is surveyed appears to be
too broadly and ambiguously defined to distinguish it from the
general pursuit of self-interest in pre-trial process. What range of
activities is covered by the disjunction, “evasive responses,
withholding information, or noncompliance”? What portion of the 61
72. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendments; Nesson,
supra note 12, at 793 n. 2; Rivlin, supra note 6, at 1004 n.5.
73. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 790 (1980).
74. Id. at 824.
75. Id. at 825 fig.14.
76. Id. at 791 (emphases added).
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percent is attributable to each? Does “withholding information”
include failing to volunteer damaging information to the other side?
Does an “evasive response” include answering the question precisely
as asked, rather than giving the opponent-questioner the benefit of
the doubt? Brazil’s own discussion of the definition of “evasion”
confirms the breadth of meaning connected to even this single
77
element of his trio.
Brazil’s 61 percent finding regarding “evasive responses,
withholding information, or noncompliance” inspires what has
become one of the most frequently quoted passages of his article:
[A]mong the lawyering practices targeted for blame, none
commanded more negative attention than the redoubtable art of
evasion . . . . [I]t would be difficult to exaggerate the pervasiveness
of evasive practices or their adverse impact on the efficiency and
effectiveness (for information distribution) of civil discovery.
Evasion infects every kind of litigation and frustrates lawyers in
78
every kind of practice.

Given that this statement apparently applies not to evasion per se but
to “evasive responses, withholding information, or noncompliance,”
and given the definitional problems with the term “evasion” alone,
this is a potentially misleading summary of Brazil’s results.
Reattached to the actual survey results that inspired it, this oftenquoted excerpt may signify only that litigating parties act strategically
within the confines of the rules governing discovery.79
77. See id. at 829:
The term “evasion” as used here is incapable of precise definition but embraces
several kinds of reportedly widespread practices. The most obvious is the habit of
manipulating the definitions of opponents’ words, interpreting their interrogatories,
document demands, or deposition questions as narrowly, broadly, or selectively as
possible for the purpose of serving a client’s adversarial interests . . . . The term
“evasion” also refers to more direct forms of resistance to disclosure, for example,
refusing to respond in any way to discovery probes or intentionally withholding some
evidence that is clearly sought and discoverable . . . .
In fact, “several attorneys made it clear that evasion, at least in the form of seeking out and
taking advantage of ambiguities, oversights, or other errors in the way opponents phrased
discovery probes was, so far from being unethical, a clear duty of the responsible advocate.” Id.
at 838.
78. Id. at 828–29 (referring to the 61 percent statistic in his figure 14, id. at 825 fig.14).
79. Note also that this finding regarding evasion mostly concerns interrogatories. See id. at
829–30. (“Lawyers commonly associated the problem of evasion with interrogatories, the only
one of the rule-created instruments of discovery that a sizable number of attorneys (50 of 177;
28 percent) identified by name as a principal source of difficulty.”).
Another finding concerning “evasion” appears elsewhere in the study. Brazil asked
lawyers to compare the existing system to a “frictionless system of sharing information in which
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When Brazil does ask directly about “lack of candor or bad faith
80
by the opposing party or attorney,” the results are less dramatic.
Respondents reported on average that such practices impeded
81
discovery in 14 percent of their cases.
Yet, at the same time, Brazil does provide impressionistic
evidence that foul play is far more prevalent than this. He reports, for
instance, one litigator’s view that “’manufacturing evidence for
82
parties is so common it would shock the average person.’” And so, in
the end, Brazil’s study, though it fails to provide systematic evidence
of tampering, does in effect provide evidence of the juxtaposition
between the paucity of firm evidence and the prevalence of firmly
held impressions.
c. Other Studies. Other empirical research in this area is also
problematic. One can still find mention of a study by Arther and Reid
in which almost 90 percent of parties in a large sample of paternity
suits admitted after trial that they lied under oath when subsequently
83
confronted with a lie detector test. But this study was conducted in
1954. And the very fact that it is still wheeled out to certify the
prevalence of perjury in modern process may itself be some indication
of the scarcity of contemporary empirical support. Moreover, as is too
rarely noted, the study appears to have been sponsored in some
responding parties made good faith efforts to understand and satisfy the requests of
propounding parties.” Id. at 834. Brazil finds that every lawyer in his sample stated that “evasive
and incomplete” answers had impeded discovery at least once. Id. at 835. Arguably, however,
this unanimous response is merely the result of his having posed a “frictionless system” as the
benchmark.
80. Id. at 838. There were also definitional difficulties with “lack of candor.” Brazil reports
that the attorney/respondents were not sure whether lack of candor meant “dishonesty” or
“evasiveness.” Id. In “later interviews” (Brazil does not say what portion) the attorneys were
instructed to include just unethical behavior. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 838 n.80; see also id. at 855 n.105:
A few attorneys even admitted having [lied]. One said, e.g., that he and a client
simply decided not to acknowledge the existence of clearly discoverable information
because to do so would have been disastrous for the client’s case . . . . Another
attorney intimated that it was not beyond the pale “even [to] lie about temporarily
losing a document.”
83. Richard O. Arther & John E. Reid, Utilizing Lie Detector Techniques to Determine the
Truth in Disputed Paternity Cases, 45 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 213, 215 (1954);
see Franklin E. Zimring, Commentary, What Is the Aim of Criminal Law? Is it Selective
Prosecution to Deter Wrongdoing or an Inflexible Moralist Standard?, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1999,
at B9 (citing Arther & Reid, supra); Robert Cooter & Winand Emmons, Truth-Bonding and
Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 2 (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (same).
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capacity by a company that stood to profit from the general use of lie
84
detector tests.
Beckstein and Gabel’s 1980 survey of the ABA’s Antitrust Law
85
Section is occasionally cited to support the proposition that evidence
destruction is widespread.86 Respondents were asked to indicate “the
frequency with which you encounter [various] compliance practices
87
among corporations.” Two of these practices are of interest here.
First, respondents were asked about “policies that reduce
88
historical records.” Roughly half said that they had often or always
encountered such practices. More than three quarters said they had
89
encountered such practices at least sometimes. As with survey
questions posed by Pepe and Brazil, this question seems too broadly
worded to support the conclusion that evidence tampering is
prevalent. The category “policies that reduce historical records”
presumably includes not only last-minute shredding, but also truly
routine document management.
Consistent with the possibility that such policies need not qualify
as tampering are participants’ answers to a second question
concerning converse practices. The survey asks about the prevalence
of “policies to preserve information on intent, sources of competitive
information, etc.”90 Here, roughly 30 percent said that they often or
always encounter such practices among corporations, while almost 70
91
percent said that they at least sometimes encounter such practices.
84. Arther & Reid, supra note 83, at 213 (opening with a two-paragraph editor’s note
detailing the management positions of both authors at John E. Reid and Associates, “an
organization specializing in lie detection”); id. at 214–15 (indicating that results come from “a
six-year study of the 312 disputed paternity cases handled at the Chicago laboratory of John E.
Reid and Associates”); see also www.reid.com (last visited February 26, 2004) (website for John
E. Reid and Associates, “established 1947,” offering polygraphs services).
85. Alan R. Beckenstein & H. Landis Gabel, Antitrust Compliance: Results of a Survey of
Legal Opinion, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 459 (1982).
86. See, e.g., Solum & Marzen, supra note 38, at 1183 & n.418 (citing the Beckenstein &
Gabel study in support of the proposition that “[t]he routine destruction of documents, often
accomplished through formal ‘document management’ programs, has become commonplace”).
87. Beckenstein & Gabel, supra note 85, at 489.
88. Id. at 493.
89. Id.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. Id. To be sure, careful empirical research in the broad area of litigation has flourished
over the last two decades. Yet, this has benefited the analysis of evidence tampering only
indirectly. Most of the attention has been focused on proving, disproving, or qualifying the claim
that the costs of pretrial discovery—incurred legitimately or otherwise—are disproportionate to
what is at stake in most litigation. See, e.g., James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management:
Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 636
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3. Summary. On the issue of whether legal process is ablaze
with evidentiary foul play, any attempt at metanalysis is largely
abortive. Studies by Pepe, Brazil, and others laid aside, no results
appear to survive preliminary screening, leaving nothing to
synthesize. At the same time, an informal “survey” of statements in
the legal literature regarding the prevalence of evidentiary foul play is
unusually conclusive. It appears to be as difficult to find a
commentator who thinks evidence tampering is under control as it is
to find systematic empirical evidence confirming its ubiquity.
B. Is the Law Fiddling?
Although commentators are in accord that evidence tampering is
92
93
commonplace and that this is a lamentable state of affairs, they do
(1998) (finding that the “parade of horribles” that dominates the debate over discovery is
confined to a minority of cases); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery
and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 531
(1998) (“[F]or most cases, discovery costs are modest and perceived by attorneys as
proportional to parties’ needs and the stakes in the case.”). These researchers did occasionally
ask about foul play, but not in a way that confirms or dismisses anecdotal evidence on the topic.
For example, in studying the efficacy of mandatory disclosure under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26, one study found that “lawyers report that when disclosure is done on a
mandatory basis, it is full disclosure for 50% of the cases and pro forma disclosure for the
remaining half of the cases.” Kakalik et al., supra, at 679. With regard to requests for the
production of documents and things under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34, another study
found that:
[D]ocument production . . . . is the activity for which the highest percentage of
attorneys reported problems in their case (44%). The most frequently reported
problems with document production were failure to respond adequately (28% of
those who engaged in document production) and failure to respond in a timely
fashion (24%).
Willging et al., supra, at 540.
92. See supra Part I.A.1.
93. See Nesson, supra note 12, at 793 (“Spoliation is an effective, and, I believe, a growing
litigation practice which threatens to undermine the integrity of civil trial process. It is a form of
cheating which blatantly compromises the ideal of the trial as a search for truth.”); Nolte, supra
note 56, at 353 (“Destruction or spoliation of evidence in civil litigation has undermined the
integrity of the adversary system, thus raising serious public policy concerns.”); Oesterle, supra
note 12, at 1188 (“[E]xisting laws on the consequences of document destruction are too lenient.
The standards defining illegal destruction are too permissive, and the penalties attaching to
illegal acts are largely toothless.”); Solum & Marzen, supra note 38, at 1086 (“[T]he strict
controls being developed by many courts are justified. In particular, truth and fairness to
litigants support restrictions on evidence destruction even though the inefficiency of wideranging document preservation and concern for individual rights and privacy suggest boundaries
beyond which destruction of evidence should not be controlled.”); Harris, supra note 12, at
1779–1802 (arguing for the need to revamp the legal system’s approach to perjury, discussing
the reasons why perjury has been able to “infect the system of justice,” and finding the reason to
be that its “contagion has gone unchecked”).
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not always agree on what aspect of the legal system is to blame. Some
emphasize the leniency of the rules as written—including the relevant
criminal statutes, procedural rules, evidentiary rules, and codes of
94
professional responsibility. Others fault the lack of enforcement by
95
96
prosecutors, judges, and attorney disciplinary boards.97 Ultimately,
94. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1188 (arguing that “existing laws on the consequences of
document destruction are too lenient”). But see Nesson, supra note 12, at 806 (“I do not believe
that the remedy to the problem is to strengthen and clarify the rules. Existing rules are more
than adequate . . . . From reading the rules of discovery, one would think that spoliation is a
question the law has taken very seriously.”).
95. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 5.1, at 170 (“[C]riminal convictions have been
obtained only for destruction of evidence pertinent to criminal proceedings, not civil actions,
and then only for selective rather than routine destruction.”); KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at
69 (noting that limited prosecutorial resources prevent prosecution of spoliation in private
lawsuits); Kindel & Richter, supra note 56, at 700 (“[T]he threat of criminal prosecution for
spoliation of evidence in the civil arena appears to be more theoretical than real . . . . [given] no
reported criminal convictions [arising from] civil litigation.”); Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1202–
03 (“Either private parties do not complain . . . or federal prosecutors do not prosecute those
complaints that are reported.”); Solum & Marzen, supra note 38, at 1106 (“The threat of
criminal prosecution for evidence destruction in civil litigation . . . appears to be more
theoretical than real. Our research revealed no criminal convictions for destroying evidence in
civil litigation. Indeed, we have discovered only one reported government investigation of
document destruction in a private lawsuit.”); Uviller, supra note 54, at 813 n.84:
Not only are witnesses rarely prosecuted for perjury, but criminal defendants are
virtually exempt (which they doubtless know). . . . [I]f a defendant is acquitted, only
the most vindictive prosecutor will take a second shot at proving his lost cause by the
perjury route. The barrier is not the Double Jeopardy Clause, but rather the prudent
balance of discretion and valor.
Kristin Adamski, Comment, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Courtroom: Spoliation
of Evidence in Illinois, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 346 (1999) (“[T]here are no cases where a
party was criminally convicted for the spoliation of evidence in civil litigation.”); Harris, supra
note 12, at 1777 (suggesting that despite “severe regulations . . . few [perjury] offenders . . . are
ever punished”). But see Richard F. Ziegler & Seth A. Stuhl, Spoliation Issues Arise in Digital
Era, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 16, 1998, at B9 (“It’s not easy to go to jail because of discovery abuse in
civil litigation, but it can happen.”).
96. See Nesson, supra note 12, at 806–07:
[I]n practice, judges are extremely reluctant either to expose discovery violations or
to punish discovery violations once exposed, applying the rules instead in ways that
minimize or avoid the problem . . . . Whatever the motivation, the resulting judicial
behavior sends a message to every litigator: the rules against spoliation will not be
seriously enforced.
Uviller, supra note 54, at 813 n.84 (“Not only are witnesses rarely prosecuted for perjury, but
criminal defendants are virtually exempt (which they doubtless know). If convicted, their
fruitless perjury may induce some judges to add a small increment to their . . . sentence . . . .”).
But see GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.1, at 66 (citing approximately fifty cases as
evidence that “discovery sanctions are fast emerging as an effective tool against inappropriate
destruction of evidence”).
97. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1219 (“[V]ery few charges are brought and few
convictions are obtained against lawyers who counsel or assist clients in the illegal destruction of
documents.”); Harris, supra note 12, at 1770:
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however, this too has been a battle of competing impressions. As with
the question of whether evidence tampering is commonplace, the
question of what the law does to address the problem has been the
subject of little systematic empirical analysis.
This is not to say, of course, that statistics are rarely deployed.
The public debate surrounding President Clinton’s impeachment is a
case in point. For a brief time, the lax enforcement of perjury became
98
newsworthy. The New York Times and other news outlets began
reporting that in 1997 only about ninety of the nearly fifty thousand
99
filed felony cases—roughly .2 percent—were on charges of perjury.
But then the news pendulum swung the other way, and the
100
possibility that these claims were exaggerated became the story. The
In spite of the frequency with which lawyers are admittedly involved in perjury,
formal complaints against attorneys for perjury or suborning perjury filed by state
attorney disciplinary boards represent only a fraction of the annual charges filed
against attorneys. For example, in Michigan, from the years 1982 through 1994, of
approximately 2,700 formal complaints filed by the grievance administrator against
attorneys, only seven involved attorney perjury or suborning of perjury.
(footnotes omitted).
This regularity may not apply to sitting lawyer/presidents acting as private litigants. In
addition to facing sanctions under the discovery rules, President Clinton was suspended from
the Arkansas Bar for five years and was fined $25,000. See ROTUNDA, supra note 2, § 55-1, at
772–73 (stating that, under some circumstances, “a lawyer may be disciplined for wrongful
conduct even though she was not acting in her capacity as a lawyer while she was engaging in
the wrong”).
98. See Dennis Cauchon, Perjury Charges Rarely Brought in Civil Cases, USA TODAY, Jan.
29, 1998, at 5A (“Kenneth Starr can indict former White House intern Monica Lewinsky for
perjury if there is evidence that she lied in a civil case. But, in practice, such prosecutions are so
rare that bringing charges would raise questions of whether Lewinsky had been unfairly singled
out for prosecution.”); id. (“(Perjury) charges are brought very, very, very infrequently in these
types of cases.” (quoting Ronald Woods, a defense attorney and former U.S. attorney in
Houston)); Mansnerus, supra note 56. (“[L]egal experts agree that in ordinary civil suits, lying is
rampant and prosecution for lying is rare. There have been at most a few dozen published court
decisions over the last decade that concern perjury and civil cases, though the total number of
prosecutions could be considerably higher.”).
99. See Cauchon, supra note 98 (“In 1996, only 86 of the 42,436 criminal defendants
convicted in federal court were found guilty of perjury, encouraging perjury or bribing a witness,
according to U.S. Sentencing Commission statistics.”); William Glaberson, Testing of a
President: Legal Issues; In Truth, Even Those Little Lies Are Prosecuted Once in a While, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1998, at A1. (“One statistic on perjury prosecutions has been widely circulated
since the President’s supporters began arguing that perjury was little more than a technicality
seized upon by his enemies: Of 49,655 cases filed by Federal prosecutors last year, only 87 were
for perjury.”). For the most recent federal statistics on perjury, contempt, and obstruction, see
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 2000 (2002).
100. Compare Ruth Marcus, Paying the Price for Civil Perjury: Prosecution May Be
Unusual, but It Can Mean Prison, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1998, at A4 (challenging “any of the
pundits on the air to find . . . a case of civil perjury that has been pursued criminally at the
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New York Times itself reported that, however rare perjury
prosecutions might be in federal court, they were markedly less rare
101
in state court. The Times supported this claim with the statistic that
in California in 1997, there had been 4,318 “perjury prosecutions” out
of 326,768 “felony prosecutions” (or about 1.3 percent, six times the
.2 percent in the federal criminal system).102 This California statistic
was then picked up by the House’s Impeachment Trial Manager,
Representative Stephen E. Buyer (R-Ind.), who presented it with
great aplomb in advancing the House’s case against the President
103
before the Senate.
One can confirm that around 4,318 arrests in 1997 in California
104
were coded as “perjury,” and that this was out of a total of 326,768
felony arrests for the state.105 And thus perjury arrests would appear
to be more common in California than in the federal system. What
was not reported, however, is that the percentage of these cases that
led to conviction in California is notably lower—lower than in the
federal level in the last 100 years” (quoting William H. Ginsburg, NBC’s “Today”)), with id.
(taking up Ginsburg’s challenge and noting that “[a] cursory computer search of federal court
records turned up more than twenty-five cases of federal prosecutions for perjury in civil
cases—and that does not include prosecutions that went forward but did not result in a written
opinion by the court”).
101. See Glaberson, supra note 99 (looking at perjury prosecutions in both the federal and
state systems).
102. Id. The New York Times also reported 395 New York state “perjury cases” but did not
provide statistics on the total number of felony prosecutions in that state. Id. Data from no
other state was reported.
103. See 145 CONG. REC. S281, SS284 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1999) (statement of Rep. Buyer,
House Manager) (“In State jurisdictions all across the country, they take [perjury] very
seriously. I have chosen one State, the State of California, which brought 4,318 perjury
prosecutions in 1997.”). No other state data is cited. The source of the statistic does not appear
in the record.
104. In 1997 there were 4,313 arrests for which a violation under CAL. PENAL CODE § 118
(West 2003) (“Perjury defined”) was the major offense and in which a final disposition was
reported and processed in that year. E-mail from anonymous individual at the Criminal Justice
Statistics Center, California Department of Justice, to Chris W. Sanchirico, Professor of Law,
Business, and Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania Law School and Wharton School (Oct.
10, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (basing its statistics on numbers extracted from
the Offender-Based Transaction Statistics system for the year 1997). See infra note 108 and
accompanying text for the discussion of data limitations.
105. E-mail from anonymous individual at the Criminal Justice Statistics Center, California
Department of Justice, to Chris W. Sanchirico, Professor of Law, Business, and Public Policy,
University of Pennsylvania Law School and Wharton School (Oct. 9, 2002) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (“The Adult Felony Arrest Disposition file shows a total count of 326,768
dispositions in 1997. This matches the number stated in [Glaberston’s] article, however, it is not
the number of ‘felony prosecutions.’ We are not able to provide a count on the number of felony
prosecutions.” (emphasis added)).
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federal system, and lower in comparison to other adult felonies in
California. Of the roughly 4,318 perjury arrests in California in 1997,
106
less than 500 (12 percent) resulted in conviction. In comparison, of
all 326,768 California adult felony arrests, 221,808 (67 percent) led to
107
conviction. Consequently, though it may be true that the proportion
of perjury arrests in California (1.3 percent) is six times larger than in
the federal system, the percentage of all perjury convictions is about
the same across the two systems (.2 percent).
Yet the more important and general point is that the precise
meaning of these kinds of arrest, prosecution, and conviction
numbers is far from clear. In the first place, such statistics typically
show only the number of defendants for whom perjury (and/or
obstruction) was the “most serious offense” charged, prosecuted, or
proven, a coding convention with uncertain but potentially significant
effects on the reported frequency of perjury charges and
108
convictions. Consider, for example, that this coding rule forms part
of the explanation for California’s relatively large number of perjury
arrests as well as its relatively small percentage of perjury convictions.
Most of the 4,000 or so perjury arrests in California in 1997 derived
from a single county’s idiosyncratic practice of adding perjury charges
to welfare fraud charges.109 Perjury charges carry the longer sentence
and so these welfare cases were coded as perjury in the “charges”
database. Typically, prosecutors in this county would then drop the
perjury charges and conviction would follow only on welfare fraud.110

106. See E-mail from anonymous individual, supra note 104. These numbers concern CAL.
PENAL CODE § 118 (“Perjury defined”), and data limitations apply. See infra note 108 and
accompanying text.
107. Table 6: Final Law Enforcement, Prosecution and Court Dispositions of Adult Felony
Arrests by Type of Disposition Statewide, CJSC Statistical Tables Site, at http://justice.hdcdojnet.
state.ca.us/cjsc_stats/prof00/00/6.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
108. This is true of both the federal numbers and the California numbers. See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 99, at 107–08 (“Where more than one offense is charged or
adjudicated, the most serious offense . . . is used to classify offenses.”); DIV. OF CAL. JUSTICE
INFO. SERVS., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME & DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 168 (2001),
available at http://caag.state.ca.us/cjsc/publications/candd/cd01/appn.pdf (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (“If a person is arrested for multiple offenses, OBTS selects only the most serious
offense . . . .”).
Another related problem with the California numbers specifically is that they count
“perjury” only and not also “obstruction of justice.”
109. Telephone Interview with anonymous individual at the Criminal Justice Statistics
Center, California Department of Justice (Nov. 22, 2002).
110. Id.
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The second general problem with these statistics is that they
provide no information on whether the coded offense arose in a civil
trial among private parties, a civil trial in which the government was a
party, or a criminal trial. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are
large differences across these three types of cases: although
prosecutors themselves may pile on or follow up with a perjury
111
indictment in a case in which they were already involved, they will
112
rarely respond to complaints from private parties. If so, averaging
over these various settings serves to exaggerate the threat of perjury
and obstruction charges in private party litigation.
Thirdly, the comparison of process crimes with primary activity
crimes is fraught with difficulty. Crimes like perjury and obstruction
arise from the operation of a system meant chiefly to adjudicate
primary activity behavior. Perhaps the relative rarity of perjury and
obstruction in criminal process merely reflects the fact that the “crime
opportunities” for this derivative crime are only a fraction of the
opportunities to commit primary activity crimes and wrongs—a
fraction roughly equal to the number of primary activity decision
points that end up generating litigation. If this is the case, perjury and
obstruction may not be as relatively underenforced as such
comparisons make them seem.
Fourthly, even if one could find the right benchmark and
establish that, relative to that benchmark, the number of perjury
arrests, prosecutions, and convictions were “low,” it is unclear what
this would say about enforcement. A small number of arrests,
prosecutions, and convictions for perjury is consistent with both
rampant perjury due to lax enforcement and tight enforcement
leading to very little perjury. Without also knowing how often crimes
like perjury are committed, knowing how often such crimes are

111. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1204:
If a section 1503 [obstruction of justice] offense occurs in the context of a pending
federal criminal trial, the prosecutor (after going back to the grand jury, of course)
just adds, in essence, another count to the existing indictment. The fact that the
prosecution had begun on other charges signals that convicting the defendant is a
high priority and, perhaps, that the defendant has a history of criminal activity. The
new section 1503 [obstruction of justice] charge provides another round of
ammunition for the prosecutor in the plea bargaining process.
But see Uviller, supra note 54, at 813 n.84 (“[O]nly the most vindictive prosecutor will take a
second shot at proving his lost cause by the perjury route.”).
112. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1188. (“[P]rivate litigants have limited recourse against
those who engage in unlawful destruction; public prosecutors, however, may initiate or threaten
a range of prosecutions with criminal and civil penalties.”).
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punished tells us little about the chance that any given commission
will be punished.
Lastly, even if one could reliably determine that the chance of
arrest, prosecution, or conviction was low, one could not conclude
from this that the impact of these laws on behavior was insignificant.
As is well understood, the law’s effect on behavior is not just a factor
of how frequently transgressions are detected, but also how severely
113
they are punished. In fact, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
punish perjury and obstruction rather severely—a first time offender
114
serves no less than ten months in prison. The incremental impact of
this prison time on the well-being of the average contract or tort
litigant is likely to be large relative to the stakes of the underlying
suit, especially considering the potential damage to reputation and
earning power. According to a Washington Post headline from the
time of President Clinton’s impeachment, “Prosecuting Civil Perjury
Is Unusual, but It Can Mean Prison.”115 It is hard to say whether
reading this would have deterred or encouraged the average civil
litigant.

113. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325 (1931)
(identifying the trade-off between the probability of the detection and the severity of the
punishment); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169, 179–80 (1968) (analyzing the implications of the aforementioned trade-off for
optimal criminal enforcement).
114. As of this writing, the base offense level for obstruction (as for perjury) under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines is still twelve, which roughly means imprisonment from ten to
sixteen months for a first-time offender and perhaps also fines ranging from $3,000 to $30,000
(for individual defendants). U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL §§ 2J1.2–.3, 5E1.2 (2001); id. ch. 5 pt. A.
Several additional points regarding sentencing are in order. First, section 805 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act directs the United States Sentencing Commission to “review and amend, as
appropriate” the sentencing provisions relating to obstruction of justice. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 § 805, 15 U.S.C.A. § 994 note (West Supp. 2003); see also id. § 1104(b)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. §
994 note (requesting that the Sentencing Commission “ensure that guideline offense levels . . .
are adequate”). Second, the offense level for conviction of another nonobstruction offense may
be increased by two if the defendant obstructed the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of
that offense. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, supra, § 3C1.1. Third, if, based on a single
knowing, material lie stated under oath in federal district court, a defendant is convicted of both
perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2000) and obstruction under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(c) (West Supp.
2003), these two counts would likely be grouped together resulting in an overall offense level of
twelve for the single lie. Id. §§ 3D1.1–.2. It is also possible that several lies told to the same court
in the same case, and to the same end, would also be grouped in this fashion. Id. Fourth, the
sentencing judge has some authority to deviate from the guidelines.
115. Marcus, supra note 100.
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C. Forced Assessment
Given the paucity of hard data, the hypotheses that evidence
tampering is commonplace and that the regulation thereof is lax
would probably be rejected in any systematic metanalysis116 of existing
data. But the rejection of a hypothesis in careful empirical work does
not imply the acceptance of its opposite; the hypothesis that
tampering is not commonplace and that the law is not lackadaisical
would probably also be rejected.117
Suppose, however, that principled agnosticism is not an option.
Imagine that we find ourselves in a position analogous to that of the
umpire at home plate—for whom concluding that the runner’s slide
kicked up too much dust to make the call at a 95 percent confidence
level, or making a principled plea for “more and better empirical
work on the play” would be inappropriate responses.
We might consider the possibility that impressionistic evidence—
though unreliable in general—may be conveying at least some real
information in this case. Although an isolated anecdote is little more
than an illustration of what it would be like for a proposition to be
true, a sizable collection of anecdotes is not so far from a survey. The
chief similarity is that in both cases many individuals communicate
their impressions of the world. The chief differences (at least with
regard to a carefully conducted survey) are three. First, the survey
produces a more uniform set of responses by asking all subjects the
same question which all respondents interpret in the same way.
Second, the survey is more careful about selecting a representative
sample. Third, because survey questions can be framed in terms of
personal knowledge, the survey has a somewhat better chance of
avoiding “herding” behavior, wherein several seemingly independent
impressions derive in reality from a unitary source. These distinctions
are likely to make a large difference when one is “averaging” over
anecdotes that point in many different directions, or when there is
reason to believe that only those who witness what they regard as
notable behavior come forward with their impressions. But when, as
here, the anecdotal evidence is, and has been for some time, relatively

116. A metanalysis quantitatively combines the results of prior studies meeting express
criteria. See, e.g., R. Rosenthal & M. R. DiMatteo, Meta-analysis: Recent Developments in
Quantitative Methods for Literature Reviews, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 59 (2001) (primer on metaanalysis).
117. See generally MORRIS H. DEGROOT, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 437–517 (2d ed.
1986) (discussing statistical techniques for testing hypotheses).
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broad-based and remarkably aligned, the impact of these distinctions
may be somewhat attenuated.
In reviewing the literature over the last two decades, one is
struck by the fact that apparently no one—no judge, no plaintiffs’
attorney, no defense counsel, no client—is waxing eloquent on the
sanctity of trial evidence: nobody, apparently, is “drowning” in
litigant integrity. This regularity would convey less information were
our attention restricted to the first wave of reporting, when the
opposite belief that “things are going reasonably well” might not have
been worth mentioning. But the persistence of this unanimity is
telling. Despite the fact that it would have been at several points in
recent history newsworthy, scholarship-worthy, and in the political
interests of those whose voices generally command attention, the
optimistic view of evidentiary foul play has never surfaced.
In the end, then, if we had to make the call—which arguably, we
do whenever we decline to privilege the status quo—we could
perhaps feel reasonably secure in concluding that evidence tampering
is not uncommon and that the law, though it does not ignore the
activity, does at best a halfhearted job of preventing it. This is the
provisional position adopted in the remainder of the Article.
II. THE LAW’S MYOPIC FOCUS: DOCTRINE
Scholars may disagree about whether the prevalence of evidence
tampering is a result of how the law is written or how it is enforced.118
There is general consensus, however, that the law as written is the
source of the second potentially troubling aspect of tampering
regulation considered in this Article—namely, that it is too tightly
focused on tampering that occurs far downstream along the litigation
flow.119

118. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
119. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1194–96 (advocating moving back the date on which
evidence destruction actions can be brought); id. at 1195 (“[L]itigants apparently can destroy
relevant documents on the eve of the filing of a civil action. Most lawyers appear to use this
standard as a general rule of thumb when advising clients who are parties to, or are facing, civil
litigation.”); Philip A. Lionberger, Comment, Interference with Prospective Civil Litigation by
Spoliation of Evidence: Should Texas Adopt a New Tort?, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 209, 230–31 (1989)
(“Currently, spoliators may escape criminal or civil sanctions by destroying evidence before the
institution of legal proceedings.”); Andrea H. Rowse, Comment, Spoliation: Civil Liability for
Destruction of Evidence, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 191, 193 (1985):
[U]nder some statutes an individual may escape criminal liability where evidence is
destroyed before a legal proceeding is instituted, even though the spoliator
reasonably believed a legal proceeding or investigation was likely to arise. Because of

080304 SANCHIRICO.DOC

1248

9/17/2004 2:04 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1215

The rules governing evidence tampering span several fields of
legal scholarship. These rules are notoriously unsettled and their
application across jurisdictions varies widely—a disequilibrium that
120
may reflect infrequent employment. The discussion that follows
considers those laws and rules that apply in civil actions among
private parties in federal court (although some discussion of agency
investigations is unavoidable). The focus is on rules that increase the
legal risk of evidence tampering, as opposed to those that make
tampering more difficult to effect (e.g., those facilitating
impeachment of witnesses). Furthermore, the discussion concentrates
on manifestations of the law’s downstream focus in this area, putting
aside a host of other interesting issues (many of which are already
well handled in existing scholarship).121
The structure of these statutes and rules confirms the impression
that only downstream evidence tampering is subject to sanction.
Moreover, even within the limited downstream reaches where these
rules apply, one detects a sliding scale: the farther downstream the
activity, the toothier the proscription.
A. Criminal Statutes
Statutes criminalizing evidentiary foul play fall into three
overlapping categories: obstruction of justice, criminal contempt, and
122
perjury.
these statutory loopholes, many lawyers believe they can legally and ethically advise
their clients to destroy evidence.
120. Apparently the Peter Pan of evidentiary procedure, the law in this area has been
deemed “immature” for almost seventy-five years. See John MacArthur Maguire & Robert C.
Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation or Related Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226, 230 (1935)
(“[A]s a whole the published opinions are most unsatisfactory. After reading some scores of
them, we concluded that any ‘collection of the authorities’ would be an uninformative hodgepodge.”); Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 690 (writing in 1966: “Unfortunately, there are few
interpretive cases that are closely enough related to our specific problems to be of much
assistance. Through this foggy bog the antitrust lawyer must make his way . . . .”); Oesterle,
supra note 12, at 1231 (writing in 1983: “At present, the standards imposed by courts that have
gone beyond the language of rule 37 are immature.”); Joseph V. De Marco, Note, A Funny
Thing Happened on the Way to the Courthouse: Mens Rea, Document Destruction, and the
Federal Obstruction of Justice Statute, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 570–71 (1992) (“[T]he mens rea
requirement has never been clearly articulated.”).
121. See generally GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12; Beckstrom, supra note 12; Nesson,
supra note 12; Oesterle, supra note 12.
122. For an analysis of when such “public remedies” might be preferable to procedural and
evidentiary sanctions or independent tort claims, (discussed infra in Parts II.B and II.C,
respectively), see Richard D. Friedman, Dealing with Evidentiary Deficiency, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1961, 1980–81 (1997).
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1. Obstruction of Justice. The twenty statutes in Title 18’s
123
Chapter 73 —which reach activities as diverse as destroying,
altering, and fabricating documentary evidence; lying to juries,
agencies, and investigators; and violently retaliating against judge,
jury, or witness—are scattered like leaves over the landscape of
evidentiary foul play, overlapping here, leaving patches of green
there.124 In the wake of Enron’s collapse and the conviction of its
auditor, Arthur Andersen, for obstruction of justice,125 Congress
tossed a few new leaves onto the turf. Precisely where these landed is
unclear. Their legislative history is particularly hard to discern,
shadowed as they were by auditing and securities reforms contained
in the same Sarbanes-Oxley Act.126
Arguably, however, Sarbanes-Oxley did little to widen the law’s
tight focus on downstream tampering.127 The dual object of this
Section is to support this claim, while also generally elucidating how
obstruction statutes govern tampering in private suits.
a. The Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Problem. Much simplified, the score
of obstruction statutes in Chapter 73 vary in scope along three
dimensions: (1) the genre of “obstructive” act proscribed; (2) the
form of “justice” that is obstructed (e.g., judicial proceeding, agency
investigation, or congressional hearing); and (3) the degree of causal
and intentional linkage—i.e., the “nexus”—between the
128
“obstruction,” on the one hand, and the “justice,” on the other.
Before Sarbanes-Oxley, the most criticized aspect of Chapter 73
was the fact that many obstructive acts were not criminal unless they
were specifically directed at a pending judicial or agency
123. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501–1520 (West Supp. 2003).
124. See Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 704 (referring to Chapter 73 as a “motley collection”
of statutes).
125. Arthur Andersen, LLP was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2000). Luisa Beltran
et al., Andersen Guilty, CNN Money, at http://money.cnn.com/2002/06/13/news/andersen_verdict
(June 16, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
126. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)). The relevant titles of this act are
Title VIII (“Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability”) and Title XI (“Corporate Fraud
and Accountability”).
127. That Congress went so far as to crack open Chapter 73 and yet did little to correct its
supposedly myopic focus may be instructive, but we will leave that possibility for the analysis in
Part IV.
128. The “nexus” requirement is actually the conjunction of elements that are sometimes
treated separately. See, e.g., De Marco, supra note 120, at 572 (listing four elements, including
pendency and specific intent).
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129
proceeding. More precisely, the provisions of Chapter 73 with an
adequately broad definition of “obstruction” had an overly strict
nexus requirement, while those with a relaxed nexus requirement had
a too narrow definition of “obstruction.”
Thus, on the one hand, section 1503(a)’s “omnibus
130
provision” —with its broad scope relative to different forms of
obstructive activity—had (and still has) a strict nexus requirement.
The Aguilar case, 131 specifically held out as an example of the need for
reform by the Senate sponsor of the new obstruction provisions,
132
illustrates the point. Aguilar, a federal district judge, lied to Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigators about his improper
efforts to influence the outcome of a case being handled by another
judge in his district. For these lies, he was charged under section
1503(a)’s omnibus provision with “corruptly endeavoring” to obstruct
a grand jury investigation.133 At the time that he was questioned by
the FBI, a grand jury had convened to investigate his influence
activities, and Aguilar apparently knew of this fact.134 But the FBI
agents to whom he lied had not been subpoenaed to appear before
135
this grand jury and were not “act[ing] as an arm of the grand jury.”
The Supreme Court held that there was not a sufficiently significant
“nexus” between Aguilar’s obstructive act and the kind of justice
protected by 1503(a)’s omnibus provision: “[U]ttering false
statements to an investigating agent . . . who might or might not

129. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995) (finding that the defendant’s false
statements to the investigating agent were not covered by the statutory language because the
agent “might or might not” testify before a grand jury); Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1201–02
(“[S]ection 1503 apparently allows parties to destroy any documents, even those relevant to
future civil actions, if the destruction occurs before the complaint is filed.” (referring to 18
U.S.C. § 1503 (2000))). But see Solum & Marzen, supra note 38, at 1111–12 (arguing more on
the basis of logic than case law that obstructive acts perpetrated prior to a grand jury subpoena
or civil complaint may be criminal under section 1503).
See infra notes 162–171 and accompanying text for a discussion of how recent changes to
Chapter 73 would apply to the facts in Aguilar.
130. Section 1503(a)’s omnibus provision applies to “[w]hoever corruptly . . . influences,
obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of
justice.” § 1503(a).
131. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 593.
132. See 148 CONG. REC. S1786 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
133. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599.
134. See id. at 597, 600–01 (noting that when Aguilar asked the FBI agent whether he was a
target of a grand jury investigation, the agent told him there was a grand jury convening).
135. Id.
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testify before a grand jury is [in]sufficient to make out a violation of
136
the [omnibus] provision of § 1503.”
On the other hand, several other sections of Chapter 73 requiring
less of a nexus were seen as too narrow in their definition of
“obstructive acts.” Chief among these other sections was (former)
137
section 1512. Unlike section 1503, section 1512 did not (and still
does not) require that the obstructed form of justice—the “official
proceeding”138—be “pending or about to be instituted at the time of
139
the offense.” Yet, although section 1512 applied to “corruptly
persuading” another to lie, mislead, destroy, or conceal, it did not
apply to one’s own such acts.140
b. The Sarbanes-Oxley Solution. Congress’s apparent object in
passing Sarbanes-Oxley’s obstruction provisions was to combine
section 1503(a)’s broader definition of obstructive acts with section
141
1512’s weaker nexus requirement. The House had one idea about

136. Id.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2000) (criminalizing, prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, an array of specific
forms of obstruction, including killing or threatening witnesses and, by threats or other means,
inducing another person to destroy evidence).
138. The phrase “official proceeding” in section 1512 was and is defined in section
1515(a)(1) as follows:
(A) a proceeding before a judge or court of the United States, a United States
magistrate, a bankruptcy judge, a judge of the United States Tax Court, a special trial
judge of the Tax Court, a judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims, or a
Federal grand jury; (B) a proceeding before the Congress; (C) a proceeding before a
Federal Government agency which is authorized by law; or (D) a proceeding . . .
before any insurance regulatory official or agency . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1) (2000). Thus, in addition to its weaker nexus requirement, section 1512
also applies to a broader range of “justice” than section 1503(a), a point not emphasized in the
text. (Note also: not all provisions in section 1512 require that the justice obstructed be an
“official proceeding,” as defined in section 1515(a)(1)).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e)(1). Nor did (or does) section 1512 require that the obstructer know
or intend his acts to be directed specifically to a federal court, grand jury, or investigation. Id. §
1512(g).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that
“neither the bill that passed the House nor the compromise bill that was ultimately enacted
criminalizes a witness’s violation of his own legal duty”).
141. According to Senator Leahy, the sponsor of some of these provisions, the changes to
Chapter 73 were meant “to clarify and plug holes in the existing criminal laws relating to the
destruction or fabrication of evidence, including the shredding of financial and audit records”
because “[c]urrently, those provisions are a patchwork which have been interpreted, often very
narrowly, by Federal courts.” 148 CONG. REC S1786-6 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002) (statement of
Sen. Leahy). Leahy specifically mentions Aguilar’s nexus requirement and section 1512’s
inapplicability to one’s own acts. See id.
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142
how to do this, the Senate, another. Rather than melding the two
approaches into a coherent whole, the conference report simply
adopted both approaches,143 thus making Chapter 73’s “medley of
144
crimes” all the more cacophonous.
The House’s approach, which has received less attention than the
145
Senate’s, appears to be more far-reaching along several important
dimensions146 (although this will ultimately depend upon judicial
interpretation). The House took the fairly natural step of inserting
into section 1512 a general proscription on the obstructer’s own
obstructive acts, new section 1512(c),147 leaving the rest of section
1512’s structure intact.

142. The obstruction provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley that originated in the House were finally
passed as H.R. 5118 on July 16, 2002. H.R. 5118, 107th Cong. (2002). The history leading up to
passage is somewhat convoluted. The House’s first effort toward enacting what became
Sarbanes-Oxley was passage of another bill, H.R. 3763 (4/24/02). H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002).
This was followed in the Senate by passage of S. 2673 (7/15/02), and the two were taken to
conference. S. 2673, 107th Cong. (2002). H.R. 5118 appears to have been the House’s
“afterthought” in the wake of additional events following passage of H.R. 3763, including the
revelation in early July that Global Crossing was being investigated for shredding documents
relevant to its bankruptcy proceedings. See 148 CONG. REC. H5475, (daily ed. July 25, 2002)
(statement of Rep. Bereuter) (mentioning Global Crossing as a “recent corporate scandal”);
Dennis K. Berman, U.S. to Investigate Possible Shredding at Global Crossing, WALL ST. J., July
3, 2002, at B4 (announcing the Global Crossing investigation). H.R. 5118 was then incorporated
into the conference report on H.R. 3763. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 107-610 (2002).
Ironically, the House’s approach in H.R. 5118 was similar to the Senate’s approach,
ultimately rejected, in the original passage of section 1512 in 1982. S. 2420, 97th Cong. (1982). See
also Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 382–84 (discussing the legislative history behind section 1512’s
original passage).
143. Compare H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 107-610 (2002), with H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002),
and S. 2673, 107th Cong. (2002).
144. United States v. Buckley, 192 F.3d 708, 710 (7th Cir. 1999).
145. Senator Leahy, who sponsored the Senate approach, received both more press and
more floor time to advocate his solution. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S1785 (daily ed. Mar. 12,
2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy); News Conference of Senator Leahy, Introduction of the
Corporate
and
Criminal
Fraud
Accountability
Act,
transcript
available
at
http://www.senate.gov/~leahy/press/200203/031202.html. In contrast, regarding the House’s
alternative approach, electronic searches uncover no entry in the congressional record, nor any
press.
146. But see John J. Falvey Jr. & Matthew A. Wolfman, Commentary, The Criminal
Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley: A Tale of Sound and Fury?, 1 No. 19 ANDREWS ENRON LITIG.
REP., Oct. 7, 2002, at 15 (arguing that the change to section 1512 “largely overlaps with the
[Senate-sponsored additions of sections 1519 and 1520] and with existing law”).
147. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(c) (West Supp. 2003):
Whoever corruptly—(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document,
or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or
availability for use in an official proceeding; or (2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or
impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
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The Senate, on the other hand, added two new provisions to
148
Chapter 73. New section 1520 applies only to auditors. New section
1519 appears to apply only to obstructive acts conducted with regard
149
to tangible evidence. Moreover, the “justice” protected by new
section 1519 seems to include only activities by federal agencies and
departments, and bankruptcy cases under Title 11—and not general
judicial proceedings.150 On the other hand, new section 1519 applies
“in relation to or in contemplation of any matter” within the agency’s
or department’s jurisdiction, and it is possible that courts will read
this nexus requirement to be weaker than that applicable to section
1512(c).
How then does Sarbanes-Oxley change Chapter 73 in the context
of civil suits between private parties? Possibly the only change for
such cases is that the obstructer’s own generally obstructive acts
would now be proscribed at some time prior to the filing of the
complaint. Such self-help would now fall under section 1512(c) with
its relaxed nexus requirement, rather than just under section 1503(a)’s
(emphasis added). New section 1512(c)(2) appears to add general obstructive behavior by the
obstructer herself to the list of activities regulated by section 1512. In terms of the obstructive
activities covered, then, it appears to overlap with the omnibus provision, section 1503. Notice,
however, that section 1512(c)(1) also specifically, and apparently redundantly, mentions the
destruction and manipulation of tangible evidence.
148. See id. § 1520(a)(1):
Any accountant who conducts an audit of an issuer of securities to which section
10A(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78j-1(a)) applies, shall
maintain all audit or review workpapers for a period of 5 years from the end of the
fiscal period in which the audit or review was concluded.
Section 1520 essentially adds, within the somewhat unlikely context of Chapter 73, another
item—namely, “audit or review workpapers”—to the long list of statutory record retention
requirements spread throughout the U.S. Code. See generally CCH GUIDE TO RECORD
RETENTION REQUIREMENTS (as of July 1, 2001) (cataloging the federal statutory and
regulatory record retention requirements). The new section instructs the SEC more precisely to
define what kind of documents must be retained, and the impact of this new section will depend
in large part on what that definition turns out to be.
149. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1519:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes
a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede,
obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed
under Title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
150. See id. (applying the provision to “any matter within the jurisdiction of any department
or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11”). The late addition of bankruptcy
proceedings to this provision may have been partly inspired by the contemporaneous
announcement that Global Crossing was being investigated for shredding documents relevant to
bankruptcy proceedings. See generally Berman, supra note 142 (announcing the Global Crossing
investigation).

080304 SANCHIRICO.DOC

1254

9/17/2004 2:04 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1215

omnibus provision, which requires that the obstructed justice be
151
pending.
Unfortunately, Congress did not take the opportunity to clarify
just how much more relaxed section 1512(c)’s nexus requirement is
meant to be. Although it is clear that the obstructed “official
proceeding” need not be pending under section 1512(c), this leaves
open many questions regarding how tightly targeted to a specific
proceeding the tampering need be. New section 1512(c) would
probably reach a defendant’s destruction of documents relevant to a
particular plaintiff’s suit that is only anticipated and not actually
pending. But what if the documents are destroyed to guard against
whatever suit might arise, without having specific litigation in mind?
For example, how would the provision apply to the ongoing
destruction of safety test records by a manufacturer when there is no
specific plaintiff—perhaps not even a specific buyer for the product?
Arguably, such upstream behavior would still fall outside the bounds
of new section 1512(c).152 At the very least, Sarbanes-Oxley does little
to resolve the issue.
151. Recall that section 1519 with its arguably broader language of “matters,” “cases,” and
“contemplation” appears to apply to judicial proceedings only when they arise under the
bankruptcy laws in Title 11.
152. See, e.g., United States. v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804, 812–13 (5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting, in
the context of other provisions of section 1512, the “official proceeding” requirement also
applicable to new section 1512(c) as meaning that “[w]ithout at least a circumstantial showing of
intent to affect testimony at some particular federal proceeding that is ongoing or is scheduled
to be commenced in the future, this statute does not proscribe his conduct” (emphasis added)).
But see United States v. Scaife, 749 F.2d 338, 348 (6th Cir. 1984) (employing an apparently
weaker nexus requirement in connection with the same “official proceeding” requirement).
This “official proceeding” requirement, which applies to new section 1512(c), does not
apply to all provisions of section 1512. A comparison of the different nexus requirements
applicable to other provisions of section 1512 may shed some light on what the nexus
requirement for section 1512(c) is and is not. See, e.g., United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233,
1249–50 (11th Cir. 1998):
Sections 1512(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), and (b)(2)(A)–(D) [like new 1512(c)] all require
that the proscribed conduct occur in the context of an “official proceeding”. . . . In
contrast, §§ 1512(a)(1)(C) and (b)(3), the subsection under which this case arises,
contain a different jurisdictional basis: the defendant must have committed the
obstructive conduct with the intent to “prevent,” in § 1512(a)(1)(C), or “hinder, delay,
or prevent,” in § 1512(b)(3) communication to a federal law enforcement officer or
judge information relating to the commission or possible commission of a federal
crime.
The Eleventh Circuit’s implicit comparison of this weaker nexus requirement (applying to, inter
alia, new section 1512(c)) is illuminating. See id. at 1250:
[F]ederal jurisdiction under § 1512(b)(3) [with its weaker nexus requirement] is based
on the federal interest of protecting the integrity of potential federal investigations by
ensuring that transfers of information to federal law enforcement officers and judges
relating to the possible commission of federal offenses be truthful and unimpeded. By
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To bring home the significance of Congress’s silence on this
issue, consider how new section 1512(c), would bear upon two salient
cases.
c. Section 1512(c) and Andersen. Although the shredding
episode that provided the main impetus for Sarbanes-Oxley’s
obstruction provisions concerned an agency investigation, rather than
a private suit (the focus here), it is instructive to consider how new
153
section 1512(c) would have applied ignoring this distinction. Arthur
Andersen, the partnership, was convicted under former (and new)
section 1512(b) of corruptly persuading employees to obstruct justice
by shredding documents.154 The “official proceeding” in question—
which was not pending at the time of Andersen’s obstructive acts, but
was the specific object of Andersen’s intent—was an SEC inquiry into
Enron’s special purpose entities.155 Were these same events
prosecuted under new section 1512(c), the secretaries and staff who
actually did the shredding—as opposed to those who “persuaded”
them to do so—would also be criminally liable and possibly subject to
156
roughly a year in prison.
Sarbanes-Oxley leaves unanswered the question whether
Andersen would have been criminally liable under any portion of
Chapter 73 if it had simply complied with its own policy of routinely
destroying audit-related documents. A few years before, the SEC had
made extensive use of Andersen’s internal documents in proving that
157
Andersen knew of Waste Management’s improper accounting. In
158
response to this debacle, Andersen devised a “document retention

its wording, § 1512(b)(3) does not depend on the existence or imminency of a federal
case or investigation but rather on the possible existence of a federal crime and a
defendant’s intention to thwart an inquiry into that crime.
153. Although they do not apply to a general civil suit between private parties, new section
1519 and section 1520 might have applied to the Andersen case. See supra notes 148–149; infra
note 161.
154. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
155. See Indictment at 5, United States. v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, No. CRH-02-121 (S.D.
Tex. filed Mar. 7, 2002).
156. See supra note 114. Compare this to the up to $500,000 fine that would have been paid
by the partnership had it survived. Violations of section 1512(b) are punishable with fines or
imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2000).
157. See Eichenwald, supra note 3.
158. See id. (“The problems created by the Waste Management records were never to be
repeated.”).
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policy” that required preservation of audit work files, but quick
159
destruction of audit-related documents. However,
early [in 2000], to cut costs, Andersen dismissed some employees
who handled the newly required shredding, and paper began
stacking up. By June [2001], accountants handling Enron in Houston
were virtually buried in documents that, under the policy, should
160
have been shredded long before.

If Andersen had been destroying audit-related documents as it went
along, rather than after it learned of the SEC inquiry in October 2001,
would it have been criminally liable under new section 1512(c)?
Arguably not. Although section 1512(c) does not require that the
obstructed official proceeding be pending, it does seem to require
that a particular official proceeding be looming on the horizon.161 If
Congress had wanted to criminalize the kind of upstream destruction
that might have taken place under Andersen’s retention policy, it
could have done so with specific language. Indeed, the courts’
demonstrated tendency to interpret Chapter 73’s ambiguities in favor
of the accused162 would have indicated that specific statutory language
163
was necessary to criminalize this kind of behavior.
164
like Andersen,
d. Section 1512(c) and Aguilar. Aguilar,
concerned an agency investigation rather than a private suit. But

159. See generally ARTHUR ANDERSEN, PRACTICE ADMINISTRATION: CLIENT
ENGAGEMENT
INFORMATION—ORGANIZATION,
RETENTION
AND
DESTRUCTION,
STATEMENT NO. 760 (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.ethicsandlawyering.com/issues/files/
andersenretenpolicy.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
160. See Eichenwald, supra note 3.
161. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
What about sections 1519 and 1520? Even new section 1519, which employs the arguably
broader “in contemplation of” language, seems to require a particular “matter” or “case.” If an
individual shreds documents as she goes along so as to obstruct whatever matter or case may or
may not arise, section 1519 may not apply. Certainly, § 1519 itself does little to make clear how
specific one’s “contemplation” must be.
Because Andersen was acting as an auditor, new section 1520 might also apply, though at
least one commentator has doubted its application to the facts of this case. See Falvey &
Wolfman, supra note 146 (“In the case of Arthur Andersen, for example, there was no evidence
that the firm shredded audit workpapers, but rather that it shredded other audit-related
documents. This new provision imposes a statutory requirement for a retention practice that
public accounting firms already observe.”).
162. See supra Part II.A.1.a (discussing United States v. Aguilar).
163. Cf. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 378–84 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (employing
similar logic in interpreting § 1505).
164. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995).
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because it also appears to have played a role in motivating the
165
obstruction provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, it is worth considering
how new section 1512(c) would apply to its facts. Recall that Judge
Aguilar was acquitted in that case under section 1503(a)’s omnibus
provision because of an insufficient nexus between his obstructive act
and ongoing grand jury investigations.166 There is at least a colorable
argument that Judge Aguilar’s lie to the FBI agent would not result in
167
his conviction under new section 1512(c) either.
Relative to section 1503, section 1512 relaxes the nexus
requirement in two ways, neither of which seems to bridge the gap in
Aguilar. First, as noted, unlike section 1503, section 1512 does not
168
require that the “official proceeding” be “pending.” This relaxation
is irrelevant to the Aguilar fact pattern, because the grand jury
proceeding was pending anyway, and Judge Aguilar knew it to be
so.169 Second, section 1512 does not require specific intent that the
official proceeding be federal.170 This relaxation is probably also moot
for Aguilar. Aguilar seems to have known about the particular federal
171
grand jury convened against him. Instead, according to the court’s
interpretation of the evidence in Aguilar, what Aguilar did not know
firmly enough was whether the FBI agent to whom he lied would be
called to testify.172 It is not clear why this lack of knowledge would not
still be decisive under new section 1512(c).173

165. See supra note 141.
166. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600–01.
167. Note that on its face, new § 1519 would not apply because it is limited to obstructive
acts performed on “records, documents or tangible objects.”
168. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(f)(1) (West Supp. 2003) (“[A]n official proceeding need not be
pending . . . .”).
169. 515 U.S. at 600–01.
170. See § 1512(g) (“[N]o state of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance—
(1) that the official proceeding . . . is before a judge or court of the United States . . . .”).
171. See 515 U.S. at 600–01.
172. Id. at 601.
173. § 1512(c). In interpreting former section 1512, 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2000), some
commentators seem to assert that FBI investigations are themselves “official proceedings,” and
thus, in particular, “agency proceedings” “authorized by law.” See Lisa R. Rafferty & Julie
Teperow, Obstruction of Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 989, 1008–09 (1998):
[I]n order to secure a conviction under § 1512, an official proceeding need not be
pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense. Hence, an investigation
by a federal agency may constitute an “official proceeding” within the meaning of §
1512(e). Furthermore, if an individual realizes that a federal proceeding might be
commenced and acts in such a manner as to affect potential testimony, conviction
under § 1512 is permissible.
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2. Contempt. To be held in contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401, a
175
party must either commit the offending act in the court’s presence
or be in willful176 violation of a standing court order. Thus, an
individual may be in contempt for violating a subpoena issued during
177
discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(e). But out-ofcourt evidence tampering that does not violate a specific order is not
criminal under section 401. Thus, even document destruction in direct
response to a discovery request may not be criminal. In partial
mitigation of this restriction, a party may attempt to obtain,
immediately upon filing, a court order directing her opponent to
retain all relevant documents, and practice guides and treatises often
suggest doing so.178 Such orders, however, will never predate filing of
the complaint. Thus, contempt effectively requires a pending
proceeding. Consequently, its reach is even more restricted to
downstream tampering than is obstruction of justice.
In return for this stricter restriction to downstream activity—and
in line with the sliding scale identified above—contempt sanctions are
more summarily imposed. The presiding judge may herself initiate
criminal contempt proceedings without involving the prosecutor. And

Jeffrey R. Kallstrom & Suzanne E. Roe, Obstruction of Justice, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1081,
1111–12 (2001) (repeating Rafferty & Teperow’s language essentially verbatim). This analysis
seems to conflate the definition of an “official proceeding” with the requirement that it be
“pending.” Moreover, the analysis appears too divorced from the main issue of the defendant’s
state of mind regarding the connection between the obstruction and the justice, the issue which
forms the core of the Supreme Court’s analysis of section 1503, see Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, and
is arguably the heart of the matter in section 1512 as well.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2000):
Power of court. A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or
imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as—
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice; (2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official
transactions; (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command.
175. Id. § 401(1). In some cases, the court’s “constructive presence” has sufficed. In re
Indep. Pub. Co., 240 F. 849, 857 (9th Cir. 1917).
176. See De Marco, supra note 120, at 591–92. (“[C]ourts hearing contempt cases generally
convict only those persons who purposefully intended to be contemptuous—those who intended
to flout the authority of the court.”).
177. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(e) (“Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a
subpoena . . . may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued.”).
178. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.4, at 76 (“[P]rudent counsel should move
for a document-preservation order at an early stage of the litigation.”).
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the judge whose court was the object of the alleged “contempt” will
179
then be the one to handle the contempt proceeding.
3. Perjury. There are three perjury statutes in Title 18’s Chapter
180
79. Section 1622 concerns inducing another to commit perjury.
Sections 1621181 and 1623182 reach the act of perjury itself.
Of the latter two concerning perjury per se, section 1623 applies
farther downstream than section 1621. Section 1623 applies only to
falsehoods perpetrated “in any proceeding before or ancillary to any
court or grand jury of the United States.”183 In practice, “ancillary”
proceedings have included depositions conducted under rules of
184
procedure. In contrast, section 1621 applies whenever a person has
“taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any
case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be
administered.”185 Courts have construed this language to encompass

179. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) (allowing a judge to summarily punish criminal contempt
committed in her presence); see also Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1204–07 (outlining the
application of section 401 to document destruction cases); Solum & Marzen, supra note 38, at
1113–14 (listing differences between contempt and obstruction of justice).
180. 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (2000).
181. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000). Section 1621, “Perjury generally”, reads as follows:
Whoever—(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in
any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered,
that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony,
declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary
to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be
true . . . is guilty of perjury.
(emphases added).
182. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2000). Section 1623(a), “False declarations before grand jury or
court”, reads as follows:
Whoever under oath . . . in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand
jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration or makes or
uses any other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording,
or other material, knowing the same to contain any false material declaration, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(emphases added).
183. Id.
184. Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at 963 (describing section 1623 as “construed to
limit the operation of the statute to testimony actually submitted in the presence of the court or
grand jury or in the course of a deposition pursuant to valid rules of procedure”). Compare
United States v. Krogh, 366 F. Supp. 1255, 1256 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that a sworn deposition
constituted an “ancillary proceeding”), with Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 111 (1979)
(holding that a sworn statement given in the course of an interview in an attorneys’ office was
too informal to qualify as an “ancillary proceeding” under section 1623).
185. 18 U.S.C. § 1621.
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186
investigations, agency proceedings, and signed affidavits, all of
which may be precursors to depositions, or grand jury testimony.
In line with the sliding scale identified above, section 1623, which
applies only later along the process time line, is otherwise broader in
187
application. First, section 1623 requires only that the defendant
knowingly make the false statement. Under section 1621 the falsity
188
must be “willful.” Second, section 1623 applies to “mak[ing] or
us[ing] any other information, including any book, paper, document,
189
record, recording, or other material.” Section 1621, in contrast,
applies only to a narrower range of activities constituting “stating or
subscribing any material matter.” Third, under section 1623, falsity
may be proven simply by establishing that the defendant made
“irreconcilably contradictory declarations.”190 Section 1621, on the
other hand, requires the government to prove precisely which of the
191
contradictory statements was false. Last, while section 1621 has
been interpreted to incorporate the common law “two witness
rule,”192 section 1623 specifically eschews this formula,193 allowing

186. Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at 962 (describing section 1621 as “construed to
extend the operation of section 1621 to a diverse range of situations, not all related to judicial
proceedings”); see, e.g., Woolley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258, 261 (9th Cir. 1938) (holding that
perjury can be committed in an ex parte investigation); Natvig v. United States, 236 F.2d 694,
695 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (affirming defendant’s conviction for perjury in a hearing before the
Federal Communications Commission); United States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 1040, 1042 (11th Cir.
1994) (affirming defendant’s conviction for perjury in a signed affidavit).
Section 1621 also applies to congressional hearings. Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at
959 n.9; see, e.g., United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 660–61 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding a
conviction under section 1621 where the defendant had perjured herself in a Senate hearing).
187. See Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at 973 (“While § 1621 is broader than § 1623
with regard to the range of proceedings where it applies, the opposite is true regarding the range
of conduct condemned.”).
188. See also Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at 964 (“Section 1623, unlike § 1621, does
not require proof that the alleged false testimony was submitted willfully. Rather, it requires
that such testimony have been knowingly stated or subscribed.”).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2000); see also Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at 973–74
(“Although it is infrequently invoked, the ‘make or use’ provision of § 1623 has been broadly
construed.”).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Lebon, 4 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[T]he fact that a witness
contradicts herself . . . does not establish perjury.”). For further discussion of this point, see
Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at 967 and sources cited therein.
192. This is the rule that one witness alone, with no other evidence of any form, is
insufficient to prove perjury. See Kislak & Donoghue, supra note 39, at 972–73 and sources cited
therein.
193. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e).
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proof beyond a reasonable doubt by any constellation of admissible
194
evidence.
B. Procedural and Evidentiary Sanctions
The court that hears the underlying case may impose sanctions
for evidence tampering under either the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or its “inherent power” to regulate process. The overall
pattern for such sanctions is similar to that for the criminal statutes
examined above. For the most part, procedural and evidentiary
sanctions reach only evidence tampering perpetrated after the
complaint has been filed. Moreover, even along the limited reaches
where such sanctions apply, the farther downstream the tampering,
the greater the sanction and the more summarily it is imposed.

194. Before leaving the topic of criminal sanctions it is worth considering the relationship
between perjury and obstruction. Consider first the definitions of the crimes. It seems clear that
both section 1621 and section 1623 perjury will usually also qualify as obstruction of justice
under new section 1512(c)(2), especially in the context of civil suits between private parties.
First, the perjurous acts of making or subscribing a false statement or making or using false
records would most likely fall under the range of obstructive conduct proscribed by section
1512(c)(2). See supra note 147. Second, the mens rea requirements for either brand of perjury
would probably imply the mens rea requirements for obstruction in nearly every case. Compare
18 U.S.C. § 1621, and 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a), with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(c)(2) (West Supp. 2003)
(requiring that the defendant have acted “willfully,” “knowingly,” and “corruptly” respectively).
Third, it seems that a “proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United
States,” and probably even any “competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a
law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered” would qualify as an “official
proceeding” under section 1512. Cf. POSNER, supra note 54, at 37 (stating, prior to the passage
of new section 1512(c) that “‘obstruction of justice’ . . . includes perjury when committed in
either a civil or criminal proceeding; [but] excludes perjury in other settings, for example before
a congressional committee unless the committee is inquiring into possible violations of law”).
After passage of new section 1512(c), “obstruction of justice” presumably includes perjury, as a
general obstructive act under section 1512(c)(2), when committed before an “official
proceeding,” defined in section 1515(a)(1) to include not only civil or criminal proceedings, but
also federal agency proceedings authorized by law and congressional proceedings. See supra
note 138 for the text of section 1515(a)(1) and supra note 147 for the text of section 1512(c).
That said, there may still be situations where an oath is administered before a “competent
tribunal, officer, or person, in [a] case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to
be administered,” as per section 1621, and yet there is no “official proceeding” under sections
1512(c) and 1515(a)(1). Recall that new section 1519, which appears to apply to a broader range
of “justice” than does section 1512(c), does not, on its face at least, pertain to lying under oath.
For a comparison of sentencing under the two provisions, see supra note 114.
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1. Sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

195

a. Failure to Obey a Court Order. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(b) authorizes sanctions if a party fails to obey a court
order “to provide or permit discovery.”196 In addition to the orders
specifically listed in Rule 37,197 a wide range of orders are subject to
sanction. For example, it is now common practice for parties to obtain
198
“evidence preservation orders,” the violation of which has been
held sanctionable under Rule 37(b).199
The often cited case of Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. General
Nutrition Corp.200 illustrates well how evidence tampering might
trigger Rule 37(b) sanctions. Thompson, a national brand vitamin
manufacturer, sued GNC, a vitamin retailer, for advertising
Thompson’s products at a 20 percent discount, but purposefully not
having enough in stock to meet expected demand, thus employing
“bait and switch” advertising for its own private label.201 GNC’s
195. Although several federal rules touch on evidence tampering, only the most important
are reviewed here. Relevant federal rules (of both procedure and evidence) not explicitly
considered in Section II.B, generally, include Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) (sanctioning
the bad faith presentation of affidavits in supporting or defending against a motion for summary
judgment), Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) (exempting from the hearsay rule statements
“offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and
did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness”), and Federal Rule of Evidence
1004(1) and (3) (allowing “other evidence” of contents of a writing, recording, or photograph
when “originals” are lost or destroyed, unless these are lost or destroyed by a proponent in bad
faith or the party in control of the originals fails to produce them).
196. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2).
197. The list includes court orders to compel discovery, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(a), in light of a party’s failure adequately to (1) make the various “required
disclosures” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) regarding how she plans to support
her case, FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(2)(A)), (2) answer questions put to her in a deposition or an
interrogatory, or (3) permit inspection of documents and things upon proper request, FED. R.
CIV. P. 37(a)(2)(B). Also specifically enumerated in Rule 37(a) are orders to submit to physical
and mental examinations, FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2), 35(a), and orders to attend the parties’
scheduling conference for discovery, FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f), 37(b)(2).
198. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1225 (“Litigants have begun to avoid a part of the
problem by securing court orders early in the litigation that all documents material to the
litigation must be preserved for possible production at the request of opponents.”).
199. See Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(imposing sanctions on GNC for failure to comply with an order from a special master); In re
Air Crash Disaster Near Chi., Ill. on May 25, 1979, 90 F.R.D. 613, 618 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (“A party
may not destroy documents where a preservation order has been entered . . . .”); see also
GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.4, at 76 (describing, with examples from case law, how the
violation of an order to preserve evidence can trigger sanctions under Rule 37).
200. 593 F. Supp. 1443.
201. Id. at 1444.
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purchase, sale, and inventory records—in both hard copy and
electronic form—were important evidence in the case. One year after
Thompson filed its complaint, at a time when GNC still had these
202
records in its possession, the court ordered GNC to preserve such
203
records. GNC declined to pass this directive on to its internal
departments and employees, and the records were destroyed.204 After
GNC failed to produce the records in response to Thompson’s
subsequent discovery request, the court ordered GNC to do so. At
the same time, the court widened the scope of its original
205
preservation order. No records were forthcoming. Ultimately GNC
was sanctioned under Rule 37(b) for violating the court’s multiple
orders to preserve and produce evidence.206
In addition to illustrating how Rule 37(b) sanctions are triggered,
the GNC case also illustrates the fact that the sanctions within the
court’s discretion are broad-ranging.207 In the GNC case, the court
struck GNC’s answer, entered default judgment against it on
Thompson’s claims, dismissed GNC’s own claims against
Thompson,208 and required GNC to pay (with interest) the attorneys’
202. Id. at 1445 (finding of fact 7).
203. Id. (finding of fact 18).
204. Id. at 1447–48 (findings of fact 19–28).
205. Id. at 1449–50 (finding of fact 35).
206. Id. at 1455.
207. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)–(E) enumerates a number of sanctions.
To the detriment of the violator and with varying relationship to the nature of the violation, the
court may take certain facts as given, refuse to hear certain claims or defenses, refuse to admit
certain evidence, strike certain pleadings, stay or dismiss part or all of the action, render
judgment by default, hold the violator in contempt of court, or any logically consistent
combination of the above. Additionally, under Rule 37(b)(2), the court may force payment of
certain costs and attorneys’ fees.
The court has wide discretion to choose which of these enumerated sanctions to impose.
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2) (authorizing the court to make any “such orders in regard to the failure
as are just”); Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1226 (“Once a court is willing to invoke the sanctions of
rule 37(b), it has wide discretion in its choice of orders.”). But courts are reluctant to go beyond
this list. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 8A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §
2289 (2d ed. 1994):
[T]he five lettered paragraphs of Rule 37(b)(2), setting out some eight possible
sanctions, are not mutually exclusive. The court may impose several of these specified
sanctions at the same time. . . .
....
The court is not limited to the kinds of orders specified in Rule 37(b)(2), though
courts have been reluctant to impose novel sanctions of a sort not mentioned in the
rule.
(footnotes omitted).
208. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. at 1456.
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fees that Thompson had incurred in attempting to compel discovery
of the records, conducting discovery on the destruction thereof, and
209
pursuing sanctions under Rule 37(b).
Compared to exercise of the court’s inherent powers, as
discussed below in Section B.2, Rule 37(b) sanctions are—by their
nature—summarily imposed. The court need only satisfy itself that
the litigant violated a valid and unambiguous court order.210 The
litigant’s intent, for example, is generally not at issue.211
Nevertheless, the prerequisites for imposing Rule 37(b) sanctions
guarantee that such sanctions will be imposed only for tampering that
occurs late in the game. Though “court order” is broadly defined
under the rule, imposition of Rule 37(b) sanctions generally requires
the existence of a court order of some kind.212 Moreover, courts

209. Id. at 1456–57.
210. See, e.g., id. at 1455–56 (imposing discovery sanctions for bare violation of an order).
The existence of a valid order is not just sufficient but in fact necessary. See GREGORY P.
JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE § 48(A), at 582–83 (3d ed.
2000) (discussing the requirement of a court order for the imposition of sanctions); Shepherd v.
Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that a violation can occur only
where there is an identifiable discovery order); Holcomb v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 774 F.2d 398,
400–01 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[I]f the order of court which the plaintiffs and their attorneys
disobeyed was not itself a valid order, then the sanctions must necessarily fall.”).
211. See Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. at 1455–56 (not requiring a finding of bad
intent); cf. id. at 1454 (examining, in determining whether to exercise the court’s inherent
powers, whether GNC acted in bad faith).
212. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 207, § 2289 (“Rule 37(b) usually has no application if
there has not been a court order.”). However, the order may be oral, JOSEPH, supra note 210, §
48(A), at 582; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 207, § 2289, and in some cases even “constructive,”
GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.4, at 76; JOSEPH, supra note 210, § 48(A), at 583.
Note that some courts have held a party in violation of an order for its failure to produce
documents that it previously destroyed. See Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68,
72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Even though a party may have destroyed evidence prior to issuance of the
discovery order and thus be unable to obey, sanctions are still appropriate under Rule 37(b)
because this inability was self-inflicted.”); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chi., Ill. on May 25,
1979, 90 F.R.D. 613, 620–21 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that American Airlines’ failure to produce
a report due to its undisclosed destruction of that report was a “failure to respond” within the
context of Rules 34(b) and 37(b)).
Note, also, that under other provisions of Rule 37, a standing court order is not a
prerequisite for behavior to be sanctionable. These provisions are less applicable to evidence
tampering. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1) (authorizing sanctions when a party improperly and
harmfully fails to make, update, or correct required disclosures under Rule 26); FED. R. CIV. P.
37(c)(2) (requiring that a party that fails to admit the genuineness of a document or the truth of
a matter, as requested under Rule 36 must pay the other side’s expenses in proving such, if the
document turns out to be genuine or the matter true); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d) (allowing sanctions
for ignoring a discovery request outright); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 207, § 2291
(interpreting Rule 37(d) as not applicable to partial failures of cooperation). But see GORELICK
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generally issue such orders only upon motion by the other side.
Thus, a defendant will almost always enjoy some window of
opportunity between notice of the plaintiff’s claims, via service of the
summons and complaint, and the issuance of an order to permit
discovery of or to produce or preserve certain evidence.214
In the GNC case, for example, a year passed between when
Thompson filed its complaint and when the court issued its first order
215
directing GNC to preserve the business records. Recall that at the
time the order was issued, GNC had not yet destroyed the records. If
GNC had destroyed the records in the window between the filing of
the complaint and the issuance of the preservation order, sanctions
under Rule 37(b) would not have been appropriate. (The court might
have imposed sanctions under its inherent powers, as discussed
below). And even if Thompson had made its request for production
and its motion for an order to preserve at the same time as it filed its
complaint, presumably there would still have been an interval
between GNC’s official notice of Thompson’s claims and
procurement of the preservation order.
In effect discovery sanctions, with their relatively wide range and
toothy character, are imposed upon the tamperer only if her
opponent has made it quite clear that the evidence at issue is
important to his case. The tamperer who risks these sanctions is not
merely on notice of her opponent’s claims or defenses. Nor is she
merely in possession of a discovery request indicating that her
opponent hopes to use this evidence to prove his case. Rather, the
tamperer sees that this evidence is so important to her opponent’s
case that the opponent is willing to go out of his way to motion the

ET AL., supra 12, § 3.6, at 84–85 (attempting to establish a link between sanctions under Rule
37(d) and document destruction perpetrated prior to an order to preserve or produce).
213. See JOSEPH, supra note 210, § 48(A)(1), at 585 (“Except in the case of failure to
disclose . . . the opposing party is required first to move for an order compelling discovery under
Rule 37(a).”); R. W. Int’l Corp. v. Welch Foods, Inc., 937 F.2d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding a
failure to follow the “protocol” of Rule 37 where the opposing party, “[i]nstead of . . .
adjourning the deposition and seeking an order to compel [discovery] . . . elected to bypass Rule
37(a) and seek immediate dismissal of the suit” and holding that “[u]nder such circumstances,
the district court’s premature resort to Rule 37(b)(2) [could not] be upheld”).
214. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1222:
Incredibly, [Rule 37(b)] provides no explicit sanctions against parties who
unjustifiably frustrate anticipated, or even served, discovery requests for documents
by using the office paper shredder. Only when a party destroys documents in the face
of a court order to preserve or produce documents does the rule seem to levy
sanctions.

215.

See Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. at 1445.
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court for an order of preservation or an order to produce. This
characteristic of discovery sanctions will become important in Part
IV.
b. Certification. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 26(g)
216
can also be sources of sanctions for evidentiary foul play. For
example, Rule 11 may apply if a plaintiff lies about facts in her
217
complaint, a defendant denies in his answer a factual assertion by
the plaintiff that he knows to be true,218 or either party submits a false
219
affidavit to accompany a motion or pleading.
220
In the recent case of Margo v. Weiss, for example, ex-members
of the 1960s musical group the “Tokens” sued for a declaratory
judgment that they were co-owners of copyright in the song, “The
Lion Sleeps Tonight.”221 Years before, the Tokens had relinquished
copyright in the song, whose melody was based on an African lullaby,
after learning that the “Weavers” had earlier recorded a song,
“Wimoweh,” based on the same tune.222 Decades later, the Tokens
found out that the lyricists on their later version had cut a separate
deal with the “Wimoweh” copyright holder to retain songwriter
royalties.223 In response, the Tokens filed suit to restore their own co224
ownership. Unfortunately, as each Token independently confirmed
in his deposition, the Tokens had learned of the lyricists’ side deal
more than three years before filing their suit, meaning that their suit
was time-barred.225 After defense counsel informed them of this fact,
the Tokens filed affidavits (with an amended complaint) that

216. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.6, at 84–85. Note, however, that although the
original version of this chapter was written in 1989 and there have been significant changes to
Rule 11 since then, the 2004 cumulative supplement of this treatise does not update assertions
made about this rule. See JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE, § 3.6, at
103–04 (Supp. 2004). Yet another source of sanctions is 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000), the history of
which parallels that of Rule 11. See JOSEPH, supra note 210, § 2(C), at 40–42.
217. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (stating that submission to the court is a certification that
the submitted allegations have or are likely to have evidentiary support).
218. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(4) (stating that submission of denials to the court are
certifications that the denials are warranted on the evidence).
219. See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 544–45
(1991) (treating affidavits as “other papers” under Rule 11).
220. 213 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2000).
221. Id. at 57.
222. Id. at 57–58.
223. Id. at 58.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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“updated,” as it were, their deposition testimony—the group now
claiming in ensemble to have first been informed of the lyricists’ side
deal several years later than originally stated, and within the statutory
226
The district court granted the defendant’s summary
period.
judgment motion and applied Rule 11 to force both the Tokens and
their lawyers to pay $22,000 of the defendant’s attorneys’ fees.227
Notwithstanding this conspicuous example, it is difficult to
ascertain how frequently the current version of Rule 11 is applied in
practice for any purpose, let alone for the purpose of punishing
fabrication. Strengthening amendments to the Rule in 1983
purportedly set off an explosion of “satellite litigation.”228 In response,
229
Rule 11 was in some respects toned down in 1993. Systematic
empirical work on the Rule seems to have followed a similar cycle,
with much activity between 1983 and 1993230 and little thereafter. Less
rigorous sources of evidence, however, do seem to indicate a reduced
role for the amended Rule. On the basis of Rule 11’s new text, Justice
Scalia argued that it had been rendered “toothless.”231 Personal
observation of practice under the amended Rule led Federal District
Judge Milton Shadur to proclaim that “Rule 11 is pretty much

226. Id. at 58–59.
227. Id. at 59.
228. Compare Lawrence C. Marshall, et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NW. U. L.
REV. 943, 950–52 (1992) (finding significant Rule 11 activity in a survey study of selected
districts in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits) with BURBANK, supra note 58, at 60–62
(finding that, for the Third Circuit, Rule 11 motions were made in only .5 percent of all pending
civil cases during the period July 1, 1987 to June 30, 1988, and that 71 percent of attorneys had
sought Rule 11 sanctions no more than once since the 1983 amendments to that rule), and
Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule
11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1957 (1989) (“[M]y personal speculation is that such a study in the
Seventh Circuit might conform the worst fears of Rule 11’s critics.” (emphasis added)).
Regarding reported cases, see Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, No Armistice at
11: A Commentary on the Supreme Court’s 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 3 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 93, 107 (1993):
[T]he volume of increase has been staggering: in the first 38 years of practice under
the original rule, there were about 20 reported decisions addressing the rule; while in
the first nine years of practice under the 1983 Amendment, there were some 6,000
reported decisions under the rule, including 600 decisions by courts of appeals and
four decisions by the Supreme Court.
229. See generally Cynthia A. Leiferman, The 1993 Rule 11 Amendments: The
Transformation of the Venomous Viper into The Toothless Tiger?, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 497
(1994) (reviewing the 1993 textual changes to Rule 11).
230. See, e.g., BURBANK, supra note 58, at 60–62; Marshall et al., supra note 228, at 950–52.
231. Communication from the Chief Justice of the United States Transmitting Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2072, reprinted in 146
F.R.D. 507, 507 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined in relevant part by Thomas, J.).
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232
dead.” Others have made similar pronouncements on the same
233
basis. And the volume of reported activity under Rule 11, however
imperfect an indicator of actual litigation behavior,234 appears to have
235
declined markedly.
There is also some discussion in the treatises and cases of the
possibility of using Rules 11 and 26(g) to sanction the destruction or
suppression of evidence that occurs before issuance of a court order—
236
thus picking up where Rule 37(b) leaves off. Nonetheless, there is
scant evidence that either rule has ever actually been applied in this
237
manner. Possibly, the reason is redundancy. Courts tend to deal

232. Laura Duncan, Sanctions Litigation Declining, 81 A.B.A. 12, 12 (1995) (quoting Judge
Milton Shadur of the Northern District of Illinois). Note that Judge Shadur sits in the Seventh
Circuit which, in contrast to the Third Circuit, was the site of significant Rule 11 activity prior to
the 1993 amendments. See supra note 228.
233. Id. (reporting the similarly morbid impressions of other judges and practitioners—
again, mostly from the Seventh Circuit); Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 626, 643 (1998).
234. See, e.g., BURBANK, supra note 58, at xiii, 4, 55, 59.
235. Duncan, supra note 232, at 12 (reporting results of law firm’s study of Rule 11 motions
reported on Westlaw: “In November 1994, almost one year after the new amendments, there
were 34 percent fewer motions filed than the same month a year earlier.”).
236. The possible hook for sanctions under these rules is that an attorney has failed to
conduct “reasonable inquiry” in responding to a discovery request as required under, for
example, Rule 26(g) if she or her client have in fact destroyed or suppressed the documents that
were supposed to be turned over for inspection. See Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors v.
Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 558 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1987); see also GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, §
3.7, at 85 (discussing the holding of Turnage). Further, if the party then fails to account for the
content of these destroyed or suppressed documents in filing other nondiscovery papers with
the court, then these too are submitted without reasonable inquiry, thus invoking Rule 11. See
Turnage, 115 F.R.D. at 558 n.4; see also Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Turnage for this proposition); GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.7,
at 85 (discussing the holding of Turnage). Note, however, that the 2004 cumulative supplement
to Gorelick’s treatise does not update this discussion to account for the 1993 amendments to
Rule 11. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 216, § 3.7, at 104.
237. Regarding Rule 11, there appears to be no case allowing use of the Rule to sanction the
destruction or suppression of evidence that occurs before issuance of a court order. Rule 11 by
its own terms does not apply to discovery-related papers. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(d). And at least one
court seems to have interpreted this limitation in a manner inconsistent with Gorelick, Marzen,
& Solum’s expansive reading of the Rule. See supra note 12; Bakker v. Grutman, 942 F.2d 236,
241 (4th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Rule 11 to preclude “preemption of Rules 26 and 37 for the
sanction of discovery responses and abuses”).
Rule 26(g) is rarely employed at all. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 207, § 2052:
At the time the 1983 amendments were adopted it was supposed that Rule 26(g) was
at least as important, and would be at least as much used, as Rule 11. That has not
been the case. Rule 11 has been invoked many times, while Rule 26(g) has not been
much used.
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with pre-order evidence destruction by stepping outside the four
corners of the Rules and exercising their so-called “inherent
238
powers.”
2. The Court’s Inherent Powers. Although courts have ventured
farthest upstream by exercise of their “inherent powers,” the same
two regularities apply to this source of sanctioning authority. First, as
a general rule, courts have been reluctant to use such powers to
punish foul play that is perpetrated farther upstream than the filing of
239
the plaintiff’s complaint. Second, to the limited extent that these
inherent powers reach farther upstream than Rule 37(b), additional
requirements are placed on the imposition of sanctions,240 and the
241
sanctions themselves are generally less severe.
a. “On Notice” Requirement Generally. When sanctioning a
litigant under the Rules for disobeying a court order, the analysis is
242
relatively cut and dried. When considering whether sanctions for
evidence destruction are appropriate in the absence of a court order,
courts conduct a murkier and more drawn-out analysis. Courts
generally ask whether the litigant acquired a “duty” to preserve the

JOSEPH, supra note 210, § 41(A), at 533 (“There is a relative scarcity of case law under . . . Rule
26(g) . . . . [F]orce of habit exerts a strong pull. Lawyers and judges still think largely in terms of
Rule 37 to resolve discovery disputes.”).
238. See, e.g., Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 72 (“Courts thus have the power to sanction the
destruction of evidence, whether that authority is derived from Rule 37 or from their inherent
powers.”); see also GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.5, at 77:
For destruction of evidence beyond the reach of Federal Rule 37 . . . courts have
found it necessary to invoke authority existing outside the rules of procedure. They
have found it in a doctrine known as inherent power. Inherent power has been
expressly invoked by numerous courts to justify imposition of sanctions for evidence
destruction.
Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1231 (“[T]he federal trial courts have used their ‘inherent power’ to
levy sanctions on parties to define a legal obligation to preserve evidence not otherwise
specified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). Professor Oesterle is specifically opposed
to the resort to inherent powers. Instead, he proposes an amendment to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1231, 1239–41.
239. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.12, at 103 (“[M]ost courts have imposed
sanctions for destruction of evidence only after suit has formally begun.”); GORELICK ET AL.,
supra note 216, § 3.12, at 126 (“The belief that sanctions are not available for destruction of
evidence before suit is filed may stem, in part, from the limited reach of Rule 37.”).
240. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, at 98–99 (analyzing both inherent powers and Rule
37(b) sanctions together and making a similar point in terms of whether notice was “actual”
(i.e., essentially, whether an order was violated)).
241. See discussion of Lewy v. Remington, infra Part II.B.2.c.
242. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
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243
evidence. In large part, this is a question of whether the destroyer
was “on notice” that the destroyed evidence would be relevant.244 In
general, a party is not “on notice” until suit is filed.245 And in the few
cases where parties were held to be “on notice” prior to filing, the
destroyer’s expectations were usually tightly focused around a
particular lawsuit against a particular opponent.246
Cappellupo v. FMC Corp.,247 often cited for its imposition of
sanctions for pre-filing destruction,248 illustrates these points. In that
gender-based employment discrimination case, the court did in fact
249
invoke its inherent power to sanction defendant/employer’s precomplaint destruction of documents regarding employment practices
250
and records of past complaints of discrimination. What is less often
noted, however, is that FMC began destroying the documents only
one month before service of the complaint251 and continued

243. See, e.g., Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 72; Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593
F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984); see also KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 1–15
(emphasizing the “duty” formulation more than other treatises).
244. See Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. at 1455:
Sanctions may be imposed against a litigant who is on notice that documents and
information in its possession are relevant to litigation, or potential litigation, or are
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and destroys
such documents and information. While a litigant is under no duty to keep or retain
every document in its possession once a complaint is filed, it is under a duty to
preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is reasonably
likely to be requested during discovery, and/or is the subject of a pending discovery
request.
Although this language is frequently quoted in discussions of inherent power, see, e.g., Turner,
142 F.R.D. at 72; GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.11, at 93, it is worth noting that the
findings of fact from the General Nutrition Corp. case itself seem to indicate that all or virtually
all destruction followed a court order, and thus that invocation of the court’s inherent power
was apparently superfluous in that case.
245. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.12, at 104 (“Courts have imposed sanctions
for precomplaint destruction of evidence in [only] a half dozen cases.”).
246. See infra notes 247–254 and accompanying text; cf. KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 20.
(“[C]ompanies do not have a general duty to retain all documents on the theory that a lawsuit
might possibly be filed at some unspecified future time.”).
247. 126 F.R.D. 545 (D. Minn. 1989).
248. See, e.g., Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 72 (citing Cappellupo for this reason); Patton v. Newmar
Corp., 520 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Nesson, supra note 12, at 797 n.21 (same);
Lino Lipinsky et al., Duty to Preserve Electronic Evidence After Enron and Andersen, COLO.
LAW., June 2003, at 58 n.8 (same).
249. The sanction amounted to twice the plaintiffs’ “expenditures resulting from defendant’s
document destruction.” Capellupo, 126 F.R.D. at 553.
250. Id. at 547.
251. Id. at 548, 550 (finding that destruction began in early October 1983, while the
complaint was received in early November of the same year).
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destroying documents for quite some time after the complaint was
252
filed. Moreover, the destruction began only after one of the
plaintiff/employees approached the defendant’s equal employment
opportunity manager and told her that “she was ‘fed-up’ with [its] . . .
gender-based treatment and she was contemplating bringing a class
action gender discrimination charge against the company, based upon
her experiences and observations.”253
How important is it that the defendant in Cappellupo knew of
these specific plaintiffs’ intentions to sue? The defendant had
254
previously had similar legal troubles at another business location.
And one is thus led to speculate whether the court would have
imposed sanctions if the defendant had destroyed the same
documents merely in anticipation of the possibility that some as yet
unspecified employee would file a gender discrimination suit also at
plaintiffs’ location.
As with obstruction of justice, the authority for imposing
inherent powers sanctions when there is no specific plaintiff is
unclear. In formulating the requirement of notice, courts often talk
255
about the anticipated litigation. With few exceptions, it appears that
this encompasses the specific plaintiff. Thus, even if the defendant can
imagine the nature of the claim, so long as she cannot anticipate the
particular plaintiff who will bring it, she generally is not “on notice.”
And she may destroy documents relevant to this, as yet, faceless claim
without invoking sanctions. A designer of a defective product, for
example, is likely free to destroy negative safety test results before
the first unit is sold, probably also before the first plaintiff is injured,

252. Id. at 549 (“Document destruction continued from early October, [sic] 1983, through all
of 1984, and beyond.”).
253. Id. at 546. Thereafter, the defendant “made the decision to systematically destroy . . .
documents relating to . . . employment practices and the employee relations department’s
personally-held records relating to equal employment opportunity and employee complaints of
discrimination.” Id. at 547.
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., id. at 551 (“Defendant’s senior officials and senior employees were on notice
of this potential lawsuit and were acutely aware of its subject.”); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 747 P.2d 911, 914 (Nev. 1987) (“[E]ven where an action has not been commenced and
there is only a potential for litigation, the litigant is under a duty to preserve evidence which it
knows or reasonably should know is relevant to the action.”); KOESEL, ET AL., supra note 40, at
4–8 (explaining that there is no duty to preserve evidence until a case is filed).
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and maybe even after the first plaintiff is injured if the injury precedes
256
the first complaint letter from a customer.
Two exceptions to this general rule in the case law receive
arguably too much attention in the treatises. Consider these in turn.
b. Carlucci and Selective Destruction. In Carlucci v. Piper
257
Aircraft Corp., a federal district court excoriated Piper Aircraft for
its long-standing practice of selectively destroying flight test records
that it thought would be damaging in future lawsuits against
unspecified victims.258 The leading treatise on evidence destruction
seems to imply that the court entered a default judgment and assessed
259
fees against Piper based on this upstream, destructive behavior.
But though clearly disapproving of Piper’s upstream destruction,
the Carlucci court was also careful to note, in the same breath, not
only that Piper’s selective destruction “continued after the
260
commencement of this law suit,” but also that Piper violated several
court orders by failing to produce documents that existed at the time
261
the order was issued. Even more, the court found that Piper’s foul
play extended beyond destruction: it had “consistently disobeyed
orders, obstructed discovery, delayed proceedings and made
misrepresentations to the court.”262 Piper’s upstream evidence
destruction may well have been superfluous to the court’s imposition
of sanctions in this case.
Thus, notwithstanding the court’s disapproval of this upstream
activity, this district court case is scant authority for the proposition

256. This assumes that no regulation requires the retention of such documents. See generally
CCH GUIDE TO RECORD RETENTION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 148 (cataloguing regulatory
retention requirements).
257. 102 F.R.D. 472 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff’d, 775 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir. 1985).
258. Id. at 485–86.
259. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.12, at 105 (offering Piper’s document
destruction as an example of “when a party is engaged in a series of lawsuits and destroys
evidence after litigating the first lawsuit but before another lawsuit has been filed”).
260. 102 F.R.D. at 485–86.
261. See id. at 482:
The fact that Piper has not produced a single document (other than the official
report) relating to its involvement in the . . . investigation [of the crash] is very
damaging in view of defense counsel’s representation to [the] Judge . . . that such
documents existed. Furthermore, defendant has admitted that it destroyed the
originals of the Product Condition Reports . . . despite Judge Paine’s order requiring
their production.
262.

Id. at 488.
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that such behavior on its own is sanctionable at all, let alone by entry
of default judgment against the spoliator.
c. Lewy and Document “Retention” Policies. Even to the extent
that Piper’s upstream destruction would have been independently
sufficient to inspire sanction, Piper may well have avoided the
263
problem by not being as selective (or at least as obviously selective )
in its choice of what documents to destroy. Companies often take
what is essentially a document destruction policy, grant it the
semblance of nonselectivity, and dub it a “document retention”
policy.264 The prevalence of such policies265 is consistent with
indications in both scholarly articles and practice guides that the
policies help to shield the manipulator against inherent powers
sanctions for upstream destruction.266
263. See id. at 481 (reciting strong evidence of selective destruction for the purpose of
avoiding exposure to liability).
264. Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1185–86:
Businesses routinely destroy documents in order to keep the documents out of the
hands of opponents in future legal proceedings. An amusing set of euphemisms has
grown up around the practice: programs of “preventive maintenance” or “law
compliance” include a “document retention” schedule to eliminate “misleading,”
“improvident,” or “erroneous” documents for the purpose of “optimizing the
position” of the corporation in the event of litigation.
265. For an early discussion of document retention policies in the scholarly literature, see
Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 688–89. See also GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 8.2, at 276
(“The vast majority of large business enterprises now has some formal document-management
program.” (citing John M. Fedders & Lauryn H. Guttenplan, Document Retention and
Destruction: Practical, Legal and Ethical Considerations, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW REV. 5 (1980)));
Oesterle, supra note 12, at 1185–86 (“[M]any corporations purposefully operate programs to
destroy evidence . . . primarily to reduce litigation ‘exposure.’”); Solum & Marzen, supra note
38, at 1183 (“The routine destruction of documents, often accomplished through formal
‘document management’ programs, has become commonplace.” (citing AM. SOC’Y OF CORP.
SEC’YS, INC., SURVEY OF RECORDS RETENTION PRACTICES 2 (1971))).
Document retention programs are even more often the subject of articles in the practice
literature. See generally GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, app. A (providing sample policies); id.
app. B (same); KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 16–26 (discussing the importance of
documentation retention policies and providing advice on how to implement them); Fedders &
Guttenplan, supra (providing general advice on document retention policies); Donald S.
Skupsky, Discovery and Destruction of E-Mail, in THE INTERNET AND BUSINESS: A LAWYER’S
GUIDE TO THE EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 47–59 (Joseph F. Ruh, Jr. ed., 1996) (discussing how
e-mail messages are stored and can be used against the author, making recommendations about
how to handle e-mail).
266. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 8.1, at 275 (“In most cases to date, courts have
refused to sanction destruction of evidence under the auspices of those programs . . . .”);
KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 25 (recommending, as a means of dealing with litigation risk,
the implementation of a document retention policy to “include at least annual purging periods
when employees must review records under their control and dispose of those that have
exceeded their retention periods or are otherwise inappropriate for retention”).

080304 SANCHIRICO.DOC

1274

9/17/2004 2:04 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1215

The shield is not invincible. Several courts have expressed a
willingness to pierce the veil of routine destruction. The high water
267
mark in this regard is the case of Lewy v. Remington Arms Co.
Unloading a particular model of Remington rifle required
moving the safety to the fire position.268 When Lewy did so in his
basement, the gun went off, and the bullet went through the ceiling,
269
wounding his mother who was standing on the floor above. To
establish a design defect, Lewy introduced similar-incidents evidence
consisting of Remington’s records of customer complaints and returns
prompted by the same model’s propensity to fire upon safety
release.270 Lewy also “introduced customer complaint letters,
responsive correspondence prepared by Remington, and depositions
and live testimony of some of the customers who complained to
Remington.”271 Still more similar-incidents evidence—in the form of
customer complaints and gun examination reports—had been
destroyed by Remington under its document retention policy,
according to which “records . . . were kept for a period of three years
and if no action regarding a particular record was taken in that period
it was destroyed.”272
Remington’s destruction of these records provoked the following
jury instruction from the trial judge:
If a party fails to produce evidence which is under his control and
reasonably available to him and not reasonably available to the
adverse party, then you may infer that the evidence is unfavorable to
273
the party who could have produced it and did not.

On appeal Remington argued that this instruction was improper
because the destruction had taken place “pursuant to routine
274
procedures.” Importantly, the Eighth Circuit did not affirm the trial
court’s instruction. Rather it announced that it was unable to decide
267. 836 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1988).
268. Id. at 1105.
269. Id. But see KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 21 (stating that Lewy’s bullet hit his wife).
270. Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1108. For a lucid discussion of the admissibility of similar incidents
evidence, see GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 187–91
(1996).
271. Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1108.
272. Id. at 1111.
273. Id.
273. Id. (quoting 3 EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 72.16 (4th ed. 1987)).
274. Id.
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whether the instruction was proper based on the record before it.
Having already decided to remand the case for other reasons, the
Eighth Circuit provided the court below with a list of three “factors”
that it was to consider in determining whether to issue such an
instruction, should the plaintiff again request it.276 First, the court was
to consider “whether [Remington’s] three year retention policy [was]
277
reasonable” for “documents such as customer complaints.”
“Second, in making this determination the court [could] consider
whether lawsuits concerning the complaint or related complaints have
been filed, the frequency of such complaints, and the magnitude of
the complaints.”278 Lastly, the court was to determine “whether the
document retention policy was instituted in bad faith.”279 The Eighth
Circuit’s strongest statement against the propriety of Remington’s
document retention policy was appended—with ambiguous logical
relationship—to the enumeration of these three factors: “[I]f the
corporation knew or should have known that the documents would
become material at some point in the future then such documents
should have been preserved. Thus, a corporation cannot blindly
destroy documents and expect to be shielded by a seemingly
innocuous document retention policy.”280
281
Lewy has received special emphasis in the treatises. In fact,
there are several reasons why Lewy is less important than one might
glean from this elevated position. In the first place, although it was
decided a decade and a half ago, Lewy has gotten far less play in the
courts than it has in legal commentary. Even within the Eighth
Circuit, Lewy is rarely cited to justify sanctions for upstream
282
destruction under a document retention policy. Outside the Eighth

275. Id. at 1112.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 216, at 24–25, 47, 363, 364, 368–69, 370–71, 374,
380 (discussing Lewy); KOESEL, ET AL., supra note 40, at 21.
282. For a limited exception, see Stevenson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 204 F.R.D. 425,
432, 436 (E.D. Ark. 2001) where the court granted a permissive adverse inference instruction
against Union Pacific for recording over “dispatch tapes” under its document retention policy
one year before the case was filed, but after the train crossing accident that killed plaintiff’s
decedent. But see Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL
33352759, at *7 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997) (declining to grant permissive inference for deletion
of relevant e-mails prior to filing of complaint relevant to antitrust suit).
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circuit, Lewy appears to have been cited for its approach to document
retention policies in only one published opinion, Turner v. Hudson
283
Transit Lines, Inc. That case, litigated in the Southern District of
New York, involved a bus accident on the New Jersey Turnpike and
the plaintiff/passenger’s allegations that the bus’s brakes were
faulty.284 Despite an approving citation in the opinion to Lewy’s
strongest language, the facts clearly indicate that the defendant/bus
company destroyed maintenance records only after the plaintiff filed
an amended complaint specifically alleging faulty brakes.285 Indeed,
such destruction was actually in violation of, not pursuant to, the bus
286
company’s own “document retention policy.”
The second reason to question Lewy’s reach is that its language
is particularly elastic. Neither the independent meaning of the three
factors listed by the court nor their logical relationship has ever been
287
adequately clarified. Merely listing three factors to consider gives
no guidance on whether the three factors are to be regarded as
independent necessary conditions, independent sufficient conditions,
or whether a shortage of one factor may be compensated for with a
surplus of another. Similarly, words like “reasonable” are empty
shells without application to specific fact patterns.
In the specific fact pattern of the Lewy case, the docket shows
that on remand the plaintiffs again asked for the adverse inference
instruction, but this time the trial judge, a different judge, declined to
issue it.288 Although the new judge provided no justification for this
ruling,289 one may reasonably infer that he considered the Eighth
Circuit’s three factors and found Remington’s document retention
practice “reasonable” and not in “bad faith,” despite the long list of
similar fire-upon-safety-release incidents. This ruling was not
appealed: conversations with plaintiffs’ lawyers indicate that they let
283. No. 89 Civ. 4252 (PKL), 1992 WL 51570, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 09, 1992).
284. Id. at *1, *3.
285. Id. at *2–*3.
286. Id. at *3.
287. Compare Stevenson, 204 F.R.D. at 428 (“This is not a three-part test where each factor
must be met, but rather three factors to be considered in determining whether sanctions should
be imposed.”), with Concord Boat Corp., 1997 WL 33352759, at *6 (“[T]he Court finds that bad
faith is arguably a prerequisite to giving an adverse inference jury instruction. If it is not a
prerequisite per se it is definitely the primary factor to consider in weighing the appropriateness
of the instruction.”).
288. Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. L, Lewy v. Remington Arms, 836 F.2d 1104
(8th Cir. 1988) (No. 83-3172-CV-S-2).
289. Civil Docket Continuation Sheet at 31, Lewy (No. 83-3172-CV-S-2).
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the ruling on the instruction slide, focused as they were on what they
290
considered to be more important issues.
The third reason to doubt Lewy’s significance is that the
evidence destruction battle in that case was fought over a non-partyspecific, and merely permissive, inference instruction. The battle was
not over entry of a default judgment against Remington, nor over
striking Remington’s answer, nor over imposing sizable monetary
sanctions, nor over a ruling on a mandatory inference that the
destroyed records were damaging to Remington, nor over a
presumption that would shift onto Remington the burden of
291
production on the issue of whether the rifle’s design was defective,
nor even over Lewy’s attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with
292
procuring the instruction. As Professor Nesson has argued, it is hard
to consider an adverse inference a sanction at all. A negative
inference from spoliation seems no worse than the negative inference
that the evidence would have inspired had it not been destroyed and
instead had been admitted into evidence.293
Excepting fee awards, this adverse inference instruction—
frequently referred to as the “spoliation inference”—is often the most
severe sanction issued under the court’s inherent powers when these
powers are extended beyond the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.294 Conversely, it is interesting to note that the enumerated

290. Telephone Interview with Rich Miller, Attorney (Aug. 30, 2002).
291. Cf. Friedman, supra note 122, at 1968 (“[I]t is probably rather rare that a case of
spoliation is sufficiently serious to justify a true presumption, actually shifting the burden of
production, rather than simply supporting the case of the spoliator’s opponent.”).
292. Indeed, not only was the punishment merely an adverse inference based on missing
evidence, it was also an adverse inference instruction in a case in which the evidence that did
make it to the jury—including customer complaints from the immediately preceding three-year
period and the testimony and personal records of similarly situated customers who were
uncovered by Lewy’s lawyers—seems to have been sufficient on its own to support a finding
that the rifle was defective. See Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1107–08 (8th Cir.
1988). In this regard, one should note that Lewy and his mother (both plaintiffs in this case)
obtained a favorable verdict on remand, without the benefit of the instruction, and were
awarded damages totaling $165,000. Lewy v. Remington Arms Co, Judgment in a Civil Case,
No. 83-3172-CV-S-4 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 20, 1989).
293. See Nesson, supra note 12, at 797. But see Friedman, supra note 122, at 1964 (“[M]issing
evidence inference is extremely useful and powerful. Its strength lies in large part in its
informality . . . .”).
294. See Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (9th Cir. 1993) (ordering the lower court
on remand to revise the adverse inference instruction given so as not to require a finding of bad
faith); Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1112 (requiring the lower court on remand to consider several factors
regarding Remington’s document retention policy before giving adverse inference instruction);
Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1982)
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sanctions under Rule 37(b) for violation of a court order, as discussed
295
above, do not even include the adverse inference instruction. In the
context of evidence destruction, the weakest remedy in Rule 37(b)’s
list is that the fact finder take as given facts the opponent would have
proven with the destroyed evidence.296 This remedy is quite a bit
stronger than inviting the jury to make inferences from an absence of
297
evidence that the jury may have made in any event.
d. Lewy, Carlucci, and Virtual Filing. Even if one considers
Carlucci and Lewy to have made inroads into upstream destruction, it
is important to note that they both share a particular characteristic
that makes the evidence destruction in those cases practically
equivalent to destruction after filing. In both cases the defendants had
previously faced a series of similar incidents, some of which had
resulted in other lawsuits.298 Both cases concerned defects in product
design—in Lewy, firing on safety release, in Carlucci problems with
aerodynamic stability—that had already affected a number of
customer/plaintiffs in essentially the same way.299 In practical effect,
notice of the first few suits was as good as notice of the rest to come.
Similarly, in other cases that have stretched the court’s inherent
powers, the evidence was destroyed prior to filing, but following a
serious accident to a specific plaintiff that was likely to lead to

(upholding lower court’s use of adverse inference instruction based on both evidentiary and
policy rationales); Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 204 F.R.D 425, 436 (E.D. Ark. 2001)
(instructing the jury that destroyed records would have been adverse to the defendant).
295. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2). The court would not be precluded from employing this
remedy. See supra note 207.
296. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
297. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 2.8, at 36–37 (arguing that spoliation evidence is
relevant and should at least be admitted, if not made the subject of an adverse inference
instruction); GORELICK ET AL., supra note 216, at 17–26 (same). But see 22 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5178 (1978)
(arguing against admissibility). On balance, courts exercise the same caution in admitting
spoliation evidence as they do in admitting evidence of flight. See, e.g., Caparotta v. Entergy
Corp., 168 F.3d 754, 757–58 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding inadvertent spoliation more prejudicial than
probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403). Part of this caution derives from the perceived
risk of an improper character inference from the bad act of spoliation, for example, to the bad
act of unsafe product design. See id. at 756 (“[A]n adverse inference drawn from the destruction
of records is predicated on bad faith by the defendant.”).
298. See Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1107–09; Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472, 478–79
(S.D. Fla. 1984). This point is emphasized in GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 3.12, at 105,
which categorizes Carlucci in this group of cases, and KOESELL, ET AL., supra note 40, at 20–21,
which categorizes Lewy under a similar heading.
299. Lewy, 836 F.2d at 1105; Carlucci, 102 F.R.D. at 474.
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300
litigation. In Stevenson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., for example,
the plaintiff’s decedent was hit by a train at a railroad crossing.
Shortly after the accident, but before filing, the defendant railroad
recorded over tapes of concurrent conversations between the train
crew and the dispatcher.301 Arguably, notice of the decedent’s death
was as good as notice of the survivor’s lawsuit.

3. New Trial and “Fraud upon the Court”. When foul play
comes to light only after final judgment, courts are usually reluctant
to reopen the case.302 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make it
difficult to reopen the case ten days beyond entry of judgment,303 and
even more difficult after a year has passed.304 Beyond a year, the only
possibility for relief is the court’s inherent power to vacate the
judgment upon finding that it was obtained by a “fraud upon the
court”.305 But “fraud upon the court” is a term reserved for bribery of
a judge or, perhaps, fraud perpetrated by an “officer of the court.”
Plain old spoliation or even perjury by a party or witness is not
enough.306
300. 204 F.R.D. 425 (E.D. Ark. 2001).
301. Id. at 429–31.
302. See Nesson, supra note 12, at 798 (“Once a trial is over, the risk from disclosure of
previously suppressed evidence diminishes . . . . rapidly . . . . [I]f you can suppress evidence for a
year after the verdict, you are home-free.”).
303. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(b) (“Any motion for a new trial shall be filed no later than 10
days after entry of the judgment.”).
304. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (stating that relief from a judgment or order based on factors
such as mistake or fraud may only be obtained for up to one year following a proceeding).
305. Id.
306. See 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2870
(3d ed. 1995):
[T]he courts have refused to invoke this concept in cases in which the wrong, if wrong
there was, was only between the parties in the case and involved no direct assault on
the integrity of the judicial process. Nondisclosure by a party or the party’s attorney
has not been enough.
The cases in which it has been found that there was, or might have been, a “fraud
upon the court,” for the most part, have been cases in which there was “the most
egregious conduct involving a corruption of the judicial process itself.” The concept
clearly includes bribery of a judge or the employment of counsel in order to bring an
improper influence on the court.
....
Cases of perjured evidence are troublesome. There are a few cases in which the
courts have said that this was a fraud upon the court, even in the absence of any
suggestion that any officer of the court was a party to the perjury . . . . But there is a
powerful distinction between perjury to which an attorney is a party and that with
which no attorney is involved.
(footnotes omitted).
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C. Independent Civil Actions: The Gentle Arc of the Spoliation Tort
Can a private litigant bring an independent tort action against a
litigation opponent for damage to the litigant’s case caused by the
opponent’s evidence tampering?307 Despite the general position
among scholars that such actions should be maintainable,308 the
309
answer, in most jurisdictions, is “no.”
There was some controlled rejoicing when a California trial court
310
recognized an independent tort of spoliation in the mid-1980s. But
311
only a small minority of jurisdictions followed suit. Moreover, in the
late 1990s, California’s Supreme Court shut down the spoliation tort
312
in that jurisdiction as well. At this point, courts in only about a
dozen states have recognized some form of spoliation tort.313 In fewer

307. Consistent with this Part’s focus on the federal system, note first that, in principle, the
underlying case might be one that was or could have been brought in federal court.
Furthermore, a federal court might obtain subject matter jurisdiction over the derivative
spoliation claim by either diversity or supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1367
(2000). There is also a federal civil rights cause of action for certain kinds of obstruction of
justice. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (2000).
308. See generally Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for Uncertainty: Making Evidential
Damage Actionable, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891 (1997). See also GORELICK ET AL., supra note
12, § 4.1, at 140 (“[D]estruction of evidence itself gives rise to liability rather than enhancing,
through inferences and constructive admissions, the likelihood of recovery on some other
basis.”). But see Friedman, supra note 122, at 1981–86 (arguing, in specific response to Porat and
Stein, supra, that the role for a tort action for evidentiary damage is “quite a narrowly confined
one” and probably restricted to cases where evidentiary damage is caused by a third party).
309. See Porat & Stein, supra note 308, at 1893 (“Liability for evidential damage is
recognized by the law only in exceptional cases, typically involving intentional destruction or
suppression of pivotal evidence. Subject to these exceptions, which are yet to crystallize into
bright-line rules, evidential damage is generally irremediable.”).
310. See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing
the tort of spoliation in a prospective products liability action); see also GORELICK ET AL., supra
note 12, § 4.3, at 142–43 (citing Smith with approval).
311. See generally KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 75–172 (reviewing each state’s laws as of
2000).
312. See Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223, 233 (Cal. 1999) (rejecting tort
of third-party spoliation); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal.
1998) (rejecting tort of first-party spoliation).
313. See generally KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 75–172. According to Koesel, the states
that currently recognize an independent tort of spoliation include (with qualifications noted):
Alabama (only for third-party spoliation, but also for negligent spoliation); Alaska (only for
intentional spoliation, not for negligent spoliation); District of Columbia (possibly only for
third-party spoliation, but includes both negligent and reckless spoliation); Florida (not yet
considered by Florida Supreme Court); Idaho (not expressly adopted); Illinois; Indiana
(apparently limited); Kansas (rejected by Kansas Supreme Court, but accepted in “some
circumstances” by federal district court applying Kansas law); Louisiana (not yet considered by
Louisiana Supreme Court); Montana (limited to third-party spoliation, but includes both

080304 SANCHIRICO.DOC

2004]

9/17/2004 2:04 PM

EVIDENCE TAMPERING

1281
314

still, has recognition been endorsed by the state’s highest court.
According to one practice guide, which catalogues the law of all fifty
states in this regard, recent decisions “signal a trend away from
adopting spoliation of evidence as a separate tort.”315
Even in those jurisdictions that recognize the tort, its incremental
practical effect may be more modest than first appears. Consider, for
example, the central case of intentional spoliation by a party
316
opponent. At first glance, the tort seems greatly to expand the set of
remedies and sanctions by offering monetary compensation—beyond
fee reimbursement—to the victim of the spoliation. But in a sense the
set of procedural and evidentiary remedies for foul play do already
compensate the victim, albeit in a procedural and evidentiary
currency. Such remedies include, for example, taking certain facts as
given or allowing an adverse inference instruction.317 These remedies
translate into monetary awards by increasing the chance of a
favorable verdict in the underlying case or increasing the level of
damages awarded.318 In principle, then, the spoliation tort, which
319
compensates for expected favorable verdicts foregone, covers the
320
same injury as procedural and evidentiary remedies. It would seem,
therefore, that the curative effects of procedural and evidentiary

negligent and intentional spoliation); New Jersey (not yet considered by New Jersey Supreme
Court; lower courts are split); New Mexico (requiring specific and malicious intent); Ohio (only
intentional); and Pennsylvania (only for third-party spoliation). Cf. id. at 50–51 (producing a
similar list). Koesel also indicates that several leading jurisdictions, including New York,
California, and Massachusetts, have specifically declined to recognize the spoliation tort. Id. at
84–87, 138–40, 117–19.
314. See, e.g., id. at 65 (“[T]he Supreme Court of New Mexico recently reaffirmed its
recognition of the spoliation tort . . . .”).
315. Id. at 65–66.
316. Cf. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.1, at 140 (describing the creation and
evolution of the spoliation tort in common law jurisprudence); KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at
50–67 (providing elements of the tort of spoliation and recent common law developments
relating to the tort).
317. See supra Part II.B.
318. See Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]n an action
for negligent or reckless spoliation of evidence, damages arrived at through just and reasonable
estimation based on relevant data should be multiplied by the probability that the plaintiff
would have won the underlying suit had the spoliated evidence been available.”).
319. See Petrik v. Monarch Printing Co., 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1320 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (“[W]hat
plaintiffs lost, and what they were to be compensated for, was an ‘expectancy’—the value of the
opportunity to win their suit.”).
320. Cf. Friedman, supra note 122, at 1984 (arguing the stronger proposition that whenever
recovery is warranted under the spoliation tort it would also be warranted in the underlying
action).
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remedies would have to be subtracted in calculating spoliation tort
321
322
damages. Possibly, in the spirit of the contractual duty to mitigate,
or the tort doctrine of avoidable consequences,323 attempting to secure
324
preverdict remedies would be a prerequisite for later recovery.
Thus, the incremental effect of the spoliation tort must lie in the
narrow intersection between those injuries that procedural and
evidentiary sanctions could not cure, and those injuries that are
nonetheless concrete enough to be compensable in tort.325
That said, other potential sources of incremental effect do
become apparent when one moves beyond the traditional spoliation
model. First, in some jurisdictions the spoliation tort reaches
326
negligent spoliation. Second, in some jurisdictions the tort applies to
spoliation by nonparties—as when the garage to which the damaged
car is towed junks the car despite plaintiff’s repeated requests to
preserve it for evidence.327 Third, in some jurisdictions there is
authority that the victim of spoliation may bring a separate claim

321. It appears that no case has addressed this issue directly. Some support is offered by
Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 783 So. 2d 1087, 1094–95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). In that case, plaintiff
joined to an underlying contract claim a spoliation tort claim regarding defendant’s behavior in
the same suit. Defendant argued that it would be improper for the plaintiff to recover on both
claims because this would be in effect double counting. The court responded that it would not
be improper to the extent that the spoliation lowered plaintiff’s award on the contract claim:
A party significantly impaired by the destruction of evidence may still be able to
prevail in an action for breach of contract on the basis of existing evidence, albeit to a
lesser extent and for reduced damages . . . .[T]he spoliation claim permits recovery for
those missing damages that but for [defendants’] destruction of evidence, [plaintiff]
otherwise would have been able to prove. The total measure of damages remains the
same—namely, the amount of money due [plaintiff] under the contract. Cf. Friedman,
supra note 122, at 1985 (implicitly assuming that subtraction is proper).
322. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14.15 (4th ed.
1998).
323. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 458
(5th ed. 1984) (“The Rule of avoidable consequences comes into play after a legal wrong has
occurred, but while some damages may still be averted . . . .”).
324. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal. 1998) (requiring
mitigation by raising spoliation issues in the underlying suit); GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, §
4.21, at 165 (stating that the plaintiff must ask “for discovery sanctions or for the spoliation
inference in the underlying action” and that “if these remedies prove insufficient, then the
spoliation tort action may be brought”).
325. Cf. Friedman, supra note 122, at 1984 (asserting in effect that this intersection is
empty); see also KOESEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 53 (finding that courts that decide against
recognizing the spoliation tort are primarily persuaded by the “uncertainty of damages,” as well
as the existence of other adequate remedies).
326. These are Alabama, Montana, Florida, and the District of Columbia. KOESEL ET AL.,
supra note 40, at 55.
327. Id. at 66.
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following final judgment in the underlying action when it has learned
of the spoliation after it was too late to raise the issue in the
328
underlying action. Nonetheless, if current trends continue, even
these incremental effects will be confined to a small and ever
shrinking list of jurisdictions.
D. Professional Responsibility
Rules of professional responsibility and conduct essentially add
another layer of sanction to the battery of laws and rules prohibiting
evidentiary foul play in the case where the perpetrator is an
attorney.329 In general, however, they do not expand the range of
sanctionable behavior.
With respect to evidence destruction, such rules stipulate that
attorneys may not “unlawfully” destroy evidence, nor counsel clients
330
to do the same. On its face, this does not reach beyond the laws and

328. Id. at 62–64; Nesson, supra note 12, at 798. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b), (d)
(allowing amendments to conform to the evidence and supplemental pleadings, respectively).
On the other hand, some courts have held that when the victim discovers the spoliation before
trial, the victim must join the spoliation claim with the underlying action. KOESEL ET AL., supra
note 40, at 62–63; see also Nesson, supra note 12, at 798 (“If efforts to obtain a new trial fail, the
spoliation victim might bring an independent suit for the tort of spoliation. Only [a few] states
have expressly recognized such a tort, however . . . .”).
329. Such sanctions include disqualification from serving as attorney in the instant case,
Briggs v. McWeeny, 796 A.2d 516, 542 (Conn. 2002); suspension from the practice of law for a
fixed period with reentry contingent upon passing the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination, Statewide Grievance Comm. v. DeLucia, No. CV02080512, 2003 WL 1900869, at
*4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2003); indefinite suspension, In re Carey, 89 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Mo.
2002) (en banc); revocation of attorneys’ pro hac vice status, Bank of Hawaii v. Kunimoto, 984
P.2d 1198, 1219 (Haw. 1999); disbarment, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blum, 818 A.2d 219,
237 (Md. 2003); refusal to grant the offending lawyer’s party’s request to exclude evidence,
Bradley v. Brotman, 836 So. 2d 1129, 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); setting aside of the verdict
in the primary suit, United States v. Adens, 56 M.J. 724, 735 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2002);
specifying that designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, precluding
the introduction of certain evidence at trial, striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying
further proceedings pending compliance with an order that has not been followed, dismissing
the action in full or in part, entering default judgment on some or all the claims, an award of
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 552 S.E.2d
10, 18 (S.C. 2001); and the imposition of both state and federal sanctions for the same violation,
In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). See supra note 97 (discussing the
common assertion that these rules are rarely enforced—however written).
330. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2002) (“A lawyer shall not: (a)
unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a
document or other material having potential evidentiary value.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (1980) (“In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: . . .
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal.”); id. DR 7-
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rules discussed above. Indeed, the reach may be narrower, because
331
“unlawful” may be interpreted to mean “criminal.” Only one
jurisdiction has explicitly made clear that evidence destruction may
be sanctionable even where that destruction does not rise to the level
of criminal behavior.332
Another rule of professional responsibility prohibits conduct that
333
is “prejudicial to the administration of justice.” On its face such a
provision might reach beyond unlawful behavior.334 But despite the
advocacy of several commentators, apparently only one jurisdiction
335
has explicitly adopted this broad interpretation.
With respect to the fabrication of evidence, the rules essentially
prohibit lawyers from committing perjury when they make
336
representations to the court. Thus when a lawyer perjures herself,
109(A) (“A lawyer shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to
reveal or produce.”).
331. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 7.7, at 258 (questioning whether such rules
prohibit only that behavior made unlawful by the criminal law and noting that in some
jurisdictions, “the obstruction of justice statute is severely limited or does not extend to civil
litigation”).
332. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 216, § 7.7, at 358–59 (citing the single jurisdiction, the
District of Columbia, which has supposedly broadened the reach of its Rules of Professional
Conduct to prohibit “obstruction” of an imminent or pending proceeding, which in any event
would seem to be illegal under modern obstruction of justice statutes). But see GORELICK ET
AL., supra note 12, § 7.7, at 255–60 (arguing strenuously that the definition of “unlawful” should
be extended).
333. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (“It is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to: . . . (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . .”);
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A) (“A lawyer shall not: . . . (5) [e]ngage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”).
334. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 566 (1985) (“Rule 8.4(d)
signifies that there are other offenses [in addition to crimes or violations of other Model Rules]
against a tribunal or against the administration of justice not covered in those Rules.”).
335. District of Columbia Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Op. 119, at 4 (1983). See
Solum & Marzen, supra note 38, at 1128–30 (referring to the District of Columbia’s application
of this provision). Later work by the same authors is not as clear about the rarity of this
interpretation. GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, at 261 (using the Missouri case of In re Bear
578 S.W.2d 928, 935 (Mo. 1979) as the only “example” of the proposition that “decisions under
the Model Code [refused] to limit the duty not to destroy evidence to cases in which such
destruction would be unlawful”). Yet in Bear, the attorney erased a tape recording of the
police’s post-Miranda interrogation of the juvenile suspect, which would seem to be illegal on
many scores.
336. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 advisory committee’s note 3:
An advocate is . . . usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters
asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client,
or by someone on the client’s behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. . . . However,
an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer’s own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the
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additional professional sanctions are layered on top of the usual
337
criminal sanctions. Lawyers also have an uncertain obligation to
uncover or prevent their clients’ perjury—one that is tempered by the
“obligation to present the client’s case with persuasive force” and the
general view that an advocate “is not required to present an impartial
exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a
cause.”338
E. Summary
Criminal law, civil procedure, tort law, and rules of professional
responsibility all prohibit evidence tampering in suits between private
parties. From these diverse and tortuous prohibitions two general
patterns emerge.
First, all of these sanctions are concentrated far downstream of
the litigation-inspiring event: A party may be in contempt of the court
only if before the court; Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 only
comes into play after the complaint has been filed; perjury can only
be committed under oath; and the omnibus obstruction of justice
provision section 1503 requires that the proceeding be pending.
Moreover, with regard to the exercise of inherent powers, a careful
reading of the cases indicates that the courts have been reluctant to
exercise such powers to sanction pre-filing destruction. This
reluctance is all the greater when no specific plaintiff looms on the
horizon. A fortiori, document “retention” policies that are not
specifically directed at destroying potentially damaging records
appear to remain a largely effective means of insulating document
destruction from this source of sanction. Even section 1512(c), the
newest obstruction of justice provision, which makes general
obstructive behavior criminal even when there is no pending
proceeding, may not extend to defendants who destroy evidence as
part of routine document “retention” policies, or who, more
generally, do not have a specific suit with a specific opponent in mind.
Second, even in the downstream reaches of the litigation flow
wherein tampering is punished, the farther downstream the

lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer
knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably
diligent inquiry.
337. Id. scope (“Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a
basis for invoking the disciplinary process.”).
338. Id. R. 3.3 advisory committee’s note 2.
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tampering, the more far reaching the prohibition. Of the two perjury
statutes, for example, section 1623, which prohibits lying only in
judicial proceedings and depositions, is in other respects broader in
scope than its counterpart section 1621, which applies any time a
statement is made under oath. Likewise, the fact that contempt may
be summarily imposed corresponds with its use far downstream.
A similar pattern emerges from the untidy array of procedural
and evidentiary sanctions. Here Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
37(b) and inherent powers stand out as the main sources of
sanctioning authority in practice. A court order to compel discovery
under Rule 37 is only issued at the insistence of the opposing party.
But if that order is later violated penalties will be summarily and
almost certainly imposed. If the court wishes to punish tampering
somewhat farther upstream, it must use its inherent powers. The
imposition of sanctions under this authority is hardly summary. The
court must find that the offender had a “duty” to preserve the
evidence, an inquiry which implicates the “reasonableness” of the
destruction as well as the nexus between the destruction and the
litigation. Moreover, as compared to the list of sanctions laid out in
Rule 37(b), the typical inherent powers sanction is relatively lenient—
an adverse inference instruction, which would seem to place the
spoliator in the same position she would be in if she had not spoliated.
III. IS THE LAW TOO LAX?
According to your grandfather, a job worth doing is a job worth
doing well. According to your management consultant, 20 percent of
the effort yields 80 percent of the results. Neither admonishment, of
course, is as universally valid as these advisors make it seem. The
right amount of effort to devote to a task depends upon the relative
trajectories of costs and benefits as effort is increased. Sometimes, for
example, the benefits quickly level off, and 20 percent is nearly as
good as 80 percent, at one quarter the cost. Sometimes, in contrast,
the benefits are initially elusive, and 80 percent, though four times
more expensive, is fifty times more effective.
When it comes to society’s task of policing evidentiary
manipulation, the trajectory of social benefits is starkly dependent on
what one takes to be the object of trial. This in turn produces
significant differences in what one views as the right amount of antitampering enforcement. As shown in this Part, under the
conventional view of trial as a search for truth, there is good reason to
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believe that the effectiveness of anti-tampering enforcement grows,
over much of its range, with each additional degree of effort devoted
339
to the task. It follows that, from a truth-finding perspective, policing
evidentiary foul play is likely to be one of those jobs that is worth
doing well, if it is worth doing at all.
And yet, your grandfather would probably be disappointed by
the current system of anti-tampering enforcement. As demonstrated
in Part I, the law apparently regards antimanipulation enforcement as
a job worth doing halfheartedly. One possible response is to conclude
that the litigation system is now, and has been for some time, in a
state of fundamental disrepair. An alternative reaction, however, is to
entertain the possibility that uncovering microhistorical truths about
past transactions and occurrences is not, in fact, the primary purpose
of trial—that trial’s primary purpose lies not in discovering what
happened, but in shaping what happens.
Shifting perspective from already filed cases to still undecided
conduct does in fact raise the very real possibility that the current
system is more savvy than sloppy. As this Part establishes, if trial is
regarded as but one component of a larger mechanic directed at
shaping everyday behavior, the effectiveness of anti-tampering
enforcement declines with each additional degree of effort devoted to
the task. It follows that, from a primary activity incentive perspective,
anti-tampering enforcement may very well be a job worth doing
“poorly”; a task for which 20 percent of the effort does indeed yield
80 percent of the benefit.
Although fleshing out the foregoing claims is a central purpose of
this Part of the Article, a number of other points of independent
interest lie en route, and these will also be developed.
As the preceding discussion suggests, the key to comparing
optimal enforcement levels under alternative social objectives is to
compare how the incremental social benefits of additional
enforcement depend upon the current level of enforcement. But
before understanding how incremental benefits change, one must first
understand their source and nature. This is the object of this Part’s
first Section. Section A establishes that such incremental benefits are
markedly different depending on whether one views truth-finding or
primary activity incentive-setting as the object of trial.

339.

See infra Part III.B.
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The analysis in Section A has independent conceptual interest
apart from its role in the comparison of optimal enforcement levels. It
adds to our understanding of the extent to which primary activity
340
incentive setting is not—as most would assume —an ally for truthseeking in the competition among social objectives that shapes
procedural and evidentiary law.
After establishing this difference in the nature and source of
incremental social benefits, the analysis moves on to examine the
implications of this difference for the law of anti-tampering
enforcement. Section B returns to the comparison of how the
incremental benefits of additional enforcement depend on the current
level of enforcement. Based on this comparison, it concludes that the
law’s halfhearted regulation of evidence tampering is far more easily
reconciled with a primary activities approach to trial than with the
conventional conception of that institution as a truth-seeking
exercise.
Section C then considers the optimal method of enforcement, as
opposed to its optimal level. The inclusion in this Part of some
discussion of the law’s chosen method of enforcement is warranted by
the fact that some portion of the general claim that the law is too lax
is probably best regarded as a criticism of enforcement method,
rather than overall enforcement intensity. Consider, for example, the
claim, examined in Part I, that too few perjurers are caught. This
claim by itself is incomplete as a statement about the overall intensity
of enforcement because it does not take into account how much the
law invests in sanctioning those who are caught. The claim gains
coherence, however, if it is interpreted as a criticism of the law’s
chosen balance between sanction level and detection frequency—in
particular, that the law relies too little on detection and too much on
sanction. Likewise, commentary that specifically derides the law’s
refusal, as discussed in Part II, to go back and correct tampered
litigation outcomes is directed not at the law’s overall enforcement
level, but at the fact that the law has chosen to downplay a particular
type of remedy. Section C of this Part concludes that both of these
aspects of the law’s chosen method of enforcement—its de-emphasis
on both detection and correction—are also more easily reconciled
with primary activity incentive setting than with truth-finding. Thus
whether one measures laxity in levels or in methods, the primary
activity approach is a better fit for the data of existing law.
340.

See, e.g., supra note 14.
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Many of the arguments made in this Part are supplemented by
341
discussion and formal analysis in the Appendix.
A. The Purpose of Policing Evidence Tampering
1. Thought Experiment. To fix ideas, we will focus throughout
this Part on the following thought experiment involving the law of
product liability. Upstream, in the primary activity, a manufacturer
decides whether to adopt a safe design for its product. Downstream,
closer to, or even during litigation, the manufacturer decides whether
to destroy documents relevant to product safety, including, for
example, those produced by product testing.342 The question for
consideration in this Section A: what are the social benefits of
marginally increasing the expected sanction for document destruction
in this setting? In particular, how do the social benefits of this policy
differ when the object is to provide incentives for safe product design
rather than to find the truth about whether a safe design was
adopted?
2. A Taxonomy of Potential Evidence Tamperers. The best
place to begin the analysis is downstream, with the following inquiry:
when would the manufacturer destroy evidence? No doubt, the moral
sensitivity of managers and employees is one determinant. But, given
343
the focus here on Holmes’ “bad person,” let us consider a colder
calculus. Thus, imagine that the manufacturer destroys documents
when it believes that the documents’ expected impact on the outcome
of prospective litigation would be unfavorable enough to justify
344
bearing the expected private costs of the destruction.

341. The Appendix considers several important details and caveats, including 1) the role
played by the trajectory of social costs, 2) the role of the “infra-marginal nontamperer,” as
defined within, and 3) the role played by changes in the density of “marginal tamperers,” also as
defined within. See infra app.
342. This hypothetical is evocative of several prominent cases of evidence destruction. See,
e.g., Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1111–13 (8th Cir. 1988); Capellupo v. FMC
Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 549–51 (D. Minn. 1989); Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472,
485–86 (S.D. Fla. 1984). See supra Part II.B.2 for a detailed discussion of these cases.
343. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
344. This calculus is suggested in some of the practice literature. See GORELICK ET AL.,
supra 12, § 9.1, at 298 (“[I]f the content of certain documents is worse than the inference that
would be drawn from their destruction and there is no current, pending, or imminently
foreseeable request for them, they may be destroyed.”). See also Nesson, supra note 12, at 794–
805 (reviewing the “bad man’s” decision to spoliate).
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The impact of evidence destruction on the outcome of the
litigation depends on the degree to which the outcome of the case
hangs on the kind of evidence that the manufacturer is considering
destroying. This, in turn, depends on the magnitude of the damages at
issue in the suit as well as the chance that the evidence to be
destroyed would be decisive in determining what, if any, damages are
imposed.
The manufacturer’s private cost of evidence destruction, on the
other hand, includes both the expected losses from any ancillary
litigation punishing the destruction—including both the expected
outcome of this satellite litigation and the expected costs of lodging a
defense therein—and the cost of any additional activities undertaken
in an attempt to avoid such secondary litigation losses—such as would
be incurred in destroying the evidence of the destruction itself.
Both in terms of perception and reality, these private costs and
benefits of destroying documents will differ widely across
manufacturers. But given any level of anti-tampering enforcement, it
suffices for our purposes to identify three “types” of manufacturers.
First, there are the marginal tamperers: those for whom tampering is
just barely worthwhile given their perception of the current array of
private costs and benefits.345 Second, there are the inframarginal
tamperers: those for whom the private benefits of tampering exceed
the private costs by a discreet amount so that they would continue to
tamper despite any marginal increase in the private cost of doing so
borne from additional enforcement. Last are the inframarginal
nontamperers: those who choose not to tamper and would continue
to make the same choice even were anti-tampering enforcement
reduced on the margin.
With this typology in place we will now review the benefits of
increasing anti-tampering enforcement in terms of how it affects each
of these classes of manufacturers. In particular, because truth-finding
and primary activity approaches divide mainly over their effects on
the first two types—the marginal and inframarginal tamperers—we
will focus on these in the analysis to follow. First, we consider the
benefits of increasing anti-tampering enforcement under the truthfinding approach, and then, under the primary activity incentives
approach.
345. Put another way, a “marginal tamperer” is a tamperer that stops tampering in response
to either a marginal decrease in the private benefits of tampering or a marginal increase in the
private costs.
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3. Truth-Finding Benefits of Anti-Tampering Enforcement. The
truth-finding benefits of a marginal increase in anti-spoliation
enforcement come from two sources. First, the marginal tamperer
stops destroying documents. Because these documents now make it to
court, the verdict imposed will tend to be closer to the ideal verdict in
these cases. Second, increasing anti-tampering enforcement also has
an inframarginal truth benefit. Additional enforcement effort not
only prevents spoliation, it may also increase the frequency with
which document destruction is detected. When such destruction is
detected, case outcomes can be rectified—e.g., by means of a
spoliation inference instruction.346
4. Primary Activity Benefits of Anti-Tampering Enforcement.
The primary activity incentive to adopt a safe design is generated by a
combination of two factors. First, there is the array of anticipated
litigation payoffs contingent on ending up as each possible type of
downstream tamperer. Second, there is the manner in which choosing
a safe, rather than unsafe, design affects the likelihood of ending up
as each kind of tamperer. A policy change increases the incentive for
safe design to the extent that it worsens the payoffs of types that are
more likely following unsafe design and improves the payoffs of types
that are more likely following safe design. Consider, for example,
what would happen to primary activity incentives if a policy change
worsened the litigation position of the inframarginal tamperer, all else
the same. If adopting a safe design minimizes the likelihood of ending
up as an inframarginal tamperer, this policy change would increase
the incentive to adopt a safe design.
a. Converting the Marginal Tamperer. As noted, increasing the
private cost of evidence destruction will cause the marginal tamperer
now to refrain from destroying evidence. But the fact that this
marginal tamperer has markedly changed its behavior does not mean
that its litigation payoff—as the manufacturer perceives this potential
payoff from a primary activity perspective—has also markedly
changed. In fact, its litigation payoff will remain virtually the same.
While it is true that the verdict and remedy imposed in the primary
litigation are now more likely to go against this manufacturer for the
fact that it is no longer destroying these documents, it is also true that
this manufacturer is no longer engaging in the evidence destruction
346.

See Part II.B.2, supra, for a description of this device.
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and so is no longer facing the expected private costs of this form of
obstruction. Because this tamperer is marginal—i.e., because it had
perceived destruction’s private benefits to be roughly commensurate
with its private costs—these two effects cancel each other in their
effect on the tamperer’s all-in litigation payoffs. Thus, increasing the
private cost of evidence destruction merely transmutes the marginal
tamperer’s litigation loss from the private cost of evidence destruction
347
to the private cost of worsened litigation outcomes.
The crucial point here is that the primary activity incentives
created by litigation are as much a matter of private litigation costs as
of litigation outcomes—an aspect of the primary activity approach
that distinguishes it from the verdict centrism of the truth-seeking
approach. From the prospective litigant’s perspective, as it is choosing
its behavior in the primary activity, the principal concern is the degree
to which it would be worse off in litigation if it chooses the “bad act”:
in the example at hand, marketing an unsafe product. Whether the
litigant is worse off for having to “pay” expected private destruction
costs, or worse off for having to pay in the form of a less favorable
expected verdict is immaterial. Supposing, on the contrary, that the
manufacturer in the example cares more about dollars in the form of
damages than it does about dollars in the form of tampering costs is
like imagining that the manufacturer plans its affairs with only gross
income in mind, ignoring the effect of taxes.
Thus, to the extent that the potential litigant anticipates that it is
either more or less likely to be a marginal tamperer as a result of
“misbehaving” in the primary activity, its incentive to refrain from the
bad action remains essentially the same after anti-tampering
enforcement is increased.
It may well be that the most salient, dramatic and, morally
uplifting aspect of heightened anti-tampering enforcement is its
ability to make an honest litigant out of the spoliator. And, in fact, it
is true, as noted, that this is one of the two important functions of
anti-tampering enforcement when truth-finding is taken to be the
purpose of trial. From the perspective of setting primary activity
incentives, however, the social benefit of additional enforcement
effort cannot derive from its ability to convert the marginal sinner

347. This analysis continues to hold when, realistically, the manufacturer’s interest in the
outcome of the present suit reaches beyond the current litigation to suits by future plaintiffs.
Accounting for future litigation just requires a redefinition of who is marginal. By the same
logic, it continues to hold under a variety of fee- and cost-shifting rules.
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into the marginal saint. If there is a social benefit of additional
enforcement, it must lie elsewhere.
b. Taxing the Inframarginal Tamperer. Counter to intuition, the
main primary activity incentive benefits of additional enforcement
come mainly through the effect on those whom the additional
enforcement fails to deter. These inframarginal evidence destroyers,
though they continue to destroy evidence in the face of additional
enforcement, are positively worse off in litigation due to the
348
enhanced enforcement. To the extent that safe design lessens the
manufacturer’s chance of ending up in this worsened position, the
incentive to choose a safe design increases.
In more detail, increased anti-tampering enforcement reduces
the inframarginal tamperer’s litigation payoffs for several reasons.
First, the tamperer is more likely to be called to task for its
destruction in a secondary proceeding. This means not only that it is
more likely to face sanctions in satellite litigation, but also that it is
more likely to have to pay the cost of defending itself against an
obstruction indictment or a motion for procedural or evidentiary
sanctions. Second, in the primary layer of litigation, to the extent that
the probability of detection is increased, spoliation will be less often
successful at improving litigation outcomes. Thus, the inframarginal
spoliator will now be partially denied access to what was a relatively
cheap method of minimizing litigation losses. Third, prior to the
primary litigation, the inframarginal tamperer will now be inclined to
expend additional effort in perpetrating her destruction in order to
avoid detection and sanction.
Reducing litigation payoffs for the inframarginal tamperer
improves the manufacturer’s primary activity incentives to the extent
that choosing an unsafe product design makes it more likely that the
manufacturer will find itself in the position of the inframarginal
tamperer in prospective litigation. Because it is now a worse fate to

348. Several commentators have brushed lightly against this point’s outer reaches. See, e.g.,
GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 1.15, at 19 (“[A] strict [document destruction] regime could
generate a . . . chilling of the production of useful documentary evidence . . . . Chilling the
creation of documents evidencing unlawful activity, however, directly increases the cost of
lawbreaking itself.”); Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 717 (discussing author’s proposed statute
requiring retention of antitrust documents: “[T]he proposed statute would not completely
frustrate those who would purposefully violate the substantive laws. Refuge could often be
found in the simple expedient of not making records. At least this route would be inconvenient
for them because it is usually better business practice . . . to make [such a] record . . . .”).

080304 SANCHIRICO.DOC

1294

9/17/2004 2:04 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1215

end up as an inframarginal tamperer, anything that the manufacturer
can do in the primary activity to avoid this fate seems more attractive.
Choosing the good primary activity action rather than the bad is one
of these things. The good primary activity action is less likely to emit
damaging evidentiary emissions and more likely to emit favorable
emissions. Thus, the manufacturer who adopts a safe design upstream
predicts that it is less likely to find evidence destruction worthwhile
downstream.
Drawing an analogy to tax policy may be helpful here. Increasing
anti-spoliation enforcement is like taxing manufacturers who find
themselves in the position of the inframarginal spoliator. Because
manufacturers who adopt unsafe designs are more likely to find
themselves in this position, taxing inframarginal spoliators is like
taxing (albeit probabilistically) the design of unsafe products. A tax
on unsafe design is, of course, an incentive to adopt a safe design. It is
important to note, however, that this is a tax paid in secret. The court
may never learn that the product was unsafe or that the manufacturer
is paying additional costs for its evidence tampering as a result of its
design choice.
Another way to see the same point is to recognize that safe
design is like a substitute (in the economic sense) for document
destruction in generating the manufacturer’s expected payoffs in
product liability litigation. Spoliation and safe design are two ways to
increase expected product liability litigation payoffs. Both have a
price, however. The price of spoliation includes the legal risk
therefrom. The price of adopting a safe design includes the reduction
in profit margins from not cutting corners. When the price of
spoliation is increased—via increased anti-tampering enforcement—
we can expect the manufacturer to shift toward other methods of
avoiding product liability litigation outcomes. One of these is to
choose a safe product design.
5. Summary. The truth benefits of marginally increasing antitampering enforcement are twofold: (1) the additional information
that flows into the court as a result of converting the marginal
tamperer to honest evidence production, and (2) the additional
information that flows into court because those who still insist on
tampering are more often caught in the act.
In contrast, if the object of trial is to set primary activity
incentives, converting the marginal tamperer is essentially of no
consequence. Under this objective, the social benefits from enhanced
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enforcement come primarily from worsening the downstream payoffs
of those who find the higher cost of tampering still worth incurring, a
situation more likely to arise following choice of an unsafe design
upstream.
B. The Optimal Enforcement Level
Having established the different nature and source of
incremental social benefits under the truth-seeking and primary
activity approaches, we now move on to examine how these different
incremental benefits change as the level of enforcement is increased.
From this analysis we draw our main conclusion about differences in
the optimal level of enforcement.
The Section begins by establishing that the social benefits of antitampering enforcement are self-dampening under a primary activity
approach to trial. It then moves on to explain why the social benefits
of anti-tampering enforcement are self-enhancing under the
conventional truth-finding approach to trial. It concludes by
examining the implications of these findings for the optimal level of
anti-tampering enforcement under each alternative social objective.
1. Self-Dampening Primary Activity Benefits. Section A.4.b
established that the primary activity benefits of increased antitampering enforcement accrue mainly through increasing the
effective tax on inframarginal tamperers. The impact of increasing
this tax depends on the chance that the bad action (more so than the
good) puts the actor in a position wherein she chooses to pay this
tax—that is, puts her in the position of the inframarginal tamperer,
wherein the potentially unfavorable effect of a given piece of
evidence on the case’s outcome still outweighs the private costs of
destroying that evidence.
The primary activity benefits of additional enforcement are selfdampening because the greater the level of anti-tampering
enforcement, the lower the chance of ending up in this position
following unsafe design. To take an extreme example, when antispoliation enforcement is particularly aggressive, the bad primary
actor simply does not expect to find herself in a position where
spoliation would still be worthwhile. The benefits from spoliation
would have to be improbably high. Therefore, any decrease in
prospective litigation payoffs in this attenuated contingency is
unlikely to cause her to change her primary activity behavior. More
generally, the greater the current level of anti-tampering
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enforcement, the smaller the chance that the bad actor will end up in
a position where tampering is still worthwhile, and the smaller the
effect on primary incentives of additionally raising the cost in this
349
contingency.
2. Self-Enhancing Truth Benefits. The self-dampening dynamic
just described follows from the hypothesis that primary activity
incentive setting is the main purpose of litigation. When the same
analytical hardware runs the more conventional program of truthseeking, the outputted dynamic is likely to be self-enhancing rather
than self-dampening. The more the legal system is currently doing to
prevent evidence tampering, the greater the incremental benefits of
further increasing prevention.
As noted in Section A.3, the truth benefits of anti-tampering
enforcement come mainly from two sources: conversion of the
marginal tamperer and the corrective effect on trial outcomes of
nabbing the inframarginal tamperer. Let us now review these in turn
with an eye toward how these positive effects change in magnitude as
anti-tampering enforcement increases. As we shall see, the former
conversion effect is markedly self-enhancing over the relevant range,
whereas the latter corrective effect is likely neutralized by a
crosscurrent of conflicting forces.
a. Converting the Marginal Tamperer. Recall that when we
throw an additional dollar at anti-tampering enforcement, we deter
the marginal tamperer. Because the marginal tamperer is no longer
misleading the fact finder, the verdict actually imposed is closer to the
ideal verdict in these cases.
But how much closer? That depends on the expected impact that
the marginal tamperer’s spoliation was having on the outcome of the
case. Importantly, this impact is likely to be larger the greater the
current level of enforcement.
As we begin to increase the private cost of spoliation starting
from a low level, we tend to discourage those who believe that
spoliation has only a moderate impact on case outcomes. As we
continue to increase the private cost of spoliation, our converts to
honesty are those who believe that their evidence destruction would

349. When there is a nontrivial chance that safe product designers may also find tampering
worthwhile, the primary activity benefits of additional anti-tampering enforcement need not be
monotonically self-dampening. Yet they will still be self-dampening in general trend. See app.
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have had a greater and greater effect on the court’s findings of fact.
As we drag the net farther and farther out to sea, in other words, we
catch bigger and bigger fish. The conversion of each additional
spoliator, thus, has a greater and greater benefit in terms of aligning
actual case outcomes with ideal case outcomes. And therefore, the
more we have already increased anti-tampering enforcement, the
350
more attractive it is to increase enforcement even further.
b. Nabbing More Inframarginal Tamperers. Additional
enforcement effort not only prevents evidence destruction, it also
leads to more frequent detection when destruction still occurs. If the
authorities actually catch a greater number of inframarginal
spoliators, then a greater number of case outcomes can be corrected.
In determining the trajectory of the truth-finding benefits of antitampering enforcement, this second effect must also be considered.
But unlike the effects considered thus far, this effect is fundamentally
ambiguous.
In one respect, the effect is self-dampening. The greater the
current level of anti-tampering enforcement, the fewer individuals are
currently spoliating. Like fishing on an overfished lake, additional
enforcement effort is less likely to have much corrective benefit when
remaining situations in need of correction are scarce and difficult to
find.
And yet, in another respect, the effect is self-enhancing. As the
set of inframarginal tamperers diminishes due to increasing
enforcement, authorities may be able to more effectively target their

350. Indeed, in a schematic version of this argument, the truth benefits of beefing up antitampering enforcement increase exponentially in the current level of enforcement. If the
expected private cost of evidence destruction is $1,000, then the marginal spoliator expects that
her spoliation will change the outcome of litigation by $1,000. Increasing her cost of spoliation
starting from $1,000 thus results in an expected increase in trial accuracy of $1,000 for this
marginal spoliator. Similarly, increasing the cost of spoliation starting from $2,000 increases
expected trial accuracy by $2,000 per marginal spoliator. And increasing the cost of spoliation
starting from $1,000,000 increases expected trial accuracy by $1,000,000 per marginal spoliator.
Of course, the truth benefits of additional enforcement do not accelerate ad infinitum.
Eventually the private cost of spoliation becomes so high that marginal tamperers are few and
far between. Thus, while the incremental truth benefits per marginal tamperer continue to rise,
the total incremental truth benefit of increasing the cost of tampering eventually stops climbing
and begins to fall. But, almost by definition, this tapering off will not become decisive until the
level of enforcement effort is well beyond the middling range. Thus, it plays no role in the
explanation for why a middling level of enforcement intensity is inconsistent with a truth-telling
approach. Over the relevant range for the present analysis, the truth benefits of anti-tampering
enforcement accelerate as anti-tampering enforcement effort is increased. See app.
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detection and enforcement effort. Authorities can focus on the now
smaller set of litigants where the apparent stakes from spoliating
appear to be high enough to make the destruction of evidence still
worthwhile. With enforcement resources no longer spread so thin,
leads can be followed in greater depth. Thus, although a smaller inframargin does imply that there are fewer spoliators, it also implies that
a larger percentage of this smaller number can be caught.
In the end, the presence of these two countervailing effects
makes it impossible to say whether the inframarginal truth benefits of
additional enforcement are self-enhancing or self-dampening. The
existence of opposing forces, however, does perhaps create a
presumption—albeit one rebuttable by empirical investigation—that
inframarginal truth benefits are not so largely self-dampening on net
as to overwhelm the self-enhancing effect concerning marginal
tamperers, as explained above.
3. The Optimal Level of Anti-Tampering Enforcement. We have
seen that the primary activity incentive benefits of anti-tampering
enforcement are self-dampening, while the truth-finding benefits are
self-enhancing. Intuitively, this suggests that the optimal level of antitampering enforcement is lower under the primary activity approach
than under the truth-finding approach. In fact, the logical implication
is not so bold, but still quite informative. While a middling level of
anti-tampering enforcement is consistent with the primary activity
approach to trial, it is inconsistent with the truth-finding approach.
Because the truth benefits of additional enforcement are selfenhancing, if it were worthwhile increasing anti-tampering
enforcement to a middling level, it would also be worthwhile
continuing to increase it. Whatever the size of the incremental benefit
that convinced us to turn the enforcement dial from low to medium,
an even greater incremental benefit accrues to turning the dial from
medium to high.
To be precise, the claim is not that we would necessarily want to
turn the dial from low to medium, but only that if we did so we would
not want to stop there. Thus, the analysis tells what optimal
enforcement cannot be (medium) and not precisely what it is (as
between low or high). In other words, the conclusion is that, from a
truth-finding perspective, anti-tampering enforcement is indeed a job
worth doing well, if it is worth doing at all.
In contrast, if the object of trial is to set primary activity
incentives, then a middling level of enforcement is a plausible
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candidate for the social optimum. Quite possibly, by the time we
reach this middling level, the self-dampening primary incentive
benefits of additional enforcement have fallen to such extent that
additional enforcement effort would not be worthwhile. Quite
plausibly, therefore, a modicum of effort yields most of the results.
C. The Optimal Method of Enforcement
As noted, when commentators bemoan the law’s apparent
laxness with regard to evidence tampering, some part of this concern
goes not to general enforcement levels, but to specific enforcement
methods. In particular, the infrequency with which tamperers are
called to task, as well as the law’s reluctance to go back and correct
distorted litigation outcomes are specific sources of dismay—sources
which are logically distinct from overall enforcement intensity. This
Section discusses both the frequency of detection and the importance
of correcting litigation outcomes. As with general enforcement
intensity, it concludes that the law’s current practice is far better
aligned with primary activity incentive setting than with truthfinding.351 After analyzing these issues under each approach in turn,
the Section compares the results of these analyses to existing law.
1. Truth-Finding. As noted in the previous Section, the truth
benefits of anti-tampering enforcement derive not just from deterring
the tampering, but also from uncovering the tampering activity of the
inframarginal tamperer and correcting the effect of this tampering on
the underlying proceeding. This has implications for both the proper
frequency of detection and the corrective nature of tampering
remedies.
With regard to the frequency of detection, it is well known that
deterrence is the product of both this frequency and the sanction
imposed conditional on detection. Many considerations go into
determining the proper mix of these two factors. But when the
undesirable action is evidence tampering, and one takes a truthfinding approach to trial, an additional reason is added to the list of
those favoring detection frequency over sanction magnitude.

351. That primary activity and truth-finding approaches have different implications for the
method of enforcement justifies the implicit qualification in this Article’s introduction that the
social costs are only “roughly” the same across the two approaches. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
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To see this, consider raising the sanction on evidence tampering
while lowering the frequency of detection, in such manner as to hold
constant the generated level of deterrence. The proponent of truthfinding would not be indifferent to this rearrangement. Although the
same number of marginal tamperers are converted to honest
litigants—and, as noted, this is a boon for truth-seeking—those who
still choose to tamper are less frequently caught, and the outcome of
litigation is more frequently in error. Thus, all else the same, the
proponent of truth-finding prefers to deter with a high rate of
detection rather than a high level of sanction. For truth-finding, the
former method kills two birds with one stone by both preventing
tampering and more frequently allowing it to be corrected.
Part and parcel with the fact that it leans toward detection
frequency, the truth-finding approach also has an additional reason to
prefer that the sanctions themselves are corrective of underlying
litigation outcomes. Merely fining spoliators, for instance, does
nothing to correct litigation outcomes that have already been skewed
by the spoliation.
2. The Primary Activity Incentives Approach. The primary
activity approach lacks the same impetus both to emphasize detection
frequency over sanction level, and specifically to correct skewed
litigation outcomes. From a primary activity perspective, the best way
to raise the private cost of tampering is simply that which incurs the
lowest social cost. All that is important is that from an ex ante
viewpoint, the primary activity actor anticipates worsened litigation
outcomes for inframarginal tamperers. For the purpose of influencing
the actor’s primary activity choices, precisely how this tax is
imposed—aside from the issue of how much its imposition costs the
public—is of secondary importance.352
Consider how this imbues the primary incentive proponent with
a different attitude toward the two enforcement-method issues
considered in this Section. First, in terms of the balance between
detection probabilities and sanction levels, the primary activity
proponent faces a trade-off in generating the tax on inframarginal
tamperers that is similar to that faced by the proponent of truthfinding. But the primary activity proponent lacks the truth-seeker’s

352. This point is related to one made in Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the
Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON. 191, 192–93 (1996) (finding that courts should impose
ex ante expected damages on injurers, rather than actual ex post damages).
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additional reason to favor detection over sanction level: namely, the
desire to correct as many litigation outcomes as possible. Thus, in
choosing how best to produce a given expected sanction for
tampering, the primary activity approach suggests a lower optimal
frequency of detection and a higher optimal sanction relative to the
truth-seeking approach.353
Secondly, it is clear that when sanctions are imposed for evidence
tampering, the primary activity approach also has less concern for
whether those sanctions actually correct past litigation outcomes. This
is not to say that the primary activity approach has no concern for
correction.354 The point is rather that the primary activity approach
lacks the additional impetus to correct litigation outcomes implied by
the truth-finding approach. And thus to the extent that primary
activity considerations are predominant, one would expect to see less
of an effort to correct outcomes.
3. Existing Law and Practice. Existing law and practice seem
more in line with the primary activity approach on both scores. In
terms of the balance between frequency of detection and size of
sanction, there is some indication that perjury and obstruction are
355
rarely punished, especially in civil actions between private parties.
And yet, as noted in Part I.B, when these activities are punished, the
sanctions are relatively high. The sentence in the federal system for

353. It would not be correct to conclude that the primary activity approach would favor
driving detection probabilities to zero and sanctions to infinity, despite how the theory of
enforcement is sometimes caricatured. For example, because it raises the procedural and
evidentiary effort expended by the parties, see Kakalik et al., supra note 91, at 634–50, raising
sanctions is not in fact a costless alternative to raising detection probabilities. This point has
recently been explored in relation to the question of whether what plaintiffs recover should
equal what defendants pay in damages. See Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Special Levies on
Punitive Damages: Decoupling, Agency Problems, and Litigation Expenditures, 15 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 175, 175–76 (1995) (questioning the effectiveness of “special levy” statutes, which
“require plaintiffs to hand over portions of their punitive damage awards to the state”); A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and
Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562, 562–63 (1991) (advocating “decoupled liability,” whereby
“the plaintiff is awarded an amount different from what the defendant is made to pay,” as a
method for reducing social costs); Albert Choi & Chris W. Sanchirico, Should Plaintiffs Win
What Defendants Lose?: Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of Decoupling, 33 J.
LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming June 2004) (considering “the infra-marginal effects of both
decreasing recovery and increasing damages”).
354. The incentives of plaintiffs and victims must also be considered, and such incentives
may be enhanced if these parties are confident that the impact of the defendant’s false evidence
will be nullified.
355. See supra Part I.B.
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either obstruction or perjury is at least ten to sixteen months in
356
prison. The reputational and economic sanction—both short- and
long-term—that this entails looms large for the average litigant who
happens, for example, to be in court defending her firm’s failure to
perform on a contract, or her firm’s apparent lack of care in designing
a potentially hazardous product. The loss of future income from
serving a prison term would pale in comparison to whatever this
agent of the firm stood to gain—in terms of short-run profits or career
advancement—by shorting the customer or cutting corners on
product design.
Furthermore, as noted in Part II, when sanctions are imposed
under current law, they rarely correct the underlying litigation result.
Conceivably, on convicting litigant X for obstruction of justice for
destroying documents during pending litigation, the law might
sanction her by going back to correct the outcome in the case that she
won by virtue of this destruction. Making her pay back what she won
in that case would be one way to fine her. But this rarely happens.
Unless there has been a “fraud upon the court”—which, as noted,
means more than mere obstruction by a private litigant—or the
obstruction is caught within a year after entry of judgment, that
judgment will generally stand, even as the convicted obstructer is
sentenced to time in prison.357
The spoliation inference instruction—a jury instruction
“permitting” the jury to infer that nonproduced evidence would have
been unfavorable to the party that had control over the missing
evidence—at first appears to be a form of corrective remedy. But the
effectiveness of this form of instruction is seriously open to question.
First, the instruction does not prescribe a mandatory inference; it is
not even a presumption, which would shift the burden of production.
It is merely a suggestion to jury members, without any follow-up from
the court, that they may, if they like, draw a particular inference. And
this is an inference they may already be drawing, especially given that
the spoliation victim is usually free to admit evidence of the spoliation
358
and argue on its own accord for the inference. Secondly, even if the
jury takes important cues from the judge’s instruction, the judge will
issue the instruction only if there is sufficient indication that the
missing evidence was indeed unfavorable to the spoliator. Evidence
356.
357.
358.

See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.3.
See supra note 297.
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used to establish the content of the missing evidence will often itself
be admissible directly to prove the underlying propositions for which
the spoliated evidence would have been offered. Therefore, in many
cases the judge will be issuing the spoliation instruction precisely
when the inference encouraged by that instruction is unnecessary
given available evidence on the same point. In this case, the only new
information conveyed to the jury will be the judge’s displeasure with
the spoliator. To the extent that the instruction has any effect,
therefore, the effect seems more punitive than accuracy-inducing, as
359
other commentators have remarked.
D. Summary
The truth-seeking approach to trial puts great weight on both
deterring tampering and correcting its effects. The primary activity
approach is more concerned with lowering the litigation payoffs of
those who still find tampering worthwhile, and thereby raising the
private cost of socially disfavored primary activity choices. This
different locus of concern manifests in different prescriptions for antitampering policy.
Importantly for our evolving sense of trial’s purpose, the
prescriptions of the primary activity approach seem more in line with
current law. The primary activity approach is more consistent with
the middling attitude toward anti-tampering enforcement that seems
to characterize the existing regime. Moreover, the primary activity
approach is also better aligned with current law’s reliance on high
sanctions rather than frequent detection, as well as its reluctance to
go back and correct litigation outcomes skewed by tampering.
IV. IS THE LAW MYOPIC?
According to the conventional assessment of the rules regulating
evidence tampering—an assessment informed by the view that trial is
primarily a truth-seeking enterprise—the law in this area is myopic.
Its almost exclusive focus on tampering that occurs while litigation is
pending or imminent merely encourages tamperers to shift their

359. See, e.g., Maguire & Vincent, supra note 120, at 258 (finding that in granting a
spoliation inference instruction, “courts sometimes adulterate their logic with punitive
enthusiasm”).
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operations upstream, away from the time of filing, and beyond the
360
law’s limited reach.
This Part of the Article suggests that what is myopic is not the
law’s approach to evidence tampering, but rather the analytical
approach to such law that focuses solely on the direct control of
tampering activities. More broadly defined, “the law” does not, in
fact, focus solely on downstream tampering. Instead, the law simply
employs a set of devices for the control of upstream tampering that
does not include the array of criminal, procedural, and evidentiary
sanctions examined in Part II.
Section A explicates those upstream devices. In the process, it
provides two explanations for why anti-tampering law has always
seemed shortsighted under the conventional view. In the first place,
the devices used to control upstream tampering are so much a part of
the accepted fabric of evidence law as to be virtually invisible. As
with an optical puzzle, one must purposefully adjust one’s point of
focus to bring these features to the fore. Secondly, such features do
not regulate upstream tampering in a way that makes sense under the
dominant truth-seeking approach to trial. Their role becomes clear
only when one regards evidence production as a component of the
law’s overall project of regulating primary activity behavior.
Sections B and C argue that these upstream devices are crucial to
understanding the truncated reach of direct regulations. Section B
critiques the leading alternative justification for the downstream focus
of direct regulation. Section C argues that direct regulations are
merely picking up where the subtler devices examined earlier in this
Part leave off.

360. See supra note 119. Note that the substitution into upstream activity produced by the
law’s downstream focus can also come in the form of preventing the creation of documents in
the first place. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 1.15, at 19 (“[A] strict [document
destruction] regime could generate a . . . chilling of the production of useful documentary
evidence.”). But see KATZ, supra note 13, at 52–59 (suggesting that the law may not be to blame
for a “forbidden result” no longer being forbidden); Leo Katz, Subornation of Perjury: A
Definition, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1988, at A23 (arguing that the requirement that there be a
pending investigation does not create a loophole in the law).
Yet, another form of substitution is upstream document creation. See Beckstrom, supra
note 12, at 716 n.100 (“[A]ntitrust counselors, while urging early destruction of records in
general, are agreed that one of the tenets of a good ‘antitrust compliance program’ is the
thorough documentation of exculpatory information whenever companies take action in an area
that is ‘antitrust sensitive.’” (emphasis added)).
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A. The Ex Ante Inscrutability of Fact-Finding
Why is evidence law so permissive regarding how parties choose
361
to prove their claims or defenses? Such a rule seems to ignore an
important externality: the proponent of evidence does not pay the full
cost of its consideration by the fact finder.362 Perhaps the law should
be more discriminating in this regard, admitting only evidence whose
363
consideration is socially, as opposed to just privately, worthwhile.
Perhaps it should do more to insure that only the “best evidence” is
364
considered.
Some insight into this fundamental puzzle of evidence law is
provided by viewing the ad hoc nature of fact-finding as one part of a
kind of “decoy” strategy. Roughly stated, the clearer the parties’
sense of precisely which of the evidentiary emissions of their primary
activity choice will be decisive in future litigation, the more effectively
they can target their destruction and fabrication efforts. And the

361. Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 279,
279 (1996) (identifying the “core principle (albeit with exceptions) of legally unregulated factfinding,” also termed “the doctrine of ‘free proof.’”). See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining
“relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence”); FED. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution . . . Act of Congress, [or] by these rules . . . .”); see also
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186–87 (1997) (“[T]he Government invokes the
familiar, standard rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own
choice . . . . This is unquestionably true as a general matter.”).
362. Federal Rule of Evidence 403, whose central purpose is to guard against “unfair
prejudice,” also permits the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by . . . considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” Yet, Rule 403 is hardly used as a device for internalizing evidence costs.
Nor are many of the other rules by which certain forms of evidence are inadmissible. On this
particular externality, see the discussion in Sanchirico, Character, supra note 14, at 1250–52 and
sources cited therein.
Regarding the full set of externalities at issue here, see e.g., Steven Shavell, The Social
Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 333–
34 (1982) (arguing that in deciding whether to file, plaintiff ignores both (1) the defendant’s
litigation expenses, and (2) the primary activity incentives created by litigation, and proposing
that the combination of these effects can result in a surplus or deficit of lawsuits).
363. Stein, supra note 361, at 279 (criticizing from a truth-finding perspective the “core
principle (albeit with exceptions) of legally unregulated fact-finding” and “oppos[ing] the
doctrine of ‘free proof’”).
364. Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 227 (1988):
[M]y thesis is that there exists, even today, a principle of evidence law that a party
should present to the tribunal the best evidence reasonably available on a litigated
factual issue. This principle is not absolute . . . . Nevertheless, it is a general principle
that manifests itself in a wide variety of concrete rules governing the trial process.
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more effectively parties can tamper with evidence, the lower the
litigation risk from taking the bad primary activity action. These
benefits of inscrutability weigh against the obvious drawbacks of a
system that is not as choosy as it might be about the evidence it
365
entertains.
1. Thought Experiment: Broadening the Range of Potentially
Unfavorable Evidence. To explore more fully the impact of factfinding inscrutability on evidence tampering and litigation objectives,
imagine the following thought experiment. First, suppose that we
have identified the full set of “evidentiary emissions” that are more
likely to be generated following the defendant’s “bad” primary
activity behavior than following her “good.” Second, imagine a
system—more restrictive than our own, with its lenient relevancy
requirement—that admits as proof of defendant’s bad behavior only
those evidentiary emissions for which the probability of generation
following bad behavior exceeds by some threshold the probability of
generation following good.366 If the difference in probabilities does
not meet this threshold, a more stringent manifestation of Federal
367
Rule of Evidence 403 prohibits admission: the evidence is judged to
be insufficiently probative of bad behavior to justify the public
368
expense of hearing it.
Third, starting from this system, imagine broadening the range of
evidence that counts toward liability—thus moving toward our actual
system. As shown within, this broadening will magnify the
defendant’s incentive to choose the good primary activity action. At
the same time, it will have an ambiguous effect on the court’s ability
to find truth.

365. Stein, supra note 361, at 279. The ad hoc nature of fact-finding exacerbates other
sources of organic uncertainty that are already present. For instance, a manufacturer will face
uncertainty regarding not just what evidence plaintiffs will use against it in court, but also which
of its customers end up as plaintiffs, and which of its products lead to accidents.
366. Alternatively, and to the same effect in the following discussion, we could imagine
establishing a threshold for the ratio, rather than the difference, of these conditional
probabilities. This ratio corresponds to the likelihood ratio in the odds formulation of Bayes’
Rule.
367. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (granting trial judge discretion to rule relevant evidence
inadmissible when “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice [and] waste of time”).
368. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is rarely invoked for this kind of “efficiency” purpose.
More commonly, it is employed to avoid undue prejudice.
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2. Effect on Primary Activity Incentives. When relatively few
pieces of evidence are admissible, the defendant can focus her
evidence destruction efforts. Conversely, the more forms of evidence
that are admissible, the more the defendant has to spend destroying
evidence in order to avoid liability—or, put another way, the less
effective at avoiding liability is any given level of effort devoted to
evidence destruction. Thus, broadening the set of evidence that may
count toward the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion raises the
defendant’s cost of avoiding liability via tampering. This thereby
decreases the defendant’s litigation payoffs in states of the world
where the set of natural evidentiary emissions would be sufficient for
liability. These states being more likely following “bad” primary
activity behavior, the end result is an increase in the defendant’s
incentive to eschew such bad behavior.
To take a schematic, but illustrative, example, suppose that
following the defendant’s choice in the primary activity, any number
of twenty different “pieces” (i.e., forms) of damaging evidence are
emitted into his possession. The emission of each of these pieces of
evidence is more likely following the defendant’s choice of the bad
primary activity action than following his choice of the “good.” But
some of these pieces of evidence are more socially preferable than
others. Their probability difference may be greater, or their
probability levels lower, or they may just be less expensive to present
and hear. The precise reason for the social preference is not
important here.
Evidence system 1 chooses the very “best” piece of evidence
from the twenty and insists that imposition of liability rests solely on
the plaintiff’s presentation thereof. A defendant who wants to avoid
liability can, of course, always choose the good primary activity
action. But in this first system, he also has the relatively viable
alternative of taking the bad action—which he finds less costly in the
primary activity—and focusing his efforts instead on preventing or
destroying this best piece of evidence, whenever it is emitted.
Compare this with evidence system 2. This system chooses the
“top ten” pieces of evidence from the full set of twenty and stipulates
that only these are admissible. It then requires that the plaintiff
369
present at least five of these to meet her burden of persuasion.
369. The text stipulates that five, rather than one, out of the top ten must be presented to
suggest the fact that by adjusting the number of pieces of evidence required from the admissible
set, evidence system 2 may be made roughly comparable in terms of its true and false positives
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Destroying or preventing evidence is now a less attractive means of
avoiding liability. Formerly, the defendant could focus his destruction
efforts on the single best piece of evidence. Now to avoid liability
entirely the defendant must destroy the excess, if any, of the number
of emitted pieces of evidence over four. For example, if five pieces
are actually emitted, the defendant avoids liability by destroying one.
If seven are emitted, the defendant avoids liability by destroying
three. And if all ten pieces are emitted, the defendant avoids liability
by destroying six.
Choosing the good primary activity is a more attractive means
for the defendant of avoiding liability in system 2 than in system 1. In
system 1, taking the good primary activity action competed with the
relatively easy alternative of taking the bad action and (more often)
precluding or destroying a single pre-specified piece of evidence. In
system 2, the alternative to the good primary activity action is not as
attractive. To guarantee exoneration, for example, the defendant
would have to prevent or destroy the emission of up to six pieces of
evidence. Alternatively, monitoring only one piece of evidence—as
was completely effective in system 1—only somewhat reduces, and
does not eliminate, the possibility of being held liable in system 2.
In evidence system 3, each of the twenty pieces of evidence is
ruled admissible and the burden of proof may be met by the
presentation of any ten. Relative to system 2, avoiding liability by
evidence tampering is now even more expensive. Avoiding liability
requires destroying the excess, if any, of the number of emitted pieces
of evidence over nine. Thus the required amount of destruction now
ranges from one to eleven, rather than from one to six. Turning these
evidentiary emissions off at the source—by taking the good primary
activity action—now seems all the more attractive.
The mechanism at work here is reminiscent of strategies
employed in other areas. We may imagine that when the queen of a
particularly troubled country traveled about, the coach that
transported her was randomly and secretly selected from her fleet and
then sent out as one in a sequence of departures along with other
empty coaches acting as decoys. On the one hand, this procedure
meant that the queen did not always travel in the fastest and most
comfortable carriage. On the other hand, it helped to confound her
would-be assassins. In particular, it raised the cost of producing any
to evidence system 1. Note in this regard that the existence of any one of the top ten would be
far more likely than the existence of a particular one of the top ten.
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given likelihood that she came to harm. An assassin had to attack all
coaches to guarantee his objective. Correspondingly, attacking only
one coach had less of an impact on the probability that the queen
would actually come to harm. One hopeful possibility, and likely the
intention of the queen’s guard, was that assassins would find attacking
any number of coaches not worth their while.
Similarly, as we broaden the range of admissible evidence we
begin to give weight to evidence that, considered in isolation, seems
of questionable merit—evidence with a scintilla of probative value,
for instance. Yet admitting this evidence makes evidence destruction
a less effective method of avoiding liability, and thus makes the
alternative method—taking the good primary activity action—
relatively more attractive.
3. Effect on Truth-Finding. Any policy choice that lowers
litigation payoffs in evidentiary contingencies that are more likely
following the bad primary activity action increases the incentive to
choose the good primary activity action. The decoy effect discussed
above does precisely this, and so its connection to the primary activity
approach is clear.
In contrast, the connection to truth-finding is decidedly murky.
Consider again the thought experiment wherein the range of
potentially unfavorable evidence was extended. For the truth-finding
approach, this adjustment sets in motion several contradictory forces.
First, the chance that any given bad primary activity actor will
avoid liability goes down. This is because fewer bad primary activity
actors find it worthwhile to destroy the now larger amount of
evidence that must be eliminated to avoid liability. Naturally, this
reduction in the rate of false exonerations improves truth-finding.
Second, the chance that any given good primary activity actor
will be held liable goes up. This is for two reasons. First, even good
actors sometimes face bad evidence. In a system with narrower
admissibility, these good actors might have found it worthwhile to
destroy their way out of liability. Now they may prefer to just pay the
damages. Secondly, the evidence added to expand the set of
admissible evidence may not be as precise a signal of the bad act.
Some good actors will be held liable based solely on the additional
noise. Overall, the greater rate of false liability is bad for truthfinding.
These first two effects pull in opposite directions. Nonetheless,
were they the only considerations, one could perhaps argue that the
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news was good for truth-finding on net. Given that a larger
proportion of bad actors than good are tampering in the first place, it
is plausible that a larger proportion of bad actors are converted away
from tampering. This suggests that the decrease in the rate of false
exoneration is greater than the increase in the rate of false liability.
370
However, these are not the only considerations. Two others are
worth highlighting. First, even if the rate of false exoneration falls by
more than the rate of false liability rises, the absolute number of
wrongly decided cases may still increase if there are fewer bad actors
371
than good. The fewer bad actors there are to falsely exonerate, the
lower the impact of a given decrease in the rate of false exonerations.
Similarly, the more good actors there are to falsely hold liable, the
greater the impact of a given increase in the rate of false liability.
Secondly, the policy change under consideration influences not
just what happens at trial, but also what happens in the primary
activity. In particular, as explained in Section 2, expanding the set of
admissible evidence increases the incentive to eschew the bad
primary activity act. As such, the number of bad primary activity
actors will decrease and the number of good will increase. This has
two central implications. In the first place, it adds to the ambiguity of
the population composition effects described in the previous
paragraph. These are not just uncertain, but also in flux. Second, it
adds its own independent source of ambiguity. The change in primary
activity behavior has a direct impact on the number of wrongly
decided cases. The direction of the effect depends on whether the
initial rate of false exoneration is greater or less than the initial rate of
false liability. If the rate of false exoneration is greater, the
population shift toward good actors will decrease the number of
370. The discussion in the following two paragraphs is guided by the following mathematics.
Let b be the proportion of bad actors in the population. Let fe be the rate of false exoneration
and fl, the rate of false liability. Then the number of wrongly decided “cases” (see infra note
371) is bfe + (1-b)fl. The total derivative of this expression is bdfe + (1-b)dfl + db(fe-fl). The
current paragraph considers the first two addends. The next paragraph considers the second
derivative of these addends with respect to b, and the third addend.
371. Adding to the murkiness here is the fact that truth-finding is not a self-defining policy
objective. In the first place, how false exoneration and false liability are combined into a single
evaluative dimension must be additionally specified. The implicit assumption in this analysis is
that the actual incidence of each kind of error is important in this combination. Second, one
must also additionally specify how to treat cases that do not reach trial, perhaps because they
are not even filed. “Cases” is used in the text in an expansive sense to mean “underlying events
or conditions,” including those that do not result in filed suits. A unfiled “case,” therefore, is
counted the same as a finding of no liability. Quite reasonably, then, when a bad actor is not
even sued, this is counted as an inaccuracy.
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wrongly decided cases. If the rate of false liability is greater, the
number of wrongly decided cases will increase. To see this, imagine
converting a single actor from bad to good. Will the chance that her
case is wrongly decided increase or decrease? Clearly, it will increase
if mistakes are more often made for good actors than for bad.
B. The Questionable Private-Costs Reason to Push the Tamperer
Upstream
Before connecting the foregoing analysis to the downstream
focus of anti-tampering enforcement, let us assess the most common
alternative explanation for this apparently myopic outlook.372
This explanation posits that effectively blocking (i.e., preventing
or destroying) a given evidentiary emission of the bad primary
activity action is in effect less expensive for the potential litigant the
closer the blocking is to the time of litigation. According to this view,
evidentiary emissions are not just the byproducts of primary activity
behavior, they also often facilitate that behavior. A document on
pricing policy is not just the byproduct of anti-competitive behavior,
but also facilitates the planning and implementation of business
strategies, some of which may be regarded as anti-competitive under
the law, and some as pro-competitive. The imperfections of the
human mind and its imperfect ability to communicate make
recordation a valuable business tool.373 A business that prevents the
creation of such a pricing document, or that re-collects and destroys
all copies of such documents immediately after the pricing meeting,
does not enjoy these benefits to as great an extent. On the other
hand, a business that keeps the pricing document on file up until
litigation, at which time it shreds the document or simply fails to
produce the document on request, has the benefit of that recordation
in devising, communicating, and implementing its business plan.374
372. This Article focuses on the contest between two consequentialist conceptions of trial.
But there may also be deontological arguments for the law’s apparently myopic focus on
upstream tampering. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 13, at 52–59 (arguing for the moral significance
of certain formal distinctions, an approach that might be applied to justifying document
“retention” policies that are sufficiently nonselective); see also Katz, supra note 119 (suggesting
that there is an important moral distinction between upstream and downstream obstruction).
373. This idea is explored in depth in Chris W. Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the
Upside of Cognitive Error, 57 STAN L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2004) (available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 497882).
374. See Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 717:
[T]he proposed statute would not completely frustrate those who would purposefully
violate the substantive laws. Refuge could often be found in the simple expedient of
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Because downstream blocking of a given evidentiary emission is
effectively less expensive than upstream blocking, the argument
continues, downstream blocking is a greater problem for legal
process. Directing enforcement resources at preventing downstream
tampering thus makes sense. To the extent that the literature on
evidence tampering has at all considered primary activity incentive
375
effects, this is the extent of the discussion.
Although the opportunity cost of making use of one’s evidentiary
emissions in the time before litigation is certainly a cost of early
destruction, it is not the only cost. And while opportunity costs may
be lower for downstream destruction, other kinds of tampering costs
are likely to be greater.
What is important to the tampering litigant, of course, is not
destroying a particular piece of paper, but rather preventing the
evidentiary emission represented by that piece of paper from getting
into court. It profits the spoliator little to have shredded every copy of
the damaging document except the one that gets admitted into
evidence. Practice journals warn that damaging documents have a
376
way of multiplying with cancerous rapidity. The fact that copies can
themselves be copied leads to the possibility of exponential growth.
And the farther down the family tree ones goes, the less information
and control there is over where the documents are. Practice guides
specifically warn that copies of documents may end up in employees’
personal files.377 It may be difficult for the center to find out about
not making records. At least this route would be inconvenient for them because it is
usually better business practice (aside from antitrust considerations) to make a record
of anything so important to a business that it is willing knowingly to violate the
antitrust laws to accomplish it.
375. See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 1.15, at 19 (citing Beckstrom, supra note 12, at
717). In fact, this precise point is only weakly made by Beckstrom. It appears in much stronger
form in Hart, supra note 348, at 1676: “[A]n attorney [may feel] that the only way to keep
certain evidence out of court is to destroy it altogether, or, in the case of documents, to
recommend that they never be created.”
376. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 9.4, at 365–66:
[D]uring the investigations of Ivan Boesky, Michael Milken, and Drexel Burnham
Lambert, two of the keys to the prosecution where (1) the fact that, unbeknownst to
Mr. Boesky, his secretary had made copies of ledgers (the originals of which Mr.
Boesky ordered destroyed) that reflected a secret agreement between Mr. Boesky
and Mr. Milken, and (2) the ability of Mr. Boesky’s former . . . bookkeeper . . . to
reconstruct the transactions from slips of paper that even those who produced them
to the government could not understand.
377. See, e.g., GORELICK ET AL., supra note 12, § 9.9, at 304 (“The ‘pack-rate’ [sic]
phenomenon, which refers to employees who create and maintain their own personal files of
documents which were to have been destroyed, drastically undermines the benefits of
[document retention/destruction programs].”).
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these copies and even more difficult to prevent their comprehensive
destruction when employees are capable of imagining that their
personal interests are not always aligned with those of their current
378
employer.
The use of computers and electronic documents exacerbates the
problem. No need to travel to Kinko’s, no need to stuff envelopes. A
few clicks and what was one pattern of electrons on one magnetized
disk is nearly instantly one hundred replicas in one hundred far-flung
locations, a process that is easily repeated from each of these one
hundred locations.
Therefore, while the opportunity cost of early destruction may be
greater than for later destruction, the actual costs of effective
379
destruction are likely lower. One surefire method of preventing a
document from showing up on a potential plaintiff’s computer screen
is not to create the document in the first place. One way to be sure
that the meeting agenda does not end up in the wrong hands is to
completely delete it right after it is printed, and then collect and
destroy all of the printed copies right after the meeting.
Another reason why downstream destruction is not necessarily
less costly has to do with how the destruction itself would be proved.
Throughout we have been discussing the evidentiary emissions of the
primary activity action. Similarly, sanctions are imposed on document
destruction on the basis of the evidentiary emissions of destructive
activity. Evidentiary emissions, like environmental emissions, often
dissipate and degrade over time. Witnesses’ recollections become
clouded. Documents do disappear. Trash is eventually burned.
Important aspects of legal process—such as statutes of limitations—
are designed with evidentiary half-lives in mind. Consequently,
downstream destruction is a riskier activity because the destruction is
still fresh at the time of litigation.

378. See, e.g., id. § 17.4, at 373 (“Clients . . . must be made aware that their employees . . .
will not be willing to go to prison for them.”).
379. See, e.g., id. § 9.4, at 300 (“As was illustrated perfectly in Oliver North’s destruction and
alteration of Iran-Contra memos, rarely will a document-destruction effort find all copies,
computer records, or memories of the documents. In those circumstances, the document
remains as evidence, accompanied by the strong negative inference arising from the attempted
destruction.”).
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C. The Private Benefits Reason to Focus Direct Regulation
Downstream
For the foregoing reasons it is difficult to argue that the
downstream destruction or fabrication of a particular evidentiary
emission is somehow more cost-effective for the litigant than the
same activity upstream. It is difficult, therefore, to explain the law’s
preference for upstream tampering in terms of private costs.
A better explanation may reside in the differential private
benefits of upstream versus downstream fabrication and destruction.
This Part of the Article began with the argument that the inscrutable
nature of the fact-finding process was a device for raising the cost of
using evidence tampering to affect litigation outcomes. It seems clear
that the effect of this characteristic of fact-finding on evidence
tampering would differ systematically across upstream and
downstream tampering activity. The upstream tamperer has much less
of an idea of what evidentiary emissions will be decisive in future
litigation. The nature of future litigation itself—let alone the evidence
that will be decisive for that judge or jury—is all guesswork for the
upstream tamperer.380 For the downstream tamperer, on the other
hand, many, though not all, of the uncertainties have already been
resolved. More generally, the further downstream the tamperer’s
vantage point, the more she knows about what evidence is likely to
make a difference to litigation outcomes.
Because the decoy logic described in Section A is systematically
less effective the farther one travels downstream along the litigation
flow, it stands to reason that some other line of defense is necessary
for downstream tampering. The direct regulation of evidentiary foul
play—including the criminal, procedural, and evidentiary sanctions
examined in Part II—fills that role.
This argument helps to explain several specific and puzzling
aspects of existing doctrine. First, it sheds some light on the law’s
381
tendency to ignore evidence tampering that predates the complaint.
Given all the possible lawsuits that might be filed, service of the
complaint with its short plain statement of the plaintiff’s claims often
represents a discrete jump in the information available to parties
about precisely what evidentiary emissions are likely to be decisive.
380. See Beckstrom, supra note 12, at 713 (“[I]t is easier to keep everything than spend time
and effort deciding what to keep and what to throw away.”); id. at 716 (“[O]ld documents may
serve to explain, as innocent, conduct that at first glance may be suspicious.”).
381. See generally supra Part II.
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Second, the argument helps to explain the law’s focus on whether
the tamperer was “on notice” of the litigation in those few
circumstances where the law has been willing to sanction pre-filing
th
th
tampering. After the n small airplane crashes, the n rifle fires on
th
safety release, or the n train hits the car at the crossing, the plaintiff’s
formal statement of her complaint is nearly superfluous: the
defendant already knows quite a bit about what evidence will likely
be important in the evidentiary battle to ensue.
Third, the argument provides additional insight into why the
system is most consistent and energetic about sanctioning the
382
tamperer when it violates an order to produce or preserve. No
doubt some of the reason for this resides in the party’s bold
disobedience of a specific judicial dictate. But a more complete
explanation might also note that a litigant’s efforts to secure a court
order for the preservation or production of particular evidence are a
very strong indication that this evidence is important to the litigant’s
case. To obtain a preservation order is to tip one’s hand. The order
and the effort expended to obtain it provide reliable information to
the other side—in the form of a costly signal with differential
benefits—about the importance of such evidence to the movant’s
case. Thus, the order should lead the opposing side rationally to
increase its assessment of the probability that this evidence will be
decisive in the court’s imposition of liability or awards. Accordingly, it
increases the opponent’s perception of the private benefits of
destroying or altering this evidence. Effective sanctions summarily
imposed become a necessary counterweight to this more powerful
destructive impulse.
CONCLUSION
Current writing on evidence tampering creates the impression
that the current system of litigation is in a state of fundamental
disrepair. But determining whether the system is doing what it is
supposed to be doing requires a clear conception of what the system
is supposed to be doing in the first place. And, as this Article has
argued, the general perception that the system is broken may have
more to do with defects in the conventional view of trial’s purpose.
The conventional approach to legal process focuses almost
exclusively on the task of resolving the particular factual dispute that
382.

See supra Part II.B.1.
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happens to have been placed before the court. The rules of evidence,
for instance, are conventionally viewed as a means of ensuring that
such disputes are correctly decided. This Article suggests, in contrast,
that the litigation pyramid’s massive primary activity base does and
should play a vital role in determining what happens at its tiny trial
vertex. Most important is not the system’s ability to sort out what has
already come to pass in each of the ninety million transactions and
383
occurrences that make their way into filed cases every year, but
rather the system’s ability to influence what will happen in every
transaction or occurrence engaged in by each of 275 million
individuals every day.
To be sure, the implications of truth-finding and primary activity
incentive setting often correspond. But, if an area of procedural law
remains troubling in conventional discourse, there is a fair chance
that this is a place where the generally accepted truth-finding
approach is a poor proxy for the law’s primary activity purpose. The
law of evidence tampering confirms this tendency. It is an area that
remains especially troubling to those who have studied it. And, as
established in this Article, it is also an area where the goal of finding
truth ex post is a poor proxy for the goal of shaping truth ex ante.
Under the truth-finding approach, anti-tampering enforcement
has the dual purpose of deterring tampering and correcting litigation
outcomes that are skewed by tampering that was undeterred. From a
primary activity incentive perspective, anti-tampering enforcement is
in the first instance a tax on those who find tampering worthwhile
despite its legal risks. Because taking the socially disfavored primary
activity action is more likely to place one in this position, antitampering enforcement is also a tax on the socially disfavored action.
From these differences it follows that the primary activity
approach is more in line with the law’s apparently lax attitude toward
evidence tampering. Where the benefits of enhanced anti-tampering
enforcement are self-enhancing under the truth-finding approach,
they are self-dampening under the primary activity approach.
Consequently, where reconciling the law’s leniency toward evidence
383.

See EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2001: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 10 (Brian J. Ostrom et al. eds., 2002) (describing the
number of state transactions); LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, ACTIVITIES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS: ANNUAL
REPORT
OF
THE
DIRECTOR
(2001),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/library/dirrpt01/2001.pdf (describing the number of federal
transactions).
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tampering with truth-finding requires substantial conceptual
contortion, reconciling it with primary activity incentive setting
merely requires hypothesizing that the self-dampening effect
characterizing that approach is sufficiently prominent. Similarly, the
law’s preference for high sanctions rather than likely detection as a
means of discouraging tampering makes less sense if a major purpose
of enforcement is to rectify litigation outcomes that are skewed by
tampering, as implied by a truth-finding approach. Nor is it easy to
justify the law’s reluctance to correct litigation outcomes when
tampering is discovered after judgment is entered. Such difficulties
are largely avoided, however, when anti-tampering enforcement is
viewed as but one integrated component in the overall mechanism by
which law affects everyday behavior.
The view that trial is primarily a truth-finding exercise also leads
one away from the most natural justification for the law’s apparently
myopic insistence on punishing only downstream tampering. The
inscrutable, ad hoc nature of fact-finding, which seems like a bad idea
from a truth-finding perspective, makes sense from a primary activity
perspective. The difficulty of targeting one’s tampering activity raises
the cost of avoiding litigation exposure for “bad” primary activity
behavior. That unpredictability is greatest in the upper reaches of the
litigation flow. And this helps to explain why the devices that directly
sanction evidence tampering are so focused on downstream activity.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix supplements the analysis in Part III. Section A
contains an intuitive discussion of several issues not covered in the
main text. Section B subjects the analysis in Part III to mathematical
modeling in order to test its internal consistency and make explicit its
underlying assumptions.
A. Supplemental Discussion
1. The Trajectory of Social Costs. As noted in the Introduction,
the social costs of anti-tampering enforcement are roughly the same
across truth-finding and primary activity approaches.384 Nonetheless,
the trajectory of social costs is a potentially important ingredient in
distinguishing the implications of these rival approaches.
Part III.B discussed how the differing trajectories of social
benefits across truth-finding and primary activity approaches had
different implications for the optimal enforcement level. That
discussion implicitly assumed that incremental social costs were
relatively constant. How would the analysis in Part III.B change, if we
included explicit consideration of the trajectory of social costs?
a. Condition on Cost and Benefit Trajectories. We start with the
principle that social costs must be accelerating relative to social
benefits as we increase the level of enforcement toward the socially
optimum level. (This principle is sometimes referred to as the
“second-order necessary condition” for an optimum.) The reasoning
here has three steps. First, when we are precisely at a socially optimal
level of anti-tampering enforcement—the level that balances costs
and benefits to produce the largest net social benefit—the social
benefits from further increasing anti-tampering enforcement must be
no more than the social costs. Otherwise, capturing these additional
social benefits would, impossibly, improve upon what was supposed
to be the best that we could do.
Second, and by similar reasoning, starting from a level of
enforcement just below the socially optimal level, the social benefits
from increasing anti-tampering enforcement up to the socially

384. They are only “roughly” the same because the differing implications for enforcement
methods, as discussed in Part III.C, supra, may produce different social cost trajectories.
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optimal level must be greater than the additional costs. Otherwise,
the lower level would, again, be better than the best.
Combining these first two steps, we see that marginal social
benefits must be less than marginal social costs at enforcement levels
just below the optimum, but greater at the optimum. In other words,
the social benefits from anti-tampering enforcement must be
increasing at a faster rate than the social costs at enforcement levels
just below the optimum, but at a slower rate than social costs at the
optimum.
This in turn has implications, in the third and final step, for the
relative acceleration of social costs. If someone says that the red car
was moving at a slower speed than the blue car at 11:50 A.M. and a
faster speed at noon, it must be that the red car was accelerating
relative to the blue car at some point between these two times.
Similarly if the social benefits of anti-tampering enforcement are
increasing at a faster rate than the social costs below the social
optimum (i.e., at 11:50 A.M.) and a slower rate than social costs at the
optimum (i.e., at noon), then social costs must be accelerating relative
to social benefits as we approach the social optimum from below.
b. Implications for Truth-Finding. If we take truth-finding to be
the object of trial, it is difficult to justify the middling level of antitampering enforcement that we seem to see in the current system. We
have seen that the social costs of anti-tampering enforcement must be
accelerating relative to the social benefits as we approach the social
optimum from below. It is unlikely that this will happen at any
middling range of anti-tampering enforcement. At a middling level of
enforcement we can expect a steady (or even increasing) density of
marginal tamperers. When this is the case, the social benefits of antitampering enforcement grow roughly exponentially,385 which is to say
that marginal social benefits increase in proportion to the level of
anti-tampering enforcement—which is, in turn, to say that the social
benefits accelerate.
In contrast, it is implausible that social costs of anti-tampering
enforcement accelerate in their middling range, let alone that their
acceleration exceeds that of the truth benefits of enforcement. In the
first place, at middling levels of enforcement, economies of scale in
anti-tampering enforcement are unlikely to have so exhausted
themselves as to reverse into diseconomies of scale that are, in turn,
385.

See supra note 350.
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so constricting as to cause the social costs of anti-tampering
enforcement to increase at an increasing rate.
Secondly, the decrease in the number of inframarginal tamperers
386
as we increase enforcement acts as a decelerating force for social
costs. The cost of anti-tampering enforcement is tied in part to the
number of inframarginal tamperers. The greater the number of
inframarginal tamperers, the more often courts must hold evidence
tampering hearings, the more frequently litigants must defend
themselves at such hearings, the greater the number of litigants who
spend time and effort practicing and preparing their tampering
activities to avoid getting caught. Therefore, if we raise the private
cost of tampering by beefing up anti-tampering enforcement, this
increases social costs in part because the tampering that is still being
perpetrated is more socially expensive. But, the greater the level of
anti-tampering enforcement, the fewer the number of inframarginal
tamperers, and so, for this effect, the lower the incremental cost of
increasing anti-tampering enforcement.
Therefore, the improbability of significantly decreasing returns
to scale at low and middling levels of enforcement combined with the
marginal cost-reducing effects of a shrinking infra-margin make it
unlikely that social costs accelerate faster than truth-oriented social
benefits. This in turn makes it unlikely that a truth-oriented system
would ever purposefully settle on even a middling level of antitampering enforcement. Thus, even allowing for a more general
configuration of social costs, there is still great difficulty in reconciling
the current shape of our anti-tampering enforcement efforts with the
rhetoric that trial is predominantly a truth-finding exercise.
c. Implications for Primary Activity Incentive Setting. On the
other hand, there is no inconsistency in explaining a middling level of
anti-tampering enforcement taking primary activity incentive setting
as the object of trial. We have seen that the social costs of antitampering enforcement must be accelerating relative to the social
benefits as we approach the social optimum from below. It was
further demonstrated that the social benefits of anti-tampering
enforcement measured in terms of the effect on the primary activity
incentives of the tamperer, rather than in terms of truth-finding, have
a self-dampening character. In other words, these important social
benefits of anti-tampering enforcement increase at a decreasing
386.

See supra Part III.B.1.
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rate—which is to say that they decelerate as we approach the social
optimum. Therefore, the social optimum may lie anywhere that the
economies of scale in anti-tampering enforcement are not so great. In
particular, at any middling level of enforcement, the social costs of
anti-tampering enforcement are not likely to be decelerating faster
than the social benefits. Importantly, the social optimum may well be
at a point where economies of scale in anti-tampering enforcement
are not exhausted, as long as the increase in social costs slows less
rapidly than the increase in social benefits.
2. The Role of Inframarginal NonTamperers. This Section
considers the effect of increased anti-tampering enforcement on the
inframarginal nontamperer, the third type in the taxonomy from Part
III.A.2, and a type that was explicitly left out of the analysis of
incremental increases in enforcement in Parts III.A.3 and III.A.4. The
conclusion is this: Those who were already choosing not to destroy
evidence prior to the increase in enforcement are only secondarily
affected by increasing the level of anti-tampering enforcement from
its current level. Further, what effect there is on these actors remains
ambiguous and is unlikely to be decisive in shaping the overall effect.
In a world with no “false positives” in anti-tampering
enforcement—i.e., a world in which those who do not destroy
evidence are not falsely positively identified as spoliators—increasing
enforcement levels has exactly no effect on the inframarginal
nontamperer. First, the inframarginal nontamperer has already
decided that tampering does not pay and so does not change its
behavior in response to increased enforcement. Second, the
inframarginal nontamperer is never mistakenly punished. Thus,
whatever is done to beef up anti-tampering enforcement is, from its
perspective, superfluous.
In a world with false positives in anti-tampering enforcement, the
effect on the inframarginal nontamperer of increased enforcement
effort is precisely as ambiguous as the effect of increased enforcement
on the incidence of false positives. Some methods of enhancing antitampering enforcement may have as a byproduct an increase in the
number or severity of erroneously imposed spoliation sanctions. This
in turn will lower litigation payoffs for the nonspoliator, who now
faces a heightened risk of becoming one of the system’s false
positives. On the other hand, additional resources devoted to antitampering enforcement may actually decrease the number of false
indictments and convictions as investigations and satellite trials are
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more thoroughly conducted. This would raise the litigation payoffs
for the inframarginal nontamperer.
It is thus impossible to deduce how inframarginal evidence
destroyers will be affected by increased enforcement. However, it is
perhaps possible to infer that the crosscurrent of countervailing
effects on these still honest actors makes it likely that, whatever
direction the effect points in, the net effect is unlikely to defeat the
summary proposition of the foregoing analysis: the main force driving
the primary activity benefits of anti-tampering enforcement is the
effective taxation of those on the opposite side of the evidence
tampering margin, the inframarginal tamperers.
3. Self-Dampening Primary Activity Benefits and the Possibility
that “Good” Primary Activity Actors will be Inframarginal Tamperers.
The following discussion pertains to Part III.B.1. The claim there was
that decreasing the payoffs for inframarginal tamperers has less and
less impact on primary activity incentives because the chance of
ending up as an inframarginal tamperer declines.
However, when there is a nontrivial chance that safe product
designers may also find tampering worthwhile, the primary activity
benefits of additional anti-tampering enforcement need not be
monotonically self-dampening. If anti-tampering enforcement is
increased by a small amount, the probability of ending up as an
inframarginal tamperer given safe product design may decrease faster
than the same probability given unsafe design. For example, the
probability of ending up as an inframarginal tamperer given safe
design may decline by two percentage points from 5% to 3%,
whereas the probability of ending up as an inframarginal tamperer
given unsafe design may decline by only one percentage point from
20% to 19%. Thus, the probability difference actually increases from
fifteen percentage points to sixteen. That, in turn, means that
decreasing the payoffs for inframarginal tamperers has a greater
impact than before.
Nevertheless, the probability difference cannot be larger than the
larger of the two probabilities (i.e., the probability for unsafe design).
Therefore, the primary activity benefits of additional enforcement
will always exhibit self-dampening in the large, if not also in the small.
If, in the above example, we continued to increase anti-tampering
enforcement until the probability of ending up as an inframarginal
tamperer given unsafe design was 14%, the probability difference
could be no greater than 14%, implying a decrease from 15%.
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In addition, for many common distributional forms, primary
activity benefits will indeed be uniformly self-dampening over the
relevant range. Imagine, for example, that the benefits of tampering
given safe product design are normally distributed with mean ms and
variance one, while the benefits of tampering given unsafe product
design are normally distributed with mean mu > ms and variance one.
In this case, the probability density of tampering benefits given safe
design exceeds that for unsafe design at all benefits levels greater
than the average of the two means. Therefore, the relevant
probability difference, as identified above, is decreasing for all levels
of private tampering costs greater than this average mean. That
implies that as we increase the level of enforcement, primary activity
benefits become once and for all self-dampening even while more
than half of those who design unsafe products still find tampering
worthwhile.
4. Focus on Marginal Changes. The thought experiment in Part III
considers a marginal increase in the expected sanction for document
destruction, one small enough to deter only the “marginal tamperer,”
as defined below. The effect of a larger increase will simply be the
aggregation of the effects of many small increases.
5. Tamperer’s Opponent’s Primary Activity Incentives. In judging
the primary activity incentive benefits of increased enforcement Part
III focused on the impact on the tamperer’s own primary activity
incentives. Another thought experiment might be conducted to
387
examine the effect on the tamperer’s opponent’s incentives.
Differences between the truth-finding approach and the primary
activity incentive approach exist in either case. But they are more
pronounced in the case of the tamperer’s own incentives, and that is
why it is highlighted in the text.
6. Alternatively Manipulating the Stakes Attached to Evidence
Production. For the task of affecting the incidence and impact of
evidence tampering, the law actually has two points of impact,
corresponding to the costs and benefits that individuals weigh in
deciding whether to engage in evidentiary foul play. Part III of the
Article considers the law’s attempts to alter the individual’s perceived
387. Some of issues in this case are considered in Sanchirico, Games, Information, and
Evidence Production, supra note 14 and Sanchirico & Triantis, Evidentiary Arbitrage, supra
note 14.
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private cost of engaging in evidentiary foul play. Such policy reforms
include beefing up the prosecution of perjury and obstruction of
justice, or more liberally meting out adverse inference instructions
and discovery sanctions against the spoliator. In some contexts the
law can also affect the litigants’ perceived private benefits from
evidence tampering, by fine-tuning how verdict and remedy hang on
particular forms of evidence. This is perhaps most relevant in a
388
contractual context.
B. Mathematical Analysis
Consider the problem of choosing the level of anti-tampering
389
enforcement to maximize social welfare. The argument in Part III
may be cast in terms of the second-order necessary conditions for an
interior maximum.390 The first-order necessary condition for an
interior maximum is that marginal net social benefits are zero. As is
well-known, this condition is not sufficient. For example, it would also
be satisfied at an interior level of enforcement that minimizes social
welfare. The second-order necessary condition for an interior
maximum is that marginal net social benefits are decreasing in the
level of anti-tampering enforcement. To say that the benefits of antitampering enforcement are “self-enhancing” under a truth-seeking
approach is to say that marginal social benefits are everywhere
increasing, not decreasing. Thus the second-order necessary condition
for an interior maximum will be satisfied at no interior level of
enforcement under the truth-seeking approach. In contrast, under a
primary activity incentives approach, the second-order necessary
condition for a maximum will be satisfied at all interior points. The
precise optimal level of enforcement under the primary activity
approach will depend on where marginal net social benefits vanish.
Unlike for truth-seeking, nothing prevents that optimal level from
residing in the low to middling range.
Second-order conditions fail under the truth-seeking approach
because the map from anti-tampering enforcement to trial accuracy

388. See generally Sanchirico & Triantis, Evidentiary Arbitrage, supra note 14 (analyzing
how fabrication of evidence is affected by altering the map from evidence to liability).
389. For purposes of the ensuing discussion, assume that social welfare is twice continuously
differentiable in enforcement levels.
390. For a discussion of these conditions see, for example, ALPHA C. CHIANG,
FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 246–47 (Patricia A. Mitchell &
Gail Gavert eds., 3d ed., McGraw-Hill Inc. 1984) (1967).
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391
exhibits a core nonconvexity. Nonconvexity in this context is the
technical counterpart to the self-enhancing effect described in the
main text.392 Identifying this core nonconvexity is, in turn, the core of
this Article’s analysis of enforcement levels (Part III). This
nonconvexity may be masked by ancillary convexities in other
functional components of social welfare. Yet though such masking is
theoretically possible, it is empirically unlikely for reasons discussed
at length below.

1. Basic Model. The core nonconvexity in the optimal choice of
anti-tampering enforcement under a truth-seeking approach is
apparent in the following simple model (which is enriched in
subsequent sections). The model tracks the thought experiment laid
out in Part III.A.1. In order to incorporate the complications of antitampering enforcement—complications that are absent in
conventional models of legal process—the model simplifies other
aspects of the conventional model—such as filing and settlement
decisions.
a. Timeline. In period 1, a risk-neutral manufacturer chooses
whether to design its product safely or unsafely. If, and only if, the
393
product is unsafely designed, the plaintiff files suit in period 2. In
period 3 “nature” determines for the manufacturer its benefit from
391. Cf. David A. Starrett, Fundamental Nonconvexities in the Theory of Externalities, 4 J.
ECON. THEORY 180, 189–93 (1972) (identifying a core nonconvexity in the production
possibilities set in the presence of externalities and noting the troubling implications of this
nonconvexity for general equilibrium theory).
392. The adjective “nonconvexity” as used in this context refers to the set of points that lie
below the function. This set is said to be “convex” if the line segment between any two points in
the set is entirely contained in the set. Unfortunately, this property is equivalent to another
property of the function that is frequently termed “concavity.” The function is called “concave”
if the line segment between any two points on its graph lies entirely below the graph. See
generally RALPH TYRRELL ROCKAFELLAR, CONVEX ANALYSIS (Marston Morse & A.W.
Tucker eds., 1970) (reviewing the properties of convex sets and concave functions).
Whichever term is used, the important implication for our purposes is that, over a range
in which an increasing function is nonconvex, the greater the function’s level, the greater its
current rate of increase. To relate this property to the formal definition, note that if one draws a
line segment between two points on the graph of the function over this range, the line will be
above the graph and so also outside the set of points that lie below that graph. Relative to a
linear increase between the two points, therefore, the function starts slower, but accelerates to
such extent that it reaches the same endpoint.
393. One implication of the assumption that the injurer is only sued when actually liable (a
typical assumption in models of litigation) is that the primary activity benefits of additional
enforcement are self-dampening everywhere, rather than just self-dampening in general trend.
See the discussion supra note 349.
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pursuing a policy of destroying evidence of product design. This
benefit comes via a reduction in the probability of being held liable at
trial. We denote this benefit b and assume that it has continuously
differentiable density f. The probability of being held liable is then pb, where 0 < p < 1 is a fixed baseline probability of liability. In this
subsection, we assume that b is uniformly distributed between 0 and
p, and we denote the constant density:

f = 1p .
If the manufacturer chooses to destroy evidence, it is sanctioned for
that destruction with probability q. If sanctioned, it must pay a fine of
s. In period 4, the manufacturer is held liable with probability p-b,
and, if held liable, pays a fine of l.
b. Evidence Destruction Decision. The manufacturer chooses to
destroy evidence if its expected litigation loss after destroying
evidence (inclusive of the expected sanction from destruction) is less
than its expected litigation loss if it refrains from destroying evidence:

1 − q ) ( p − b ) l + q ( pl + s ) ≤
(14
42443 1424
3
if not caught destroying
if caught...
14444
4244444
3
expected litigation loss if destroys

pl .
{

...if
doesn't
destroy

Equivalently, the manufacturer destroys evidence if the benefit
exceeds the threshold b̂ :

b ≥ (1−qsq )l ≡ bˆ .

(1)

Personifying different states of the world, we refer to b̂ as “the
marginal tamperer.” The smallest possible marginal tamperer is b̂ = 0,
in which case, the manufacturer always chooses (i.e., “all
manufacturers choose”) to destroy evidence. The largest relevant
marginal tamperer is b̂ = p, in which case—given that b is supported
below p—the manufacturer never finds destruction worthwhile.
2. The Truth-Seeking Approach. An accurate outcome at trial
means that the manufacturer is held liable for unsafe design. If the
manufacturer does not destroy evidence, the chance of liability is p. If
the manufacturer does destroy evidence and is not caught for doing
so, the chance of liability is only p-b. And if the manufacturer
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destroys evidence and is caught, the probability of liability returns to
p. Therefore, the probability of liability conditional on trial, is:394





p


A ( q, s ) = ∫ pf db + ∫  (1 − q ) p − b% + qp
{  f db .
14
4
244
3
ˆ
0
b
caught 
123
not caught
manufacturers
destroying


that don't destroy
evidence

 3
14444
4244444
evidence
bˆ

(

)

(2)

manufacturers
that do destroy
evidence

The policy instruments of interest here are q and s, the
probability of detection for document destruction and the ex post
sanction for the same. This is reflected in the notation on the lefthand side of (2).
395
There are social costs to creating both q and s. For the moment,
assume that the marginal cost of s for any given level of q is
constant—i.e., social costs take the form:
C(s,q) = sα(q) + c(q) + k ,

(3)

where k is a constant and α and c are arbitrary functions.
In order to provide an expression for social welfare, we need an
expression for the value of accuracy in this kind of case. Assume that
this value is some arbitrary constant multiple of accuracy itself, and
recalibrate the cost function C so that this constant multiple may be
taken as 1. Social welfare is then:
W(q,s) = A(q,s) – C(q,s) .

(4)

In maximizing social welfare (4), q must be a probability,
0≤q≤1,

(5)

394. Throughout this Appendix, a tilde over a variable indicates that it is the variable over
which integration is performed.
395. In particular, the social costs of s involve the cost of effort exerted by the parties in
defending against imposition of s in ancillary process. Thus, it is not true, as is sometimes
assumed, that the marginal cost of s is zero. See generally, e.g., Choi & Sanchirico, supra note
353 (noting impact of, in effect, s on litigation effort and importance of this impact in assessing
the wisdom of decoupling what plaintiffs recover from defendants pay in damages).
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and s and q must place b̂ between 0 and its upper bound, p, implying:

0≤s≤

pl (1− q )
q

.

(6)

Thus, the goal is to maximize (4) subject to (5) and (6). An interior
maximum for this problem satisfies both (5) and (6) with strict
inequality. Furthermore, an interior maximum satisfies the following
first-order necessary conditions:

∂W
∂W
= 0;
=0
∂q
∂s

(7)

and the following second-order necessary conditions:

∂ 2W
∂ 2W
≤
0;
≤0
∂q 2
∂s 2

(8)

We will now show that at any pair (q*,s*) (not necessarily
interior) that maximizes (4) subject to (5) and (6), the marginal
tamperer is either b̂ = 0 or b̂ = p. In other words, either the
manufacturer always chooses to tamper, there being no deterrence at
all of evidence destruction, or the manufacturer never chooses to
tamper, there being effectively complete deterrence of evidence
destruction.
The method of proof is to focus on s and to show that the secondorder necessary condition with respect to s can never be satisfied at
any level of s that is strictly between 0 and what it would take to make
b̂ = p. That is,
pl (1− q )

s=

q

.

These two extremes in s correspond to the two extremes in b̂ , as just
discussed.
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The first derivative of W(q,s) with respect to s is:

∂W
= {
p (1−qq )l f
∂s prob
123

"number"
of
liab. of marginal
for tamperers
marg.
nontamp.

(

(

)

)

− (1 − q ) p − bˆ + qp
144424443

q

f
123
(1− q )l

prob. of liab. for marg. tamperer "number" of marg.
tamperers

−α (q)
=  (1 − q ) f


(9)

( ( ) )  s − α ( q )
2

q
1− q l

The interpretation of the first two addends of the first statement in
(9) tracks the discussion in the main text. The expression
q

(1− q )l

f

can be thought of as the number of marginal tamperers that convert
from tampering to not tampering when we raise the tampering
sanction s by one unit. In particular,
q

(1− q )l

is the increase in the marginal tamperer b̂ and f is the number of
manufacturers at that level. Therefore, (9) shows that the incremental
benefit of raising s is the conversion of
q

(1− q )l

f

manufacturers from a lower probability of product liability, namely
(1–q)(p– b̂ )+qp, to a higher probability of product liability, namely p.
Given this interpretation, the self-enhancing quality of anti-tampering
enforcement under a truth-seeking approach can also be seen in (9).
Converting marginal tamperers has a greater impact on accuracy, the
greater the impact of the marginal tampering. Per marginal tamperer,
the chance of rightful liability increases from (1–q)(p– b̂ ) + qp to p, an
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increase of (1–q) b̂ . The impact of the marginal tamperer’s tampering
should he not get caught, b̂ , is larger, the larger is the expected
sanction s from tampering. Therefore, the larger is s, the greater is the
accuracy benefit of further increasing s.
This self-enhancing effect is precisely reflected in the sign of the
second-order derivative of W with respect to s, which is most easily
taken from the last expression in (9):

∂ 2W
= (1 − q ) f
∂s 2

(( ) )
q
1− q l

2

> 0.

(10)

Expression (10) is strictly positive for all levels of q strictly between 0
and 1 and all levels of s. This means that at any interior level of b̂
(wherein q must be strictly between 0 and 1), the marginal net social
benefit of s is strictly increasing. This, in turn, means that the secondorder condition with respect to s (as laid out in (8)) cannot be
satisfied at an interior level of b̂ .
Expression (10) represents the core nonconvexity of truthoriented W in the anti-tampering enforcement level. In a more
complicated model, this core nonconvexity can be masked by other
ancillary effects. We consider the most important of these in turn.
a. Density Effects. It is true that curvature in the density of
marginal tamperers can mask the core nonconvexity exhibited in (10).
But this statement is not terribly profound. To the extent that the
slope of the density is up for grabs, so are the first and second
derivatives of social welfare. In fact, for any desired magnitudes for
these derivatives at any point, one can always find a distribution f to
create these magnitudes. This fundamental ambiguity is endemic to
theoretical models that posit abstract distributions—and thus all
models that admit parametric uncertainty. To say anything at all one
must make some commitments regarding distributional shape.
In the analysis above, we committed to a uniform distribution for
b. This was, of course, much more than was necessary to enable the
core nonconvexity there identified to have its effect. Indeed, the
distributional assumptions required to mask that core nonconvexity
are empirically implausible at a low to middling level of enforcement,
such as is apparently seen in practice.
Intuitively, in order for distributional effects to overwhelm the
effect of the core nonconvexity and enable a low to middling level of
optimal anti-tampering enforcement, it would have to be the case that
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the density of b was falling rapidly at such a level. In other words, the
fact that we catch bigger and bigger fish as we drag the net farther
and farther out to sea (the core nonconvexity) would have to be offset
by a declining density of fish even when we are just starting out and
are still relatively close to shore. A declining density may be plausible
at high levels of b. But a declining density is more difficult to
reconcile with the claim that enforcement levels are low to middling
and that tampering is rampant.
In formal terms, with a more general density f of b we have:
bˆ

) ()
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
) pf ( b ) − ( ) ( (1 − q ) ( p − b ) + qp ) f ( b ) − α ( q )
ˆ ˆ
) (1 − q ) bf ( b ) − α ( q )
p

()

(

(

)

A( q, s ) = ∫ pf b% db + ∫ (1− q ) p − b% + qp f b% db,
∂W
=
∂s
=

bˆ

0

q
(1− q l
q

(1− q

(11)

q
1− q l

l

and

∂W 2
=
∂2s

ˆ
( ( ) ) (1 − q ) bfˆ ′ (bˆ ) + (144
( ) ) (1 − q ) f ( b )
42444
3
q
1− q l

2

q
1− q l

2

(12)

core nonconvexity

(compare the last addend in (12) with (10)). We are interested in
conditions under which (12) is still positive. Dividing through by

( ( ) ) (1 − q ) f (bˆ )
q
1− q l

2

yields

∂W 2 f ′( bˆ)bˆ
∝ f bˆ + 1
()
∂2s

(13)

The left-hand addend in (13) is the percentage change in the density
per percentage change in the marginal tamperer b̂ ; thus, it is the
elasticity of the density with respect to b̂ . If the density is falling, this
elasticity is negative. Therefore, social welfare will be concave—that
is, (12) and (13) will be nonpositive—only where the elasticity of the
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density is not only negative, but less than negative one. Consider how
this plays out for two common families of distributions
1.
Special Case: Truncated Normal Distribution. Suppose, for
example, that b’s density is a symmetric, truncated normal
distribution with truncation bounds 0 and p, mean (and mean
parameter) ½ p, and variance parameter σ2.396 Some algebra shows
that the elasticity of this density is:

f ′ (b )
f (b )

b=−

( b − 12 p ) b
σ2

.

(14)

Applying the quadratic formula and ignoring the irrelevant root, this
elasticity is less than negative one if, and only if,

b > 14 p + 12

1
4

p 2 + 4σ 2 .

(15)

The right hand side of (15) is always bigger than ½ p, the mean of the
distribution of b. Therefore, at any interior solution—wherein the
elasticity of the density must be less than negative one, and so (15)
must hold—the manufacturer will be deterred from evidence
destruction at least half of the time. This in itself might be regarded as
inconsistent with low to middling enforcement. But, in fact, quite a bit
more can be said. The larger the variance parameter σ2, the greater
the point at which social welfare becomes concave, thus satisfying the
second-order condition. Indeed, so long as

σ≥

1
2

p,

social welfare is concave over its entire range, even though the density
397
is falling on the upper tail. And this means that there is no interior
solution, as in the uniform distribution case considered above.

396.

The density function for this truncated normal would be
1
2π

exp  − 21


( ) 
b − 12 p

σ2

2

ω,

where ω is the integral from 0 to p of the corresponding normal density without truncation.
397.

σ≥

1
2

p implies

1
4

p + 12

1
4

p 2 + 4σ 2 > p and p is the upper bound on b.
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2. Special Case: Truncated Exponential Distribution. Consider a
truncated exponential density with truncation bounds 0 and p and
with parameter λ: This density will be proportional to the exponential
- b
1
density without truncation: λe λ . (Note that /λ will not be the mean of
the truncated distribution.) This density is decreasing along its entire
range. Yet, its elasticity is:
f ′( b ) b
f (b )

= −λ b.

Thus, social welfare will not be concave until b > 1/λ. So long as
1
/λ > p, social welfare will be nowhere concave and an interior solution
will be impossible.
b. Social Cost Effects. The effect of the core nonconvexity
identified above can be overwhelmed if the marginal cost of s is
sufficiently increasing. Yet, this is even more implausible at low to
middling levels of enforcement than a rapidly decaying density. The
phenomenon of increasing marginal costs corresponds to the
exhaustion of economies of scale in enforcement. In contrast, low
enforcement levels most plausibly correspond to a situation in which
not all economies of scale had been tapped, and in which marginal
social cost is roughly constant, if not actually decreasing.
In formal terms, with a general cost function (and a general
density) we have
bˆ

()

p

(

(

)

) ()

(

(

)

) ()

W ( q, s ) = ∫ pf b% db + ∫ (1 − q ) p − b% + qp f b% db − C ( q, s ),
0

∂W
=
∂s
=

()

bˆ

q

pf bˆ − (1−qq )l (1 − q ) p − bˆ + qp f bˆ − Cs ( q, s )

q

(1 − q ) bfˆ ( bˆ ) − Cs ( q, s ),

(1− q )l
(1− q )l

(16)

and

∂W 2
=
∂2s

ˆ
( ( ) ) (1 − q ) bfˆ ′ (bˆ ) + (144
( ) ) (1 − q ) f ( b ) − C
42444
3
q
1− q l

2

q
1− q l

2

core nonconvexity

ss

( q, s ) .

(17)
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Dividing (17) through by

( ( ) ) (1 − q ) f (bˆ )
q
1− q l

2

and using the first-order condition (i.e., setting (16) to zero), we
obtain the following restatement of the second-order condition:
f ′( bˆ )bˆ
∂W 2
C q,s s
∝
+ 1 − Csss(( q , s)) .
2
f ( bˆ )
∂ s

(18)

Relative to (13), the new term here, on the far right, is the elasticity of
marginal social costs in s. (Cf. the elasticity of total social costs.) We
would expect this to be nonpositive at low levels of q and s.
Therefore, this effect would most likely work in tandem with the core
nonconvexity (represented by the “1” in (18)) to ensure that social
welfare is not concave at low levels of s and therefore that the social
optimum cannot there obtain. (Were it working in tandem with the
core nonconvexity, the possibility that the density effects described
above would be negative enough to produce convexity would be even
less likely.)
Notice that in the uniform distribution, constant-marginal-cost
model considered initially, the right side of (18) reduces to 1.
3. The Primary Activity Approach. In contrast, the social
benefits of additional anti-tampering enforcement have a natural
398
convexity under the primary activity approach. Working with the
general density model considered above in Section B.2.a, deterrence
is:
bˆ

()

p

(

) ()

∆ = ∫ plf b% db + ∫  (1 − q )( p − b ) l + q pl + s  f b% db . (19)
↑ 
↑

0
bˆ
Mathematically, the important difference between (19) and the
expression for accuracy (11) is not the addition of the scalar
multiplier l, but rather the addition of qs to the right-hand integrand.
The presence of this term signifies that, from an ex ante perspective,
the manufacturer feels the expected sanction from document
destruction, in those cases where destruction is worthwhile, as part of

398. As noted, this corresponds to the statement that the social welfare function under this
approach is naturally concave. See supra note 392.
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the ex ante legal cost of designing an unsafe product. The first
derivative of (19) with respect to s is:

∂∆
=
∂s

q

(1− q )l

()

plf bˆ

(

(

)

(

− (1−qq )l (1 − q ) p − b̂ l + q pl + s
p

(20)

()

+ ∫ qf b% db
bˆ

p

) ) f ( bˆ )

()

= ∫ qf b% db.
bˆ

Tracking the main text in Part III.A.4.b, what remains in (20) is the
inframarginal effect of increasing litigation losses for manufacturers
who still find it worthwhile to destroy evidence. In contrast to the
effect on truth-finding, the conversion of marginal tamperers to
marginal nontamperers has no effect on deterrence. This is because
the marginal tamperer is exactly indifferent between tampering and
not tampering. And so its change in behavior—from tampering to not
tampering—does not change its all-in litigation losses from unsafe
design, which are what matter for inducing safe design.
It is instructive to examine precisely how the first statement in
(20) reduces to the second. The backslashes in the first statement in
(20) represent the fact that the marginal tamperer is indifferent
between tampering and not tampering taking into account the
expected sanction from doing so. The cross slashes represent the fact
that, given the marginal tamperer’s zero net payoff from destruction,
its all-in litigation losses are unaffected by changing its behavior in
response to the increase in evidence destruction sanctions.
The second derivative of deterrence is:

()

∂2∆
= − (1−qq )l qf bˆ < 0 .
∂s

(21)

This second derivative is always negative, signifying that the positive
incremental effect of increasing s on deterrence is decreasing in the
level of s. As noted in the text, this is because increasing s increases
deterrence by virtue of its effect on the infra-margin, and this inframargin decreases in ex ante importance as s increases.
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The convexity of social welfare when the social objective is
primary activity incentives also may be masked by other effects. Such
effects include the two considered above for truth-finding—density
effects and cost effects—as well as complications that may follow
from the possibility that safe product designers will still find
tampering worthwhile, as discussed in Section A.3. In addition, this
effect can be confounded by countervailing curvature in the way the
level of deterrence ∆ enters overall social welfare. But there is no
more reason to think that any of these effects works against the
convexity we have identified than to think that it works with it. And
the foregoing analysis therefore justifies at least a theoretical
presumption—albeit empirically rebuttable—that the primary activity
approach is consistent with satisfaction of the second-order conditions
at middling levels of enforcement.

